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Abstract 
Marine engineering operations rely substantially on high degrees of automation and 
supervisory control. This brings new opportunities as well as the threat of erroneous 
human actions, which account for 80-90% of marine incidents and accidents. In this 
respect, shipping environments are extremely vulnerable. As a result, decision makers 
and stakeholders have zero tolerance for accidents and environmental damage, and 
require high transparency on safety issues. 
The aim of this research is to develop a novel quantitative Human Reliability 
Assessment (HRA) methodology using the Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis 
Method (CREAM) in the maritime industry. This work will facilitate risk assessment of 
human action and its applications in marine engineering operations. The CREAM 
model demonstrates the dynamic impact of a context on human performance reliability 
through Contextual Control Model controlling modes (COCOM-CMs). CREAM human 
action analysis can be carried out through the core functionality of a method, a 
classification scheme and a cognitive model. However, CREAM has exposed certain 
practical limitations in its applications especially in the maritime industry, including the 
large interval presentation of Human Failure Probability (HFP) values and the lack of 
organisational factors in its classification scheme. All of these limitations stimulate the 
development of advanced techniques in CREAM as well as illustrate the significant gap 
between industrial needs and academic research. 
To address the above need, four phases of research study are proposed. In the first 
phase, the adequacy of organisation, one of the key Common Performance Conditions 
(CPCs) in CREAM, is expanded by identifying the associated Performance Influencing 
Factors (PIFs) and sub-PIFs in a Bayesian Network (BN) for realising the rational 
quantification of its assessment. In the second phase, the uncertainty treatment methods' 
BN, Fuzzy Rule Base (FRB), Fuzzy Set (FS) theory are used to develop new models 
and techniques that enable users to quantify HFP and facilitate the identification of 
possible initiating events or root causes of erroneous human action in marine 
engineering operations. In the third phase, the uncertainty treatment method's Evidential 
Reasoning (ER) is used in correlation with the second phase's developed new models 
and techniques to produce the solutions to conducting quantitative HRA in conditions in 
which data is unavailable, incomplete or ill-defined. In the fourth phase, the CREAM's 
prospective assessment and retrospective analysis models are integrated by using the 
established Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) method based on the 
combination of Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP), entropy analysis and Technique 
for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS). These enable 
Decision Makers (DMs) to select the best developed Risk Control Option (RCO) in 
reducing HFP values. 
The developed methodology addresses human actions in marine engineering operations 
with the significant potential of reducing HFP, promoting safety culture and facilitating 
the current Safety Management System (SMS) and maritime regulative frameworks. 
Consequently, the resilience of marine engineering operations can be further 
strengthened and appreciated by industrial stakeholders through addressing the 
requirements of more safety management attention at all levels. Finally, several real 
case studies are investigated to show end users tangible benefits of the developed 
models, such as the reduction of the HFPs and optimisation of risk control resources, 
while validating the algorithms, models, and methods developed in this thesis. 
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Definitions 
Human action: It is the act through which human is in a direct interface with a process 
or with equipment (Pyy, 2000). 
Human error: It is the fallacy causal relation of human action or performance 
characteristic to an observed outcome (Hollnagel, 1998a). 
Error: It is an action gone wrong in the sense that the outcome was not the expected or 
desired one (Holinagel, 1998a). 
Cognitive errors: They are all actions involving a modicum of cognition. As a result all 
errors must also be cognitive (Hollnagel, 1998a). 
Erroneous human action: It is the observable and verifiable human action that exceeds 
some limit of acceptability resulting of cognition, technology and of organisation. In 
other words, it is any member of a set of responses that exceeds some limit of 
acceptability. It is an out-of-tolerance action where the limits of performance are 
defined by the system (Hollnagel, 1998a). 
Human failure probability: It is the failure probability of a defined human action in a 
HRA model. There may be many reasons for failure (compare to human error). A 
human failure affects components (faults) and processes (disturbances). If the effect is 
significant (critical), a recovery or repair has to take place (Pyy, 2000). 
Latent failure conditions: They are the latent conditions in a system that may become 
contributing causes for an accident. Latent failure conditions are thus seen in contrast to 
active failures, i. e., failures of technological functions or human actions, which become 
the local triggering events that afterwards are identified as the immediate causes of an 
accident (Holinagel, 1998a). 
Human reliability: It is the probability that a person will perform according to the 
requirements of the task for a specified period of time, to that is sometimes added that 
the person shall not perform any extraneous activity which can degrade the system 
(Swain & Guttmann, 1983). 
Probabilistic safety assessment: It is a probabilistic model usually based on HRA 
method, to identify and classify those elements where improper operation of can result 
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in a contingency. The outcome of a PSA can be a quantitative estimate of the risk in one 
of the following (Dougherty and Fragola, 1988): A description of equipment failures, 
human failures, and process events whose combination must occur before a specified 
hazard can occur (Holinagel, 1998a). 
Error of omission: It is the failure to carry out some of the actions/ sub goals 
necessary to achieve a desired goal (Hollnagel, 2000a). 
Error of commission: It is carrying out an unrelated action/ sub goals, which prevents 
the achievement of the goal (Hollnagel, 2000a). 
XIX 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Summary 
This chapter highlights the restricted potential of the maritime regulative framework, 
which has been used to describe the safety standard of a vessel. It encourages the use of 
HRA methods and probabilistic calculus to assess human performance reliability in 
marine engineering operations and helps to define ways of how the human reliability 
can be improved. It also describes the statement of problem and outlines the research 
aim and objectives, which is followed by an overview of the research methodology as 
well as the scope and structure of the thesis. 
1.1. Background 
Seaworthiness and compliance are terms that have historically been used as reference 
parameters to describe the safety standard of a vessel in the maritime industry. 
Observably, these parameters have restricted potential in incidents' and accidents' 
prevention, owing to the complexity of many factors, of which the likelihood of 
erroneous human actions accounts for 80-90% (Baker and Seah, 2004; Jalonen and 
Salmi, 2009). Currently, the maritime industry is regulated by a complex international 
legal framework. The international nature of the shipping industry has made the 
enforcement of the legislative framework difficult. Although efforts have been made to 
change the enforcement process, preventive actions are still uncommon. The creation or 
amendment of legislation often occurs reactively, typically following a major disaster. 
Nevertheless, within this legal framework significant improvement has been achieved 
during the last few decades, which can be clearly observed by an average 2- 3% annual 
reduction in the total loss ratio of ships (Lancaster, 1996; Soma, 2003; Pomeroy, 2006). 
Despite this fact, the current increasing trend of marine engineering system design 
complexity and the substantial reliance on a high degree of automation and supervisory 
control in its operation bring new opportunities as well as threats (Hollnagel, 2000b). In 
fact the advance in technology has increased operating system reliability and reduced its 
maintenance requirement. In the meantime familiarity with the system has been reduced 
by the reduction in routine intervention. Considering the effect of the advance of 
technologies on the gained knowledge and skill of successive supervisory and 
operational crews, the current problem is about how the reduction in this routine 
intervention will affect the safe operation of the ship during its service lifetime 
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(Pomeroy, 2006). Hollnagel (2008a, b) stated that safety cannot genuinely be improved 
only by looking to the past and taking precautions against the accidents that have 
happened. These facts make it necessary that the safety performance of supervisory and 
operating personnel should be assessed proactively; accordingly, resources available to 
enable the safe performance could purposefully be planned. In this respect, HRA 
methods and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) or Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) models which have been used effectively to improve the Safety Management 
System (SMS) in the nuclear, aviation and chemical ergonomics are available to provide 
best proactive approaches to safety practices. These can be easily applied to mitigate the 
erroneous human actions contribution in incidents and accident of the maritime industry 
(NRC, 1994; Amrozowicz et al., 1997) irrespective of regulative requirements. 
HRA is a practical tool to define and formulate the overall human performance 
reliability. It enables users to implement the necessary changes that ensure standards of 
SMS on board and ashore. HRA can be a helpful tool to assess and analyse human 
performance and maintain this assessment and analysis in the long term. Through HRA 
the challenge is to improve human performance in relation to safety issues, resulting in 
changes to safety culture; this would produce significant operational improvements and 
savings. By improving human performance and safety culture throughout the 
organisation, there is a huge potential for cost saving and to build a reputation as a 
competitive advantage. Throughout HRA several achievements could be observed. 
These include but not limited to improved SMS performance, improved crew safety 
performance, improved incidents, accidents and resulting claims' statistics and 
improved organisation uniformity. These will also clearly demonstrate that the 
fundamental requirement for improvements to human safety performance, with reduced 
frequency of incidents and accidents, can be achieved through a structured approach 
addressing working context, human behaviour and working culture. 
1.2. The statement of problem 
First generation HRA methods have been widely used to account for human 
performance reliability. Their wide applications have been documented in many studies 
(e. g. Swain and Guttman, 1983; Williams, 1988; Swain, 1990; Hollnagel, 1993; Kirwan, 
1996; Kirwan 1997a, b; Holinagel, 1998a; Pyy, 2000; Hallbert et al., 2004; Kirwan et 
at., 2005; Chander et at., 2006; Forester et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2007; Reer, 2008a, b; 
Bell and Holyroyd, 2009; Adhikari et al., 2009; Boring et at., 2010b; Spurgin, 2010; 
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Licao et al., 2011). For example, the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction 
(THERP) method developed by Swain and Guttman (1983) was used by Amrozowicz et 
al. (1997) as a benchmark specifically to assess the Human Error Probability (HEP) of 
the marine tanker system, which has been identified as a source of high risk and has a 
high potential for improvement. This methodology had allowed the production of 
possible human task activities and their corresponding HEPs. Martins and Maturana 
(2010) had also presented a methodology emphasizing the use of the THERP method to 
reach the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) objectives. Basically, HEPs are the origin of 
the greatest uncertainty when FSA is performed. The use of the THERP method in 
association with the FSA has helped to identify the implications of erroneous human 
actions in specific areas of potential risk reduction and offered a possibility to infer 
means for its reduction. However, due to the complexity of the studied system, THERP 
could not be used to consider all hypotheses that brought hazards to the ships. 
Although first generation HRA methods are well documented, they are still revealing 
some applicable problems (Hollnagel, 1998a; Zio et al., 2009; Martins and Maturana, 
2010; Spurgin, 2010). In fact, first generation HRA methods are: 
" Very much an engineering approach to the human error modelling. Its methodologies 
are referred to as decomposition methods (Hollnagel, 1993; Spurgin, 2010), in which 
a human operator is essentially treated as a component in a system, so an operator 
failing to respond to an event is termed errors of omission, while unintended human 
action is labelled errors of commission. 
" Limited in consideration of human behaviour and human decision making factors 
that cannot be categorised simply as omissions or commissions. Human failure is far 
more complex than the failure of a system component (Doughty, 1990). 
" Largely failing to consider the context in which erroneous human actions are made. 
In addition, they are heavily focused on errors of omission and less on consideration 
of errors of commission (Hollnagel, 1998a; Spurgin, 2010). 
" Practically limited in task dependency assessment (Podofillini et at., 2010). For 
example, the most widely used dependence assessment method of THERP introduces 
five levels of dependence (zero, low, moderate, high, complete) corresponding to 
different values of conditional HEPs. In THERP the task dependency is modelled 
through a few general guidelines specifying some of the factors that may influence 
the dependence level. Guidelines give only generic tendencies of the impact of 
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factors on the dependence level, and a lot of room is left for interpretation. The 
assessment therefore requires a considerable amount of expert judgment, which may 
lack transparency and traceability (Zio et al., 2009). Hollnagel (1998a), Cepin 
(2006), Zio et al. (2009) and Podofillini et al. (2010) also highlighted the 
consequential need for a new, explicit and transparent dependence assessment 
method. 
During the 1990s many issues related to HRA were raised by Reason (1990a, b) and 
others, e. g. Roberts (1990) and Hollnagel (1993). These issues drove the revision of 
HRA methodologies and the adoption of more sophisticated models and understandings 
of erroneous human action. Therefore, second generation HRA developers have put 
forward cognitive effect and context impact in their developed methodologies. For 
example, Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) provides a strong 
argument for considering the use of cognitive factors' effect and context impact 
(Hollnagel, 1998a) and considers the context under which an action takes place to 
determine Human Failure Probability (HFP) (Hollnagel, 1998a; Spurgin, 2010). 
CREAM is well documented for a retrospective as well as a prospective approach to the 
formulation of HRA. Prospectively, it is developed in two versions. One is the 
simplified view of the Contextual Control Model Controlling Modes (COCOM-CMs) 
(strategic, tactical, opportunistic and scrambled) as the candidate model of cognition, 
which ends by determining the probable control mode and the generic action failure 
probability, based on the assessment of nine Common Performance Condition (CPC) 
primary effects. The other version is extended to a more detailed view of erroneous 
human actions. It is based on two concepts: the 13 generalized Cognitive Failure 
Functions (CFFs) and the nine CPCs called functional modifiers. These CPCs determine 
the context under which the crew or personnel operates. Consequently, the CREAM is a 
context driven method with a more psychological view of HRA. The context is 
considered to affect some aspects of the operators' cognitive processing. Over a range 
of accidents, the context can vary from reduced, satisfactory and improved impacts, 
depending on the amount of attention given to each context element by a designer or 
operator (Hollnagel, 1998a; Boring, 2007; Spurgin, 2010). This can lead to a functional 
failure, which in turn leads to an error. The general concepts are very much in line with 
current thinking about how erroneous human actions are caused. 
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Retrospectively, CREAM is carried out recursively through the core functionality of a 
method, a classification scheme and a cognitive model to identify possible initiating 
events or root causes of erroneous human action. However, the drawbacks of CREAM 
are: 
" The basic method application ends by determining the probable control mode and the 
generic action failure probability. This approach considers only the improved and 
reduced effect levels of each CPC and ignores the satisfactory effect level, which is 
supposed to be the marginal and transient condition of context-CPCs that might 
affect existing task scenarios. 
" The 13 extended method CFFs, practically, are quite high level descriptions of 
potential cognitive errors possibly associated with a task (Hollnagel, 1998a; Boring, 
2010a; Spurgin, 2010). Therefore, it would be difficult to differentiate CFFs in 
practice, because the human action controlling influence is a procedure conditioned 
by training and MMI design and layout. 
" In evaluating a situation using extended CREAM, the evaluator has to select the CFF 
and also determine which CPCs are involved and to what degree (Hollnagel, 1998a; 
Spurgin, 2010). This is a quite high level task in performance assessment. 
Data used to demonstrate Cognitive Failures Probabilities (CFP) corresponding to 
the 13 CFFs associated with a task has been selected from a variety of sources, such 
as Beare et al. 's (1983) study, THERP (Swain and Guttman, 1983), Human Error 
Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) (Williams, 1988), and Gertman and 
Blackman's (1994) human reliability and safety analysis data handbook (Spurgin 
(2010). Therefore, the use of this data is to provide a demonstration of the method, 
and not a justification of its accuracy (Spurgin, 2010). 
" There is a need to better qualify terms like adequacy of organisation in retrospective 
applications. Also, some of the words used in the classification scheme tables can be 
better defined (Hollnagel, 1998a; Spurgin, 2010). 
There have been several research studies to improve and further develop the CREAM 
basic method for determining the numerical values of COCOM-CMs' probabilities. The 
following are examples of those studies: 
" Fujita and Hollnagel (2004) have provided an improvement to the basic screening 
method of CREAM, in which the equations calculate a mean failure rate in response 
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to a change of the CPCs score directly without invoking the notion of human action 
control modes. In the derivation of these equations it is assumed that the numbers of 
improved CPCs is equal to the numbers of reduced CPCs. According to the 
dependency of CPCs described by CREAM model, the assumption may not hold. For 
instance, in the example taken from the original CREAM, there are 7 improved CPCs 
and 9 reduced CPCs: This requires caution in the use of the provided equations to 
calculate a mean failure rate. 
" Konstandinidou et at. (2006) have used Fuzzy Logic (FL) to map CREAM CPCs' 
logical relation rules as a base to enable calculating the numerical values of action 
failure probabilities. However, their study has been exposed as having some practical 
problems, such as the ignorance of different effects/importance on human 
performance that CPCs may have in the practical HRA applications; the logicality of 
using multiple-input single-output rule base to model the relations between the 
control modes and CPCs; the loss of useful information in fuzzy Max-Min inference 
operation; and the lack of adequacy of modelling CPC dependencies and of instant 
human failure probability estimation. Although different weights have been assigned 
to CPCs in the studies by Marseguerra et al., 2006 and Marseguerra et al., 2007, the 
other concerns stated above have not been well addressed (Yang et al., 2010). 
" Kim et al. (2006) have proposed a Bayesian Network (BN) probabilistic model for 
determining COCOM-CMs' probabilities. This BN probabilistic model has been 
developed to deal with the limitations of the CREAM basic method, which can only 
determine the probable control mode and a generic action failure probability for 
many possible different kinds of context scenarios separately, in the worst case, for 
31,104 context scenario end results. Although a divorcing concept is applied in the 
construction of the BN model to reduce the number of possible combinations of the 
nine CPCs' positive and negative deterministic effect levels, assigning conditional 
probabilities deterministically is still complex. For instance, there are 45,000 
deterministic conditional probabilities needed to determine the Conditional 
Probability Table (CPT) corresponding to the COCOM-CMs' node. 
" He et al. (2008) have presented a simplified CREAM prospective quantification 
process, which uses a similar quantification equation for both basic and extended 
methods. To differentiate between the basic and the extended methods in application, 
their study suggested values for some parameters, such as context influence index 
and performance influencing index, to be used in a similar quantification equation. 
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With use of this methodology, the quantification process considers the task as a 
whole; also, it is not easy to tell which control mode is really right for the continuous 
and gradual change from one control mode to another, specifically during the 
potential overlaps that exist between the adjacent modes. 
" Yang et al. (2010) have used a fuzzy Bayesian reasoning approach to facilitate the 
quantification of CREAM in maritime human reliability analysis. Their developed 
generic methodology incorporated FL, Evidential Reasoning (ER) and Bayesian 
inference. The kernels of the proposed methodology framework are to use ER to 
establish fuzzy IF-THEN rule bases with belief structures, and to employ a Bayesian 
inference mechanism to aggregate all the rules associated with a seafarer's task for 
estimating his/her failure probability. The presented methodological framework has 
dealt with CPCs' dependency effect within each scenario's fuzzy rule. The used 
scenarios revealed a limited number of CPC effect levels. However, in situations 
where the nine CPCs have effect levels, which will necessitate a maximum of 46,656 
rules to be assessed, these will constrain the extent of using the proposed framework 
in the application domain. 
For retrospective accident analysis, a specified marine domain version of CREAM 
called Bridge Reliability and Error Analysis Method (BREAM) has been developed 
(Nygren, 2006). In addition, it has also been adapted to road traffic as Driving 
Reliability and Error Analysis Method (DREAM) (Warner and Sandin, 2010). Serwy 
and Rantanen (2007) have stated that the CREAM performance analysis model is very 
tedious to apply manually and not yet in widespread use, and is, therefore, largely 
untested. Therefore, to allow for rapid and systematic evaluation of the CREAM 
performance analysis method, they developed a software tool for its application. The 
simplicity of the software allows the user to analyse events in much more detail but also 
reveals some critical shortcomings in identifying the specific/general root cause directly 
related to organisational issues in both the method and consequently the software tool 
(Serwy and Rantanen, 2007). 
HRA in oil tankers' operations has been presented by Subramaniam (2010), where a 
specific oil tanker accident was analysed by utilising several developed novel 
mathematical model approaches such as Decision Making Trail and Evaluation 
Laboratory (DEMERTEL) and discrete Fuzzy Sets (FSs), etc. 
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" Lee et al. (2011) have developed a methodology based retrospective analysis of the 
CREAM method. The methodology focuses on the root cause of communication 
errors and assessing the type of communication errors which could happen in 
Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). The antecedent consequent links of influential factors 
related to communication errors in the CREAM classification scheme have been 
developed. A quantitative analysis method focusing on estimating the probability of 
communication errors is suggested. Finally, methodology validation results have 
shown that it is possible to foresee the effects of given plant conditions on 
communication errors and reduce the error occurrences. 
The above stated drawbacks have highlighted the need for new, simple and consistent 
models. These models will enable users to obtain consistent values for CREAM 
COCOM-CMs' probabilities and the analogous crisp values of HFP. In addition, models 
will also better qualify terms like adequacy of organisation in retrospective and 
prospective applications. Such models will also be integrated with a newly developed 
Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) method so as to enable Decision Makers 
(DMs) to select the best developed Risk Control Option (RCO) in reducing HFP. 
1.3. Research objectives 
The aim of this research is to develop a methodology for HRA in an uncertain 
environment in marine engineering operations. Formulating such a methodology will 
enable users to assess and analyse human reliability and to identify ways of reducing 
HFP. As a result, decision makers and stakeholders will be able to manage and control 
marine engineering operations' vulnerability even given the uncertainty of human, 
technological and organisational factors. To achieve this aim, the following research 
objectives are formulated to: 
" Identify human, technological and organisational factors which influence human 
reliability. 
" Identify the relevant HRA methods that could be used to describe, assess and analyse 
marine engineering operations' contexts. 
" Develop advanced uncertainty treatment modelling to facilitate the quantification of 
CREAM CPC adequacy of organisation. 
" Develop advanced uncertainty treatment modelling to facilitate the quantification of 
HRA in marine engineering operations. 
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" Develop RCOs to improve human performance reliability. 
" Develop a MCDM method to select the best RCO. 
" Validate the developed models throughout the formulation of the research 
methodology. 
1.4. Research methodology and scope of the thesis 
Basically, research methodology formulates the way in which the research problem is 
systematically and rationally solved. Therefore, various methods and techniques to be 
used throughout the implementation of the methodology are consistently considered. 
The research methodology's detailed formulations are to: 
" Identify the research problem in view of HRA's potential capability to assess and 
analyse human performance implications in marine incidents and accidents. 
" Conduct a literature review. This will review the trend of marine engineering 
systems' technology development and its effect on crew skill and competence, the 
profile of the maritime legislative framework and its consequent drawbacks, the 
statistical analysis of marine incidents and accidents, the human performance 
implication in marine incidents and accidents, the development of HRA methods and 
characteristics, and the viability of probabilistic techniques in solving the research 
problem. 
" Develop a new HRA methodology using CREAM features and generate new HRA 
models to quantify human performance reliability. 
" Develop a new adequacy of organisation reliability assessment methodology based 
on the hierarchical process of the identified human, technological and organisational 
factors. 
" Develop a new decision making model for preference-ranking RCOs that have been 
developed to reduce assessed HFP. 
" Validate the developed methodology and the supporting models using various case 
studies. 
" Conclude the research contributions with the presentation of possible future work. 
The scope of the research is defined within the ship system's socio-technical 
components, such as human, technological and organisational factors. These factors 
determine the contribution of erroneous human actions in ship operations. In this 
context, the primary scope of this thesis is to assess the identified human, technological 
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and organisational factors affecting the adequacy of organisational reliability; secondly, 
to quantify human performance reliability in ship operations; thirdly, to enhance the 
quantification of human performance reliability assessment; fourthly, to analyse the 
assessed human performance reliability with the aim of identifying their initiating 
events or root causes and finally to improve human performance through the selection 
of the best RCO in an effective decision making method. This scope will provide an 
integrated HRA approach to the safety of marine engineering operations. 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
There are seven chapters in this thesis, including this introduction. Figure 1.1 highlights 
the visual model of the thesis structure that leads the reader to the stated aim and 
objectives in Section 1.3. The arrows present in the figure denote input of each phase of 
the work. Below also follows brief description of each chapter presented in the thesis. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
i 
i HRA-CREAM and the relevant Al 
techniques 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
-1-- 
'jr 
_____ 
Chapter 3: Adequacy of 
organisation reliability 
assessment 
4-* Chapter 4: Quantifying human action probability 
4 
t ý 
Chapter 5: Use of evidential reasoning for eliciting 
Bayesian subjective probabilities under 
incompleteness uncertainties 
i 
Chapter 6: Decision making methodology for 
improving human performance reliability based on 
operational context analysis 
I 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Figure 1.1: Thesis visual representation 
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Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature that defines the subjects of this research. It 
provides information about the trend of marine engineering systems' technological 
development and the effect on crew skill and competence. It instantiates both the profile 
of maritime legislative framework and its current state of implementation, and 
explicates the statistical analysis of marine incidents and accidents to define human 
performance implications. It reviews HRA methods' development and characteristics, 
as well as verifies probabilistic models of relevance to the research problem. It 
differentiates the reviewed HRA methods' characteristics. These provide the basis of 
identifying the research statement of problem, aim and related objectives, and 
formulating the research methodology. 
In Chapter 3, a new BN model is developed to evaluate the adequacy of shipping 
organisations. It first reviews the relevant literature related to the adequacy of 
organisation and defines its expanded Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) and sub 
PIFs. The discrete effect's levels/ descriptors of PIFs and sub PIFs are defined to the 
interest of adequacy of organisation reliability assessment. A hierarchical process 
features PIFs and sub PIFs' logical relation is designed. BN essential development 
characteristics are reviewed. A generic methodology for establishing the BN model of 
the adequacy of the organisation reliability assessment is developed. In Netica software, 
the assigned CPTs and BN qualitative characteristics are used to develop a 
computerised tool of evaluating the adequacy of organisation. The 'M. V. HANJIN 
DAMPIER' grounding accident is analysed as a case study to validate the established 
BN model. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of the model is carried out to verify the 
outcome of the work in the conclusion. 
In Chapter 4, CREAM bi-directional approaches to the assessment and analysis of 
human performance are discussed. A generic methodology to establish CREAM BN 
model for COCOM-CMs' reliability assessment is developed. In formulation of this 
methodology, the following sections are analysed: first, CREAM's nine CPCs' 
dependency characteristics are modelled in four convergent connections of a BN with 
the use of Netica software. The CPTs of the CPCs which are adjusted according to their 
interdependence are assigned deterministically. Secondly, new attribute and sub 
attribute nodes are introduced to simplify the assignment of CPT of the COCOM-CMs' 
node. Thirdly, the nine original CPCs of CREAM, including dependency adjusted ones, 
are modelled in convergent connections of BN. Such connections match the d- 
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separation characteristic and the cause-effect relationship in BN, thus affecting the 
newly introduced attributes and sub attribute nodes and the COCOM-CMs node 
marginal probabilities. Sub attribute nodes' CPTs are assigned uniformly, while Fuzzy 
Rule Base (FRB) is also used to simplify the subjective elicitation of CPT of 000OM- 
CMs' node by experts. FSs theory is used to transform COCOM-CMs' probability to a 
crisp value of HFP. Fourthly, the heeling accident on MN Crown Princess is used as a 
case study to validate the established generic CREAM-BN model. Fifthly, the BN 
model's final inference and aggregation of COCOM-CMs posterior probabilities is 
transformed with the use of FSs to a crisp value of HFP. Finally, model sensitivity is 
verified, and the outcome of the work is concluded. 
Chapter 5 describes the heuristic tools that have been used to enhance BN 
characteristics. A new generic methodology is developed to enhance the capability of 
the developed CREAM BN model for assessment of the reliability of COCOM-CMs. 
The developed model is enhanced to consistently deal with incomplete or ill-defined 
context data. In this respect, ER technique is used effectively to synthesis the partial 
degrees of belief elicited by experts and to define the unknown probability mass. ER is 
also used effectively to aggregate the probability of factors that symmetrically affect 
CPCs. The unknown probability masses are used to develop two sets of CPTs in the 
worst and best scenarios respectively. These CPTs are used in two developed BNs. 
BNs' final inference and aggregation of COCOM-CMs' posterior probabilities are 
transformed to a crisp value of HFP with the use of FSs theory. Both BN-derived HFPs 
provide the boundaries of a HFP range. This range is averaged to a crisp value of HFP. 
The Transocean's Deepwater Horizon accident is used as case study to validate the 
established models. Finally, the models' sensitivity analyses are verified, and the 
outcome of the work is concluded. 
In Chapter 6, a new human reliability based decision making method is developed. It 
first reviews the characteristics and limitations of the decision making methods and 
models, followed by the some solutions to overcoming the limitations of the reviewed 
methods and models in different applications. The CREAM retrospective approach to 
human performance analysis is analysed in detail. This is to provide the basis for 
specifying a CREAM classification scheme in maritime ergonomics. The generic 
decision making methodology is developed through combining Technique for Order 
Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), Analytical Hierarchical 
12 
Process (AHP), and Entropy calculation. To validate the developed methodology, the 
CREAM classification scheme is used to identify the phenotype initiating events and 
the genotype root causes of crew performance during the heeling accident on MN 
Crown Princess. Consequently, alternatives of RCOs are developed, and RCO 
evaluation criteria are chosen. AHP together with some linguistic terms and their 
associated numerical scales is referred to experts to evaluate the importance of the 
chosen criteria. An entropy algorithm is used to calculate the objective weights of the 
criteria. After the combination of both subjective and objective weights of the criteria, 
TOPSIS is used to prioritise the RCO alternatives. 
Chapter 7 summarises the main concepts that are recognized throughout the 
implementation of the research methodology. It concludes the research achievements 
and how they are progressed to obtain the research aim. Additionally, it presents the 
limitations of this research and highlights the possible future work that could be further 
developed to tackle the limitations. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
Summary 
This chapter reviews the fundamental elements that make a valuable contribution to 
every step of the research pathway. It commences by highlighting the current trend in 
the marine engineering system's technological development and its effect on crews 
training and competencies, followed by screening of maritime safety effectiveness and 
understanding of the contribution of erroneous human actions to marine incidents and 
accidents. The most common HRA methods and their associated probabilistic models 
are also reviewed. These fundamentals inevitably help to conceptualise clearly and 
precisely the research problem. They also help to understand the relationship between 
the research problem and the body of knowledge in HRA methods and the associated 
probabilistic models. By describing which methods, models and procedures have been 
used in other industry ergonomics, as well as their strengths and weaknesses, including 
which has worked well, and what problems have been met, the researcher will be better 
positioned to formulate a methodology that is capable of providing valid answers to the 
research objectives. Moreover, this chapter also explains how the findings of this study 
would fit into the existing body of knowledge, and how the answers from the research 
objectives compare with what others have found. Finally, it will place the findings of 
this research into the context of maritime safety. 
2.1. Introduction 
The trend in marine engineering systems design over recent years has been towards 
increasing complexity in shipboard systems. Modern vessels nowadays rely on a high 
degree of automation and supervisory control. The advance in automation technology 
increases the use of programmable electronic systems in place of traditional hard-wired 
or pneumatic controls. This advance provides an opportunity for reducing both the 
initial investment cost and the following operational costs. Moreover, with this 
technology, things can now be done that previously would have been impossible. For 
example, it was once impossible to build an engine that did not require a camshaft and 
to enhance the overall fuel efficiency on a continuous basis through a sophisticated 
power management system; however, this is possible nowadays. The possibility of 
increasing the level of functionality encourages the design and construction of more 
complex automation and supervisory control systems. This advance offers ship owners 
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more options. The downside of this trend is that the owners are left with systems that 
may not be necessarily understood, or, in extreme cases, that even have unknown 
properties. The result may well be a system beyond the understanding of average 
seafarers. Hence, the possible interactions and dependencies are no longer obvious, 
unlike with older, simple systems. In reality, the systems are usually not considered in 
their full contexts, in which they are a collection of individual components configured 
into higher-level systems, operated by a range of seafarers in the marine environment. 
To consider any single element in isolation is likely to provide an incomplete picture 
(Bailey, 2005; Pomeroy, 2006). 
Fundamentally, it is known that the introduction of new technologies brings both 
opportunity and threats associated with the changes to the systems (Hollnagel, 2000b), 
as the environment in which the experience for dealing competently with all manner of 
abnormal situations exists has been changed. On the other hand, the advance in 
technology has increased operational system reliability and reduced its maintenance 
requirement. In the meantime, familiarity with the system has been reduced by the 
reduction in routine intervention. 
Much incidents' analysis has shown that human behaviour underlies many marine 
accidents, and that there is an over-reliance on the last-line of defence risk control 
measures (Hollnagel, 1998a; Pomeroy, 2006; Bijwaard and Knapp, 2009). 
Consequently, the management of marine risks represents a challenge to the industry 
and requires some changes in the way that engineering systems are designed, 
configured, maintained and operated, particularly by taking greater account of human 
behaviour. The maritime industry is receptive to efforts of improving safety through 
better management of the human element. Humans certainly have to understand the 
perception of risk. This perception will develop the behavioural changes towards the 
safe operation of complex ship systems (Pomeroy, 2006). However, HRA methods 
developed in the nuclear and aviation ergonomics could be used in the evaluation and 
development of human behavioural changes (NRC, 1994). Firstly, foretelling human 
performance reliability enables the perception that those human-contributed risks might 
develop while operating these systems. Secondly, analysing the context of assessed 
human performance enables identification of the possible phenotype initiating events or 
genotype root causes that are needed to develop the effective corrective actions. This 
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could certainly help to plan available resources effectively to maintain safe human 
performance over an appropriate timescale. 
In maritime ergonomics, the ship system is characterised as a physical entity embedded 
within complex socio-technical system components, which feature the combined quality 
of physical system performance, people performance, organisation decision and 
environmental effects. These components determine the risks of the ship system. As 
delineated in Figure 2.1, the innermost layer is called the Man Machine Interaction 
(MMI) methods, representing the interface between the physical system and its 
operators. Basically, the performance and safety of the physical system is influenced by 
the design, as well as by human factors. Moving outwards from the centre, the 
personnel sub-system is shown to operate in an organisational environment, 
representing the result of management decisions corresponding to the 
organisational/management infrastructure. These components are in turn controlled by 
the environmental context, which is governed by economics, politics and social issues. 
Understanding the interaction of the socio-technical system components offers an 
integrative perception of ship system reliability assessment. Moreover, the discrepancies 
in socio-technical system components vary appreciably between shipping regions. 
These are potential risks that might cause human behaviour related problems. 
ironmental con 
Organisational /management infrastructure 
Personnel sub-system 
Technical /engineering system 
Figure 2.1: Components of the socio-technical system adapted from Hollnagel (2010) 
2.2. Overview of shipping related safety 
According to the UNCTAD (2011), over 80% of the volume of world merchandise 
trade was carried by sea for the year 2010; this was translated to 8.4 billion tons of 
cargo and around 32.7 trillion ton-miles. Due to the increased world trade, the number 
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of vessels has grown by approximately 16% over the last ten years (Lloyd's Register 
Fairplay, 2008). In this context, Bijwaard and Knapp's (2009) study revealed that the 
incident rate of ship accidents was relatively low. In contrast, the hull and machinery 
insurance portfolio for the year (2008) showed an increase in the frequency of the 
number of claims, compared to the last 10-15 year period, where it has been reported to 
be flat or have a reduced frequency (Nomis, 2008). Claims' frequency reported per 4th 
quarter of 2008 was 15% higher than for the same period in 2007(Nomis, 2008). Earlier 
analysis of root cause of increased claims frequency was attributed to the lack of 
experienced seafarers, especially for nautical claims in both the 2007 and 2008 figures 
(Nomis, 2008). 
The shipping industry is regulated by a complicated international legal framework. 
Basically, it is based on the recommendations and guidelines of more than 50 
conventions with numerous protocols and amendments (Knapp and Velden, 2010). 
These conventions are developed by the international Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) with the support of various regional 
bodies. However, there are still some loopholes in their enforcement system, which can 
lead to incidents. Shipping incidents tend to carry very high economic costs, due to the 
large asset values and the high operational risks involved in shipping (Knapp and 
Velden, 2009; Knapp and Velden, 2010; Knapp et al., 2011). 
The enforcement of an acceptable level of safety in shipping is attempted through 
various types of safety inspection. For example, mandatory inspections, which are 
normally performed by classification societies on behalf of the flag state 
administrations, are required in order to issue and maintain statuary ship certificates 
needed by the flag state administrations operating within the legislative framework of 
the IMO. In addition, ships' hull and machinery surveys are normally performed in 
respect of an identified scheme implemented to issue hull and machinery class 
certificates. Non-mandatory inspections can be divided into those performed by industry 
and those performed by Port State Control (PSC). Industry inspections are performed by 
vetting inspection regimes, to enable a vessel to obtain an acceptable vetting inspection 
report, in order to load and ship cargo. PSC is a right that allows port states to inspect a 
vessel calling at a port under its jurisdiction. There are currently ten PSC regimes, 
which are grouped by regions. If a PSC inspection detects violations from minimum 
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safety standards, the vessel can be detained and deficiencies will need to be rectified 
before it can proceed (Knapp et al., 2011). 
The international nature of the shipping industry has made it complex and difficult to 
enforce the legislative framework developed by IMO's member states. Despite efforts 
being made by IMO's member states to change this process, preventive actions are still 
uncommon, resulting in the creation or amendment of legislation being reactive and 
typically following the outcome of a major disaster (Knapp and Velden, 2009; Knapp 
and Franses, 2009b). 
In 1993, the IMO adopted the International Safety Management (ISM) Code as a 
challenge to provide a proactive qualitative tool for maintaining ship safety at an 
operational level. The ISM Code came into force in July 1998 for passenger vessels, 
tankers and dry bulk carriers, and in July 2002 for all other ship types. The ISM Code 
introduced the concept of SMS and Risk Management System (RMS) at an individual 
ship level, as well as at shipping organisations (Knapp and Velden, 2010). Although the 
ISM was seen to involve commitment from the top, verification of positive attitudes and 
competence, clear placement of responsibility, quality control of work, and promotion 
of a safety culture, and as a vehicle for continuous improvement by introducing a 
human factor into the SMS, it was not easy to measure those factors that could produce 
tangible and specific answers from administrations about its effectiveness (IMO, 2005). 
In the years 2001 and 2002, the IMO approved guidelines for the application of Formal 
Safety System (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process. FSA is a rational and 
systematic process for assessing risks relating to maritime safety and marine 
environment protection, and for evaluating the costs and benefits of IMO's options for 
reducing these risks (IMO, 2007). Some of the major drawbacks of FSA studies are the 
lack of adequate data for the proper analysis of risk factors and different applications of 
the guidelines. Additionally, in FSA, the erroneous human actions generating hazards 
and the likely risk factors could only be quantified by making use of HRA-PSA 
techniques (Fang et al., 2005). To address the lack of FSA enforcement, the IMO 
provides training and support to its member states through its Technical Cooperation 
Committee (TCC). In this respect, the IMO also developed the Voluntary Member 
States Audit Scheme (VMSAS), which should provide a better mechanism to encourage 
compliance from member states (Knapp and Franses, 2009a). 
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Finally, the effectiveness of safety inspections in the shipping industry has been 
analysed in the literature from various aspects and by many researchers (for example, 
Payoyo, 1994; Knapp and Franses, 2007a, b, c; Carriou et at., 2008; and Knapp and 
Franses, 2009a). Until now, research in this area has been focused on the determination 
of relevant risk factors and on the estimation of incident probability reduction (Knapp et 
at., 2011). Little has been done in the area of HRA in the shipping industry. This reveals 
that there is an obvious gap between industrial need and academic research. Therefore, 
the effectiveness of safety inspection in shipping needs to be extended to cover HRA 
(NRC, 1994). 
2.3. Marine accidents' statistical analysis 
The effort of allocating various forms of erroneous human actions to verified accident 
causes is surely not a simple task. Its difficulty is augmented in the case of maritime 
transport, because accident monitoring and documentation is not usually very adequate 
or of a high standard. Nonetheless, a review of available databases of marine accidents 
was undertaken by the ABS in 2004, to better understand the role of humans in 
incident/accident causation and their consequent mitigation (Baker and Seah, 2004). 
The analysis included accidents associated with commercial passenger vessels, 
freighters, tankers, tugboats, and offshore supply vessels. Accident data from the UK, 
Canada, and Australia were reviewed and analysed. Accidents cited in the United States 
Coast Guard Marine Safety Management System (USCG-MSMS) database were also 
reviewed and analysed. The finding of these reviews revealed that erroneous human 
action continued to be the dominant factor leading to maritime incidents and accidents. 
In its domination it takes the form of failures of situation awareness and situation 
assessment. Basically, erroneous human action refers to an observable and verifiable act 
(Hollnagel, 1998a). The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) analysis showed that 50% 
of maritime accidents were initiated by observable erroneous human action, while 
another 30% of maritime accidents occurred due to failures of verifiable human actions 
to avoid an accident (Jones, 2002; Baker and Seah, 2004). 
As shown in Figure 2.2, the trend of marine accidents over the years 1990-2000 was 
steadily downwards. Marine accidents often lead to a loss of property, life, and 
environmental damage. However, the magnitude of damage inflicted by a major 
shipping accident increases virtually with the public attention paid to those accidents 
and their negative influence on the perceived safety of shipping. For example, in the 
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past several decades, accidents such as the Herald of Free Enterprise, Estonia, Erica, 
Exxon Valdez, Prestige, Amoco Cadiz, Braer and Sea Empress have repeatedly 
attracted public attention and facilitated the development of new laws or amendments to 
the international conventions. 
Figure 2.2: The trend of shipping accidents over the past decade, adapted from Baker and Seah (2004) 
The analysis carried out by ABS included, firstly 150 accident reports collected from 
the Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (ATSB), 100 accident reports collected 
from the Canadian Transportation Safety Board (TSB-C), and 100 accident reports 
acquired from the United Kingdom Marine Accident Investigation Board (MAIB). The 
qualitative grouping of the causal factors identified as the primary contributing root 
causes of each accident is shown respectively in Table 2.1. The sources of collected 
accidents and their causation groupings' percentage are also shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Table 2.1: MAIB, TSB-C and ATSB shipping accident reports' causal factors and their qualitative 
groupings. Source: Baker and Seah (2004) 
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Percentage of accident causation 
Non human Maintenance Risk Management Situational 
error error awareness 
  TSB-C   ATSB MAIB 
Figure 2.3: The percentage of accident causation based on qualitative grouping of MAIB, TSB-C and 
ATSB. Data adapted from Baker and Seah (2004) 
Secondly, 71,470 accidents were cited in the USCG-MSMS database over the period 
1991 to 2001. The top-level accident causations of analysed accidents are shown in 
Figure 2.4; and the top-level breakdown of root causes related to human factors is 
shown in Figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.4: Top-level accident causation cited in the USCG MSMS database, adapted from Baker and 
Seah(2004) 
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Figure 2.5: Top-level breakdown of root causes related to human factors, adapted from Baker and Seah 
(2004) 
Figure 2.6 shows the trend of accidents cited in the USCG-MSMS database over the 
period 1991 to 2001. Though the results suggest a slight increase in the number of 
accidents; they also show that the trend was unstable. Generally, over the 1990s, the 
human element has received much scrutiny by the maritime industry. 
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Figure 2.6: The trend of shipping accidents cited in the USCG-MSMS database over the period 1991 to 
2001, adapted from Baker and Seah (2004) 
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The review of accident data from MAIB, ATSB, and TSB-C shown in Table 2.1 
revealed some interesting consistencies. Firstly, each of the groups of management 
practices, situation awareness failures and risk taking /tolerance represents about 25% of 
accident causation in the respective source - MAIB, ATSB, and TSB-C. Secondly, in 
each of these sources, 80 to 85% of all accidents are either directly initiated by 
erroneous human action or are associated with erroneous human action by means of 
inappropriate human response to threat situations. It is also noted that there is a 
consistency of causal factor findings among the data and reports within the US, UK, 
Canada, and Australia (Jones, 2002; Baker and Seah, 2004). 
A recent statistical analysis of serious casualties' data involving the human element has 
been provided by Mandryk (2011). This analysis shows the trend of serious casualties 
by vessel type during the period 2006-2010, as shown in Figure 2.7. The analysis profile 
included 21,000 casualties' reports of commercial vessels >I OOGT excluding fishing 
vessels. 
Figure 2.7: Analysis of serious casualties by vessel type-2006-2010 adapted from (Mandryk, 2011). The 
left side vertical axis represents the number of vessels per type, and the right side vertical axis represents 
the total number of vessels of all types. 
2.3.1. Individual risk and total loss of ship analysis 
A comprehensive analysis of Lloyd's casualty database was conducted by Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV) and submitted by the International Association of Classification 
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Societies (IACS) to the IMO (2006). The analysis reflected the annual accident 
frequency distribution on accident event, as shown in Figures 2.8; and individual risk 
distribution on accident event, as shown in Figure 2.9. This analysis was based on 
accident data for the period 1990-2003. It included 16 generic ship types that were built 
in 1980 and later. 
Figure 2.8: Total loss frequency/year for different ship types, distribution by accident event. Source: IMO 
(2006) 
A comparison of the individual risk given in Figure 2.9 with the general risk acceptance 
criteria given in IMO (2000) is presented in Figure 2.10. The statistics gave a clear 
indication of two critical observations: first, it was noted that the general cargo ships 
showed a high risk level both in terms of total loss of ship and fatalities to individuals 
on board. Second, occupational accidents were by far the dominant category for 
fatalities on most types of ship (IMO 2006; Huss, 2007). 
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Figure 2.9: Individual risk on different ship types, distribution by accident event breakdown. Source: IMO 
(2006) 
Figure 2.10: Individual risk on different ship types developed by DNV. Source: IMO (2006) 
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2.4. Human reliability analysis 
Human reliability means the probability of a person correctly performing an action 
demanded by a system in a specific time without performing any extraneous activity 
that can degrade the system's performance (Swain and Guttmann, 1983). Swain (1990) 
also stated that any method by which human reliability is assessed may also be called a 
HRA. For instance, in risk assessment HRA is defined as the use of systems engineering 
and human behavioural science methods in order to render a complete description of 
human contribution to a risk. HRA includes a series of methods to identify sources of 
erroneous human actions and to assess the likelihood of their occurrence (Boring, 
2008). There are other related qualitative definitions of HRA. For instance, it is the 
certainty that human ability can adapt to changing conditions in specific situations (Pyy, 
2000). Usually, HRA relates to methodologies for anticipating and assessing the effect 
of failures that are related to erroneous human actions and not the failure of some 
physical components. It is worth noting that erroneous human action is a major 
contributor to the risk and reliability of many engineering systems. For example, over 
90% of nuclear industry accidents (Reason, 1990a), over 80% of chemical and petro- 
chemical industries accidents (Kariuki and Lowe, 2007), over 80% of marine casualties 
(Ren et al., 2008), and over 70% of aviation accidents (Helmreich, 2000) are initiated or 
caused by erroneous human actions. However, the differences in erroneous human 
actions are attributed to the degrees of coupling between human action and operational 
context, which may vary due to different designs, definitions, training and analysis 
practices (Pyy, 2000). 
The real importance of HRA is to find credible ways of helping designers, managers, 
operators, and authorities to be able to increase the safety and profitability of 
technological systems. These could be achieved by maintaining a risk level as low as 
reasonably acceptable in a working environment. For these reasons the HRA approaches 
are coupled with PSA or PRA. They introduce people to a thought process to perceive 
operating risks and help to define ways in which the risks can be reduced. Having 
identified the risks and their probabilities, the next step can be to decide what, how, and 
when changes should be made, in potential conditions that might lead to a loss of output 
as well as an unsafe systems' state. HRA approaches directly affect the operating cost of 
running system equipment. Basically, reliability is tied to a cost or a failure to provide 
service when required. As a result, loss is usually tied to a loss of reliability (Spurgin, 
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2010). Thus, an increase of system reliability could benefit an organisation's 
profitability. 
Certainly human actions are an essential part in engineering systems' operation and 
maintenance during normal and abnormal conditions. The safe and economic operation 
of such systems can be ensured by proactive measures that may also be complemented 
by a reactive performance analysis to identify causes of specific disturbances. Thus, one 
of the HRA objectives is to concentrate on human actions that are important to system 
safety, such as actions causing system disturbances (initiating events), actions causing 
latent failures in safety-related systems (imperfect intervention), and actions taking 
place during the mitigation of disturbances (controlling actions after initiating events). 
In all respects, human actions can have both positive and negative impacts on safety. 
Consequently, technological, organisational and individual factors that shape human 
actions often appear as PSF embedded in the HRA models (Pyy, 2000). 
2.4.1. Development of HRA 
HRA is a fairly new interdisciplinary research area, developed after the Second World 
War to accelerate the technical development of military equipment. The first 
probabilistic human reliability study was carried out in 1952 for weapon system 
feasibility studies (Swain, 1990). One of the results of this study was that it was applied 
to different ergonomics, reliability, operability and maintainability. As a result, in the 
1960s HRA was transferred to civil applications mainly in NPP control rooms' MMI 
system design. The development of HRA was associated with an increased use of 
probabilistic safety and availability analysis methods (Spurgin, 2010). The first 
probabilistic study for a NPP safety was presented in the 1960s (Farmer, 1967). In the 
middle of the 1970s, a large PSA was published (NRC, 1975). Since then HRA has 
seemed to be tied to PSA/PRA, presumably to meet mandatory safety goal regulations, 
which have focused on the NPP specific reliability characteristic (Hollnagel, 1998a). 
One approach that has been used to narrate the chronological development of HRA 
methodologies from the 1960s to the present day is the so-called first, second, and 
emerging third generation HRA methodologies. However, these methodologies are still 
being developed, and contain elements of controversy in terms of the appropriate 
representation of HFP (Hallbert et al., 2004; Forester et al., 2006; Boring, 2010a; 
Spurgin, 2010). Moreover, the idea that human error is a random event is no longer 
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acceptable; and the concept that humans can be set up to fail due to the context under 
which they are operating is gaining credibility (Reason, 1990b, c; Roberts, 1990; 
Hollnagel, 1998a). This concept means, in effect, that people can do something to avoid 
erroneous human actions. Hence, it is believed that these methodologies still need to 
incorporate more sophisticated understanding of human behaviour, given the many 
developments that have occurred in behavioural, cognitive and organisational sciences. 
These developments could be achieved by extending methodologies underlying 
concepts, models and applicability. 
First generation HRA methods sum the probability of an erroneous human action via a 
simple fault or event tree analysis, which could lead to the ultimate success or failure of 
the operator in achieving his/her desired goal. The first generation HRA methodologies 
are generally referred to as decomposition methods (Hollnagel, 1993). Their fault or 
event tree binary analysis essentially treats the human operator as a component in a 
system. The operator failing to respond to events is termed errors of omission, while 
unintended human action is labelled errors of commission. However, evolutionary 
research in the fields of human behaviour has revealed that operator decision making 
and behaviour cannot be categorised simply as omissions or commissions. Human 
failure is far more complex than the failure of a system component (Doughty, 1990). 
For instance, Reason (I 990c) has formed system failure involving erroneous human 
actions in a model of Swiss cheese slices sliding relative to each other. The system does 
not fail because of a single slice failure; it continues to slide until a series of holes align, 
which forms the failure of several elements almost simultaneously. Basically a system is 
designed with a number of independent safety barriers. Nevertheless, human behaviour 
can link the risks of two or more barriers failing, provided that the system is influenced 
by external events leading to a common cause that may simultaneously disrupt several 
safety barriers. 
The field of psychology has thrown some light on the responses of crews during 
accidents and during normal proceedings. For example, Reason (1990a) has covered the 
separate actions of slips and mistakes. Additionally, Rasmussen (1987) and Reason 
(1990a) have described the classification system known as the Skill, Rule and 
Knowledge (SRK) error modes, in which they have advocated that a skill-based error 
mode is an inattention involving slips and lapses in human attention or concentration. 
Skill-based errors are committed while performing common activities in routine 
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situations. Generally, skill-based performance mode failure probability is typically less 
than 0.0001. Studies in the nuclear industry have shown that roughly 25% of all 
performance mode failures are attributable to skill-based errors (Summers, 2007). On 
the other hand rule-based behaviour is based on selection of stored rules in logic 
recognition. Its prevalent error mode is misinterpretation. Therefore, the greater the 
familiarity with the task achievement, the less likely that perceived risk will match an 
actual risk. Rule-based errors are committed due to misapplication of stored rules 
accumulated through experience and training. Rule-based and knowledge-based 
performance modes involve making choices. Generally, rule-based behaviour failure 
probability would roughly be 0.001 when people make choices or decisions. Studies in 
the nuclear industry have shown that approximately 60% of all errors are attributable to 
the rule-based contribution (Summers, 2007). Furthermore, knowledge-based behaviour 
is a pattern recognizable to the individual and requires diagnosis and problem-solving in 
response to a totally unfamiliar situation without the application of skill- or rule-based 
behaviour. Most decisions are made with limited information and assumptions. 
Consequently, the prevalent error mode is an inaccurate mental model of the system, 
process, or status. Generally, under such circumstances the likelihood of failure is 
particularly high, approximately 0.5. Studies in the nuclear industry have shown that 
roughly 15% of all errors are knowledge-based (Summers, 2007). 
During the 1990s many issues related to HRA were raised by Reason (1990a, b) and 
others (e. g. Roberts, 1990; Hollnagel, 1993). These issues drove the revision of HRA 
methodologies and the adoption of more sophisticated models and understandings of 
erroneous human actions. Thus, recently, second generation HRA methodologies have 
attempted to develop more sophisticated approaches to human reliability, particularly 
the ability of humans to recover and prevent some or all of the consequences of the 
threat of impending system failures (Doughty, 1990). Second generation HRA 
developers have put forward cognitive effect and context impact in their developed 
methodologies. For example, CREAM HRA provides a strong argument for considering 
the use of cognitive factors' effect and context impact on human performance reliability 
(Hollnagel, 1998a). More modern second generation HRA methods, such as the 
Methode d' Evaluation de ]a Realisation des Missions Operateur pour la Surete (where a 
possible translation of the acronym might be "evaluation method to understand 
operators' safety mission") (MERMOS) (Le Bot et al., 1999; Pesme et al., 2007) and A 
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Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA) methods (Cooper et al., 1996; 
Forester et al., 2004; Forester et al., 2007) explicitly consider and model the contextual 
factors in an extensive way. First generation methods largely failed to consider the 
context in which erroneous human actions are made, while the second generation 
methods consider and model the influences of context on erroneous human actions. 
Other distinctions have been drawn based on the consideration of errors of commission 
in the second generation methods, as opposed to a heavy focus on errors of omission in 
the first generation methods. Obviously, the HRA community has been inclined to refer 
to the HRA generational gap simply in terms of chronology. The first developed HRA 
methods are considered the first generation methods, while the subsequent developed 
HRA methods are considered second generation methods. The latter tend to be easier to 
use and have broader coverage than the former. Thus, the actual defining characteristics 
of the second generation methods are the methods' relative novelty, simplicity, and 
comprehensiveness (Boring, 2007). 
In emerging third generation methodologies, a modelling and simulation system of a 
range of human behaviours is used to recover and prevent failure (Chandler et al., 
2006). The importance of simulation and modelling of human performance for the field 
of HRA has been outlined by Cacciabue (1998). It is specifically to address the dynamic 
nature of human performance in a way that has not been found in most HRA methods. 
Several researchers e. g., Jae and Park (1994) and Sträter (2000) have hypothesized the 
need for a dynamic HRA, and have begun developing new HRA methods or modifying 
existing HRA methods to account for the dynamic progression of human behaviour 
leading to HEPs, and following up Human Failure Events (HFEs). There has been an 
interest in combining simulation and modelling in HRA (Mosleh and Chang, 2004; Reer 
et al., 2004; Sträter, 2005; Boring, 2006; Trucco et al., 2006). The simulation may be 
used to produce estimates of PSFs, which can be quantified to produce HEPs based on 
specific HRA methods. The challenge of such an approach is to find a mapping of 
available performance measures from the simulation to the specific Performance 
Influencing Factors (PSFs) required by a HRA method. Having categorised HRA 
methods according to the chronology of their first development, it is perhaps better to 
characterise the different methodologies according to their characteristics (Pyy, 2000; 
Boring, 2007; Spurgin, 2010). 
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2.4.2. HRA models' characterization 
Various HRA models or techniques are available, and each features its own 
characteristics. Based upon their use, a number of approaches have been singled out 
(Salmon et al., 2003; Lyons et at., 2005; Everdij and Blom, 2010; Spurgin, 2010). The 
problem with HRA methods is that they have no common underlying model or 
philosophy, due to the differences among the approaches with respect to their 
development. As a result, they are characterised according to the following concepts: 
task-related models, groups of sub-tasks models, time reliability models, context-related 
models, and context task-related models. A separate group of applications uses only 
expert judgment (Pyy, 2000; Forester, 2006; Boring, 2007; Spurgin, 2010). However, 
the utility of a particular HRA method is a relative function of a number of components, 
not just the absolute value of a method. For example, if the researcher is undertaking a 
completely new application, appropriate data that could be used may be limited. In this 
situation, a method may have to be selected by using generic data. Equally, if selecting a 
method to embody many years of operational data, the researcher is unlikely to select a 
method based upon generic data. For cases where data and experience are available, 
there are a number of approaches that could be used, including expert judgment 
(Boring, 2007; Spurgin, 2010). 
Expert judgment is an integral part of HRA, and it is difficult to proceed in the process 
of HRA without some recourse to its use. Expert judgment is not a model but a process 
of capturing information about human actions based upon the use of the knowledge and 
understanding of persons who are either directly involved in the operation of a system 
or who observe the actions of others. Expert judgment has been used to provide HEPs 
for given actions or estimate the impact of sub-tasks or environments on HEPs. The 
correct use of expert judgment is critical to the HRA process (Comer et at., 1984; 
Boring, 2007; Spurgin, 2010). Figure 2.11 depicts a set of models that are dominated by 
one or other of the above-stated characteristics. 
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Figure 2.11: Various human reliability assessment models reviewed and grouped by characteristics. 
Adapted from Pyy (2000) and Spurgin (2010) 
2.4.2.1. Task-related HRA models 
Task-related HRA models are considered in two groups. The first group includes the 
THERP, and a derivative of the THERP, called the Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) 
approach. The second group includes the HEART, the Nuclear Action Reliability 
Assessment (NARA), and the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human Reliability 
(SPAR-H). SPAR-H appears to fall into both the task group and the context group. This 
is because of the strong contextual influence of SPAR-H PSFs involved in deriving the 
HEP (Gertman et al., 2005; Spurgin, 2010). 
" The THERP 
The THERP approach developed by Swain and Guttman (1983) is based on the results 
of a task analysis, which breaks a task into a number of sub-tasks, and arranges it into 
an assembly of discrete HRA sub-tasks, to form a HRA event tree. To quantify this 
event tree, each of the sub-tasks depicted in a human reliability event tree is allocated an 
estimate of HEP value based on its identifying description in a series of look-up tables 
in the THERP handbook (Swain and Guttman, 1983). The total HEPs in the tree are 
summed to give an overall HEP. To account for human capability to correct an error, 
the THERP approach also introduced the possibility of an operator recovering from an 
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error during the event tree by means of a return path that diminishes the effective failure 
probability. In THERP the task dependency is modelled through a few general 
guidelines specifying some of the factors that may influence the dependence level. 
Guidelines give only generic tendencies of the impact of factors on the dependence 
level, and a lot of room is left for interpretation. The assessment therefore requires a 
considerable amount of expert judgment, which may lack transparency and traceability 
(Zio et al., 2009). The THERP approach is very much an engineering approach to the 
human error modelling problem, as it specifically considers the human action omission 
(Hollnagel, 1993; Kirwan, 1996; Kirwan, 1997a, b; Hollnagel, 1998a; Adhikari et al., 
2009; Spurgin, 2010; Licao et al., 2011). 
Although the PSF concept has been introduced in the THERP method to differentiate 
between tasks being performed in different conditions, the assessment result of similar 
tasks being performed in different applications of the THERP method has shown less 
distinction (Spurgin, 2010). This was attributed to the dominant attitude towards the use 
of similar task procedures and rules for human system interfaces. Considering the effect 
of training on different crews' performance, it would seem that the task is just a part of a 
different set of conditions. Moreover, the THERP PRA model's (event tree) final HEP 
value is based on the results of a task analysis. However, the most essential part 
behind 
the skill of using THERP to sum up HEP is the selection of the key sub-tasks to model 
(Spurgin, 2010). 
The significance of THERP is that it is relatively easy to apply. It can be used for the 
tasks similar to the original applications and mostly it is well documented. The 
weakness of THERP is that it might be difficult to define the number of key sub-tasks in 
a real application and to determine their HFPs. This would affect the task significance in 
defining the overall HEP (Humphreys, 1995; Kirwan, 1996; Kirwan, 1997a, b; Yang et 
al., 2007; Adhikari et al., 2009; Bell and Holyroyd, 2009; Spurgin, 2010). 
" CBDT 
The CBDT approach is a derivative of THERP developed by Beare et al. (1990). It is a 
set of sub-tasks placed in a decision tree or event tree format model. The effective 
overall HEP is obtained by summing the individual sub-tasks' HEP values from the 
output of each separate decision tree. In this respect, CBDT defines the specific areas 
that can lead to failure probabilities. Utilising the CBDT model in the application of the 
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HRA concept demands a high level of experience as to how control tasks are performed 
(Kohlhepp, 2005; Spurgin, 2010). 
The concept of the PSF is a key element in a number of HRA methods. With the use of 
this concept various tasks at different plants can be modelled, and accordingly their 
HEP values can be modified. The main idea of this approach is to capture the essence of 
a situation in which a task is being performed. Purely quantifying a task and 
subsequently adjusting its basic reliability by the use of PSFs makes the topic of human 
reliability very compatible with engineering equipment reliability. As a result, this will 
ignore the understanding of the real impact of the context in which a human is 
performing his/her actions (Hollnagel, 1998a; Adhikari et at., 2009; Spurgin, 2010). 
Most of the strength of THERP applies to CBDT, while CBDT is easier to apply than 
THERP is. The THERP HRA big event tree is replaced by DTs, which makes the HRA 
tree's structure much easier to follow. This would make the definition of sub-tasks 
much easier. The sum of Decision Trees' (DTs) end states is the overall HEP. CBDT is 
generally well documented. The weaknesses of CBDT raised by some users include the 
selection of pathways and limited end states. In addition, the source of the built-in data 
is questionable. CBDT tends to isolate the analysts from the real plant experience. This 
would weaken the meaning of the headings in the decision trees and affect the overall 
HEP (Forester et al., 2006; Spurgin, 2010). 
" HEART 
HEART represents a step forward in the development of task-related methods to deal 
with some limitations of THERP in combining the sub-tasks and their quantification 
process. This development was approached by quantifying the whole task rather than 
building the complete task from the sum of the sub-tasks. Such an approach enables the 
modelling of HRA in operations to be more holistically (Williams, 1988). HEART 
provides a large amount of experience from different industries to the human factor 
effects. It has defined a number of different PSFs, a number of weighting factors 
(composed of Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) and Assessed Proportion of Affect 
(APOA)) to cover the potential influences of different PSFs, and a method to modify the 
basic task with each of these PSFs. The key elements of HEART are to list a number of 
tasks in tabular form along with an associated mean HEP in a range of values to cover 
uncertainties in the estimates. HEART uses the task dependency assessment approach in 
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THERP, which is approximately the case in a number of HRA developments such as 
SPAR-H (Kirwan, 1996; Kirwan, 1997a, b; Yang et al., 2007; Adhikari et al., 2009; 
Spurgin, 2010). 
The strength of the HEART model is appreciated by users, because it is relatively easy 
to apply. It provides the experience gained during a number of PRAs. In addition, it is 
reasonably documented. The weakness of the HEART model is that it is not easy to 
select the key tasks, and the tasks' description is very vague, which would affect the 
tasks' significance in defining HER Data for HEPs are of a very questionable 
derivation. HEART's 38 EPC may have some meaning for general human reliability, 
but not in specific HRA/PRA. HEART demands a high level of expert judgment in 
selecting the appropriate Generic Task Types (GTTs), EPCs and APOA (Adhikari et al., 
2009; Bell and Holyroyd, 2009; Spurgin, 2010; Chadwick and Fallon, 2011). 
" NARA 
NARA was developed by Kirwan et al. (2005) to improve some of the characteristics of 
HEART. This has been undertaken by modifying some of the shortcomings identified in 
HEART. The changes to HEART include replacement of tasks that are considered new 
in NARA now, changes in the value of EPCs, and the HEPs distribution. These values 
are from a new database called CORE-DATA, developed by Gibson et al. (1997) and 
Gibson and Megaw (1999). The NARA tasks are broken down into four groups: task 
execution, plant status and availability of plant resources, alarm/indication response, 
and communications. NARA defines 18 EPCs, as opposed to the 38 in HEART. As 
there is a possibility of repeated terms being multiplied together in the process of 
implementation, leading to very low and unrealistic HEP values, NARA introduced the 
process of Human Performance Limit Value (HPLV) to ensure that the calculated HEP 
does not fall below HPLV (Spurgin, 2010). 
The general mathematical approach taken in NARA is essentially the same as in 
HEART, and it is based on the same idea of a series of task reliabilities modified by 
EPCs. The proportion of EPCs is changed by experts. NARA is currently in the process 
of evaluation, with the possibility of replacing HEART as the HRA method for the 
PRAs. NARA has been reviewed by an international group of HRA experts, which is a 
valuable step in the process of acceptance (Umbers et al., 2008; Spurgin, 2010). 
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The updated version of NARA shows superiority to HEART. It is relatively easy to 
apply and can be applied to a situation with limited data. In addition, it is reasonably 
documented and reviewed by an international group of HRA experts. The weakness of 
the NARA model is that it is not easy to select tasks, although the task descriptions are 
more appropriate than those in HEART. This would affect the task significance in 
defining HEPs. NARA uses a questionable CORE-DATA, even though it is considered 
better than HEART data. Furthermore, NARA needs a high level of expert judgments 
(Everdij and Blom, 2010; Spurgin, 2010). 
2.4.2.2. Time-related HRA models 
" Time Reliability Curve (TRC) 
The concept behind TRC is that a crew will eventually respond to an accident if he is 
given enough time. Therefore the estimated HEP decrease depending on the time 
available before an accident reaches an irreversible point. The TRC is an attempt to 
respond to the criticism of THERP in that it did not cover cognitive actions. THERP- 
TRC is approached by incorporating two sets of TRCs, one for screening and the other 
for final evaluation purposes (Swain and Guttman, 1983). The TRCs are used to assess 
the HEP median value and distribution as a function of time. THERP suggested the use 
of PSFs to modify its TRCs. THERP-TRC represented non-success rather than the no 
response curves given in the other TRCs (Kozinsky et al., 1983). The developing 
interest in TRCs stemmed from the simulator data collection work. Simulation was 
focused more on non-success to capture failures and later recoveries rather than no 
response to successful operations (Bareith, 1996). The basic TRC scaling was 
conceptualized by using a task mean time. It was further modified by Rasmussen (1979) 
SRK model regarding whether the task was considered to be skill, rule, or knowledge 
based. 
The strength of the TRC models relates more to the information gained from the 
simulation derived by the TRCs than to generic information (Parry et at., 1992). Actual 
TRCs based on valuable information yield relative confirmation of accuracy and 
reliability of crews' actions in similar tasks at different plants (Spurgin et at., 1990). The 
TRC represents a random variation of crews' general responses in different plants. TRC 
comparisons indicate the importance of training, procedures, and MMIs. TRCs also can 
be of assistance to the domain experts in their assessment (Spurgin, 2010). 
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The weaknesses of TRC models include the fact that they cannot be used to support the 
definition of HEP for tasks performed over a large available time. Operator reliability 
can be high even for short task times. The use of time as the main variable defining 
crew HEP values is not proven, although the quality of the procedure, MMI, and 
training is more indicative of human error potential. TRCs used in 1-IRA are more 
related to simulator-developed data and the insights gained from these developed data in 
carrying out PRA/HRA studies (Spurgin, 2010). 
2.4.2.3. Context-Related HRA Models 
Context-related HRA models consider the context under which an action takes place in 
order to determine HEP (Hollnagel, 1998a; Spurgin, 2010). Though a context is directly 
related to a task, a HEP is determined by each of the influential context elements. 
Clearly, some of these are the quality of training of the crew, the quality of the 
procedures, the quality of the MMI, and the quality of the communication standards, 
etc. The important context elements depend on the situation being considered, where the 
quality of any context element can vary from reduced, satisfactory and improved. Over 
a range of accidents, the context can vary depending on the amount of attention given to 
each context element by a model designer or operator (Holinagel, 1998a; Boring, 2007; 
Spurgin, 2010). 
" Holistic Decision Tree (HDT) 
HDT model is a context method developed by Spurgin et at. (1990). It was based on 
observation of control room crews' responses to an accident scenario on simulators. The 
simulation results indicated that the operators were more influenced by context rather 
than vague task concepts while responding to accidents. The HDT method was 
developed further by Bareith (1996) and subsequently by Spurgin, (1999,2000) through 
the analysis of the results of simulator sessions carried out with a full complement of 
control room crews. In the HDT method the use of Influence Factors (IFs) is similar to 
the use of PSFs of other methods. Each IF has a range of different Quality Factors 
(QFs), similar to EPCs associated with HEART and NARA; QFs are described in detail 
and based upon the associated technology to cover the potential of IFs (Spurgin, 2010). 
The strength of the HDT method includes its capacity in dealing with the whole 
response by a crew to an accident, and focusing on the context of an accident. The 
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method is also easy to understand. It indicates clearly which parameters can be changed 
in order to improve crew reliability (Spurgin, 2010). 
The weakness of the HDT method is that expert judgment is needed to ascertain the 
quality impact of procedures, and training, etc. The HDT method does not explain 
detailed failures associated with tasks and sub-tasks and does not feature various 
context conditions that need to be defined. The range of HEPs for a given accident 
situation need to be fixed by expert judgment, and this offsets the possible HEP 
accuracy (Spurgin, 2010). 
" CREAM 
CREAM was developed by Hollnagel (1998a). CREAM COCOM-CMs feature human 
competence control in structuring one's actions. CREAM determines the context 
through nine defined CPCs. The CPCs describe the context common conditions, rather 
than task identification. The method also concentrates upon cognitive characteristics 
associated with a task (Hollnagel, 1998a). CREAM is more associated with context- 
related methods like HDT than task-related methods like NARA (Spurgin, 2010). 
Clearly, it is a second-generation HRA model. It is an approach of modelling the 
cognitive effect and context impact of human actions. It is a context driven method with 
a more psychological view of HRA. The context is considered to affect some aspects of 
the operators' cognitive processing. This leads to functional failure, which in turn leads 
to an error. The general concepts are very much in line with current thinking about how 
errors are caused (Hollnagel, 1998a; Yang et al., 2007; Reer, 2008 a, b; Bell and 
Holyroyd, 2009; Adhikari, et al., 2009; Boring, 2010a; Spurgin, 2010). 
Spurgin (2010) said that CREAM data has been selected from a variety of sources (for 
example, Beare et al., 1983; Swain and Guttman, 1983; Williams, 1988; Gertman and 
Blackman, 1994). This was used to demonstrate error probabilities corresponding to the 
13 CFFs associated with a task. However, in evaluating a situation using CREAM, the 
evaluator has then to select the CFF and also determine which CPCs are involved, to 
what degree if involved and which is a high level task (Hollnagel, 1998a; Spurgin, 
2010). 
CREAM Extended in application is somewhat similar to the high level concepts of both 
HEART and NARA, in that they consider a basic value of HEP corresponding to a task 
or CFP and then change the value by a set of modifiers to account for specific 
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performance conditions. In the case of CREAM, these are called CPCs, which are 
weighting factors equivalent to the combination of EPCs and APOA for HEART and 
NARA. In CREAM, the CPCs are double-sided, with a possible positive or negative 
effect on human reliability. The weighting factors, i. e., CPCs, can either decrease or 
increase a CFP. In extreme cases of applying CREAM Extended, it is possible that the 
value of the adjusted CFP becomes larger than one. This is a consequence of the way in 
which the adjustments are made, and the problem can be found in other HRA 
approaches that use the same principle, e. g. HEART. The simple solution to this 
problem is to treat all values greater than one as equal to one, since a probability by 
definition cannot be greater than one. 
CREAM is a very well documented method. The database for cognitive failures 
represents a cross-section of the available data. CREAM data are used to provide a 
demonstration of the method, and not a justification of its accuracy (Spurgin, 2010). 
CREAM defines 13 CFFs for human actions of observation, interpretation, planning, 
and execution. The relationship between CPCs and CFFs- Cognitive Processes (CPs) is 
tabulated, which allows assessment of the influence of CPCs on CPs (Yang et at., 2007; 
Reer, 2008 a, b; Bell and Holyroyd, 2009; Adhikari et al., 2009; Spurgin, 2010). 
The weakness of CREAM is that it is difficult to differentiate between CFFs in practice, 
because the controlling influence is procedure-following, conditioned by training and 
MMI design and layout. The definition of CPCs should better focus on systematic 
influences rather than individual influences (Spurgin, 2010). The tabulated relationship 
between CPC and CPs may be modified by the characteristics of a particular accident. 
There is a need to better qualify terms like adequacy of organisation in retrospective 
applications. Also, some of the words used in the classification scheme tables could be 
better defined (Yang et al., 2007; Reer, 2008 a, b; Bell and Holyroyd, 2009; Adhikari et 
al. 2009; Spurgin, 2010). 
" SPAR-H 
The SPAR-H model was built based on the experience of Gertman et al. (2005) in 
human factors and HRA. The underlying psychological basis for the SPAR-H construct 
is the informational model of human factors. The model conceptualised the diagnosis 
and action of crews' responses to accident conditions. It consists of probabilities 
associated with diagnosis and action. They take the HEP values as 0.01 for diagnoses 
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and 0.001 for actions. The effective HEP is made up of these elements along with a set 
of PSFs stemming from the context and selected by experts. The method can be applied 
to retrospective as well as prospective scenarios (Gertman et al., 2005). 
The strengths of the SPAR-H method include: it is a well-documented HRA method; 
the limited probabilities of diagnosis and action of crews' responses to accident 
conditions facilitate its field applications and it is well designed for intended use and 
provides guidance for PSFs' selection (Forester et al., 2006; Bell, and Holyroyd, 2009; 
Spurgin, 2010). 
The weaknesses of the SPAR-H method include: it is limited in applications because of 
the simplified human performance approach; and the method also needs specific domain 
expertise in using its PSFs' tables (Forester et al., 2006; Bell and Holyroyd, 2009; 
Spurgin, 2010). 
" ATHEANA 
The ATHENA method was developed by Cooper et al. (1996), using the HEP values 
associated with HEART. Forester et al. (2004) and Forester et al. (2007) have used 
domain experts' elicitation of HEPs in the ATHEANA methodology. Expert judgment 
was used to meet the criticism of the HEART database and its justification. ATHEANA 
methodology can be broken down into two parts: identification of human errors within 
an event sequence and quantification of these human errors. ATHEANA has a searching 
method to identify existing Error Forcing Conditions (EFCs) that can lead to errors. 
This type of process is very useful in the case of accident analysis in order to ensure that 
all sources of errors are identified. It is helpful to have such EFC taxonomy for future 
applications. 
The advantage of the ATHEANA method is that it provides taxonomy for considering 
EFCs. It is of a more systematic process in application than other Context-Related 
HRA. It uses an expert judgment elicitation method rather than HEART data. The 
current and future development of the method approach is supported by the United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) (Forester et al., 2006; Reer, 2008a, b; 
Adhikari et al., 2009; Bell and Holyroyd, 2009; Spurgin, 2010). 
One of the weaknesses of the ATHEANA method is that more experience in its 
application is needed. The method needs to integrate simulation results to replace the 
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expert elicitation approach. The method is in need of an approach to simplify its 
problem as to how to identify the more effective EFCs (Forester et al., 2006; Reer, 2008 
a, b; Adhikari et al., 2009; Bell and Holyroyd, 2009; Spurgin, 2010). 
" MERMOS 
MERMOS has been under development for some time to support "Electricite de 
France" EDF activity during NPP accidents (Villemeur et al., 1986; Le Bot et al., 1999). 
The MERMOS method has been centred on the use of simulator information and data 
collected by observers noting the actions of the crew when they are responding to a 
simulated accident. The method makes use of simulator sessions to extract data and 
insights and appears to have a lot of possibilities that can be used as the basis of inputs 
into a PSA. EDF believes that there is a minimum error rate below which one cannot go 
to define HEPs. 
The MERMOS method defines a number of ideas and descriptions relative to HRA, 
with some different terminologies to other HRA methods. One of the clearest 
expositions of MERMOS is presented in the works by Pesme et al. (2007) and LeBot et 
at. (2008). Three noteworthy points are the idea of the human reliability mission; the 
consideration of the set of circumstances effect as a result of an initiating event; and the 
failure of humans or equipment and their interactions. The breakdown of an accident 
sequence into a number of branches is the HRA task. Insights into the breakdown are 
led by EDFs' extensive experience stemming from their years of observation of 
simulator sessions. In addition, the simulator experience has yielded the possibility of 
actual data, as a large number of EDFs' power plants are nearly identical; and these 
sessions can be used to train experts to make more informed estimates of the crew 
HEPs. 
MERMOS is a significant piece of work that has been undertaken by EDF. The method 
had to answer questions resulting from a different relationship between man and 
machine. To really understand everything, a much better understanding of the parts and 
the underlying philosophy of the method is needed. 
The strengths of the MERMOS method are: 1) the use of simulated accident scenarios 
helps to identify the alternative pathways that operators might take; 2) simulator data 
can be used to identify performance-related effects; 3) the available simulator-related 
information and database of operator actions enables analysts to better understand 
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operator actions associated with given accidents; 4) lower limits for HEP are defined by 
virtue of simulator; and 5) the MERMOS data can be used to confirm or refute the 
capability of the EDF operators in effectively dealing with accidents. This information 
can be used to help station managers and safety authorities to identify the need for 
changes to operator training, procedures and instrumentation/ displays in order to 
enhance plant safety (Forester et al., 2006; Reer, 2008a, b; Bell and Holyroyd, 2009; 
Spurgin, 2010). 
The weaknesses of the MERMOS method are that: 1) information and database are of 
EDF propriety; 2) information and database are not transparent to outside persons; and 
3) it is difficult to form a clear picture of the method from published papers - this limits 
insights gained from MERMOS for outside experts performing HRA studies (Reer, 
2008a, b; Bell, and Holyroyd, 2009; Spurgin, 2010). 
" Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) 
The SLIM method was developed by Embrey et al. (1984). SLIM provides a set of PSFs 
and their anchor (reference) values. In assessment of HFP, the SLIM makes use of 
expert judgment to select a number of PSFs and weigh them according to their 
perceived contribution in a given accident. These weighted values are then used to 
derive a modified HEP, using anchor values. SLIM makes use of PSFs to measure the 
influence of the context; therefore, the method relates context to human error. This 
is 
not the same meaning of PSF as used in THERP. A test of SLIM- "Multi Attribute" 
Utility Decomposition (MAUD) indicated that unless the expert elicitation process is 
carried out with care, consistent results will not be obtained. 
The strength of SLIM is that it is the first HRA method based on the HEPs derived from 
context. The method is fairly easy to apply. It should yield plant-specific HEPs rather 
than generic HEPs by using NPP expert domain judgments (Forester et al., 2006; 
Adhikari et al., 2009; Spurgin, 2010). 
The weakness of SLIM is that it lacks the guidance in selecting PSFs that basically need 
to be defined systematically. It demands more effort to determine the relative 
importance of PSFs. The appropriate domain experts in applications of SLIM are rare. 
The appropriate anchor values that are needed to weigh PSFs of SLIM are difficult to 
select (Forester et al., 2006; Adhikari et al. 2009; Spurgin, 2010). 
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2.4.3. Deferential assessment of HRA methods 
The field of HRA aims to identify the causes and sources of erroneous human actions. 
In achieving these aims HRA typically includes defined phases, which range from 
identifying error sources, to modelling these errors as part of a systemic analysis, to 
quantifying HEPs (Boring, 2008). The broad range of HRA methods is therefore used 
mainly for either analysis or assessment of erroneous human actions, or to encompass 
the complete spectrum of HRA (Gertman et al., 2005). Each HRA method is designed 
for specific purposes, and the lack of complete coverage of qualitative analysis and 
quantitative assessment phases by many methods should not necessarily be viewed as a 
shortcoming on behalf of those methods (Boring, 2010a). In the meantime, the current 
HRA practice for dependence assessment has a number of limitations (Podofillini et at. 
(2010). Hollnagel (1998a) and Zio et al. (2009) highlighted the consequential need for a 
new, explicit and transparent dependence assessment method. The THERP dependence 
assessment method is the most widely used, although it may lack traceability and 
repeatability (Zio et al., 2009; Podofillini et al., 2010). 
The broad range of PSFs included in HRA methods vary from small to large sets of 
PSFs. Although each HRA method brings with it a slightly different emphasis and 
slightly different set of PSFs, there is considerable overlap in the PSFs' description. 
This variability in PSFs is a reflection of the vastness of factors that can influence 
human performance; the different approaches used to distil these into a usable set of 
factors; and the different applications for which HRA methods were originally designed 
(Boring, 2010a). Galyean, (2006) has suggested that the need to drill down into the 
degrees of human performance by using an ever-increasing list of PSFs is misguided. 
The advantage of constructing a short list of PSFs, apart from simplifying the amount of 
effort required for an analysis, is that the PSFs could actually be non-overlapping, 
omitting the possibility of double-counting effects, which can have false effects on the 
HEP calculation. 
In structuring HRA-PSA models to sum the overall HEPs of tasks, models are classified 
into holistic and decomposed. The holistic model aims at assessing the human task as a 
whole, whereas the decomposed model aims at dividing the task into small sub-tasks. 
The reason for decomposition is sometimes related to the availability of data and 
sometimes to the risk management viability. Data may be either available on the human 
task as a whole or about different decomposed sub-tasks. In this context, if the model 
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structure is too deep, it might be impossible to collect data and include all dependencies. 
There is also evidence that too decomposed a model may lead to optimistic probabilistic 
results due to, for example, not all the dependencies being taken into account (Poucet, 
1988; Pyy, 2000). 
FAA/EUROCONTROL (2007) proposed a generic safety assessment process including 
seven safety assessment stages, as shown in Figure 2.12. Considering the preceding 
HRA-related extract, Table 2.2 lists the broad range of HRA methods' characteristic 
that can be used further to differentiate between all HRA methods that were reviewed in 
the preceding sections. It also can be used as a guide to extend the scope of applications 
of the chosen method in the safety assessment process. Such characteristics are listed 
according to the following heading and abbreviations: 
" Method name acronym. 
" Type: Specifying whether a human performance analysis method is a specific 
technique denoted by (S), or an integrated method (of more than one technique) 
denoted by (1). 
" Safety assessment stages: Denoting the generic safety assessment process stages in 
which the reviewed HRA methods could be of use. These stages are: 1) scope of the 
safety assessment; 2) learning the nominal operation as it should work or function; 3) 
identify hazards; 4) combine hazards into risk framework; 5) evaluate risk; 6) 
identify potential mitigating measure to reduce risk; 7) safety monitoring and 
verification; 8) learning from safety feedback. 
" Domains: Denoting the industrial ergonomics in which the reviewed HRA methods 
have been used. 
" Application: Denoting the hardware (HW), human (HU), and procedures (PR) in 
which the reviewed HRA methods have been applied 
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Figure 2.12: A generalized seven-stage safety assessment process. Source: FAA/ EUROCONTROL 
(2007) 
Table 2.2: The broad range of HRA methods' characteristics 
Method Safety assessment stages Application 
name 
acronym 
Type 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Domains 
HW HU PR 
THERP S X 
Nuclear/Defence/ 
Marine 
x x X 
CBDT S Ti X Nuclear X 
HEART S X 
Nuclear/ 
Chemical/Defence 
X 
NARA S X Nuclear X 
TRC S X Nuclear X 
HDT S X Nuclear X 
CREAM I X Nuclear/Space/Marine X 
SPAR-H S Aviation X 
ATHEANA S X Nuclear X 
MERMOS I 
Ix 
Electrical/ nuclear x 
SLIM S X Nuclear/Chemical x 
Although some of the first generation methods have a consistent approach to the HRA, 
context is certainly modelled to some extent. Context and cognition are the two features 
that second generation methods are supposed to contain. Emerging third generation 
methods based on more dynamic simulation are still under investigation. Overall, the 
result shows that the second generation HRA methods like CREAM, MERMOS and 
ATHEANA are still at the development stage and their application is limited compared 
to the well established methods like THERP and HEART. However, the ability of 
CREAM, MERMOS and ATHEANA to provide relatively precise qualitative and 
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quantitative results, and with better understanding of human performance under his/her 
cognition effect and specific contexts' impact, distinguishes them as the next generation 
of HRA. 
2.5. Review of uncertainty treatment technique 
Predominantly, all knowledge in the real world is accompanied by a certain amount of 
uncertainty. Historically, human beings have proved the ability to use this uncertain 
knowledge effectively, to shape their model of reality in taking decisions and 
performing actions. How this was done has been an intriguing concern of knowledge 
science enquiry for centuries, as it has the very nature of uncertainty itself. Inevitably, 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is an approach to dealing with uncertainty. The aim of Al is 
to identify the many facets of uncertainty and to represent them so that the knowledge 
they embody can be used effectively. The first step in setting Al to cope with 
uncertainty lies in understanding what uncertainty really is, and in establishing 
techniques to formalise and use uncertainty in cognitive processes. 
When uncertainty is to be dealt with, the possible solutions are as many and various as 
its interpretations are. Many of these solutions share the attitude of viewing the 
knowledge and the uncertainty as two independent entities, and thus treating them by 
means of two distinct loosely-coupled processes. The reasoning process handles 
knowledge as if it were exact, while a parallel uncertainty inference process 
accompanies it, computing the uncertainty affecting each newly derived fact. This 
uncertainty is in its turn usually based on the uncertainty affecting the facts used to 
derive the new fact. The way in which uncertainty is represented and processed by the 
parallel uncertainty inference process is a distinguishing characteristic of the different 
available techniques (Saffiotti, 1987). 
There are many different uncertainty management techniques, which are in need of a 
common framework in which they can be formalized. Thompson (1985) has proposed a 
clean general paradigm in which uncertainty management techniques would be 
formalized. This is structured into four parts: 
" The base elements on which the theory is defined: they would typically consist of an 
algebra of statements describing the object domain, and some certainty and utility 
functions defined over this algebra; 
" The observation reports, that is, how the new evidence is represented in the theory; 
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" The updating mechanism, defining how the transitions from one state of certainty to 
another are performed; 
" The decision mechanism, which reaches a decision based on the state of certainty. 
Granted the above structure for formalizing uncertainty management techniques, the 
updating mechanism of any probability calculus theory is essential to implement what 
Domotor (1985) called the probability kinematics, that is, the movements of the 
probability masses among the statements of algebra. Probability calculus, which takes 
into account both partial knowledge and partial ignorance, virtually became the key 
concept of sciences' development. It is the effective tool necessary to use to formalize a 
progressive approach to the HRA reality. 
Probability calculus needs a precise definition of its foundations, in particular, the 
concept of uncertainty. Accordingly, the most fitting probability calculi of Al 
techniques that are of relevance to the research objectives hypothesis will be presented 
under the following heading: 
" Bayes' theorem 
Bayes' theorem stands on how probabilities attached to a set of (exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive) hypotheses A= {A1,;..., A,, } are to be revised in light of new 
evidence E. In its most popular form, it states that 
P(A,, I E, H) = 
P(AnI H)XP(EIAn. H) 
P(EIH) 
where, 
P(AnjE, H), is the revised posterior probability of An in light of new evidence E, H. 
P(A,, IH), is the is the prior probability of An in light of information H. 
P(EIAn, H), is the likelihood probability of the evidence E given An, H. 
P(ENH), is the marginal probability of E given H. 
where all the probabilities are conditioned by some former information H. H could 
consist of the simple hypotheses of the problem, but usually it consists of the evidence 
( El, .... Em) currently obtained. 
The importance of this theorem lies in its expressing a measurable proportionality (the 
likelihood P(EIAn, H)) between the probability of A. before and after the acquisition of 
the new evidence E. From a knowledge science point of view this means formalizing an 
inductive behaviour. For the purposes of this research it is sufficient to notice that 
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Bayes' theorem is a good candidate for the updating mechanism of an uncertain 
reasoning system. In applications, Bayes' theorem is the kernel of BNs inference 
mechanism about the real world knowledge and the coupled uncertainty (Saffiotti, 
1987). However, the applications of BN will be dealt with in the literature review of the 
related chapter. 
" ER 
The theory of ER came into being in the 1960s from the work of Arthur Dempster 
(1968), and was then put into a suitable form for finite domains by a student of his, Glen 
Shafer (1976); it is often referred to as the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence or D-S 
theory. It can be applied successively to combine any number of bodies of evidence that 
are in symmetric positions; as a result there is no distinction between prior probabilities 
and likelihood functions, as there is in the Bayes theory. Bayesian approaches work well 
only if prior and conditional probabilities are well defined. This might not always be the 
case in most real-world scenarios. However, a more informative approach would be to 
assign the probability belief to the combined bodies of evidence, which can be 
determined by using further information. This representation of uncertainty is difficult 
using Bayes' theory. An extension of the Bayes theory, the Dempster-Shafer evidence 
theory (Shafer, 1976), uses belief and plausibility values to represent the evidence and 
corresponding uncertainty. These values can represent how the uncertainty of a 
hypothesis increases or diminishes as more and more evidence is available to the 
system. The advantage of this approach is that it allows the researcher to work with 
incomplete, ambiguous or conflicting evidence (Srinath and Otman, 2010). 
The application of the Bayes theorem leaves little room for representation of ignorance 
and vagueness in quantitative estimates. Adhering to the classical probability calculus, 
the Bayesian approach can only replace ignorance with indifference. Shafer's belief 
functions are different in this respect. Free from the additively requirement of classical 
probabilities, they preserve the vagueness of subjective beliefs. Together with 
Dempster's combination rule, the belief functions offer an alternative to the Bayesian 
updating of probability estimates. 
Over the past two decades, considerable research has been conducted on integrating 
techniques from Al and operational research for handling uncertain information (Yager, 
1987; Yager, 1995; Yen, 1990; Zimmermann, 1990). Following this line of research, an 
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ER approach has been developed for Multiple Attribute Decision Analysis (MADA) 
under uncertainty (Yang and Singh, 1994; Yang, 2001; Yang and Xu, 2002). This 
approach is based on an evaluation analysis model (Zhang et at., 1989) and the D-S 
theory of evidence (Lopez de Mantaras, 1990). In recent years, the ER approach has 
been applied to decision problems in engineering design, safety and risk assessment, 
organisational self-assessment, and supplier assessment - e. g., motorcycle assessment 
(Yang and Singh, 1994); general cargo ship design (Sen and Yang, 1995); marine 
system safety analysis and synthesis (Wang et al., 1995 and 1996); software safety 
synthesis (Wang, 1997; Wang and Yang, 2001); retrofit ferry design (Yang and Sen, 
1997); executive car assessment (Yang and Xu, 1998); organisational self-assessment 
(Yang et al., 2001); and detection of faults in various mechanical devices (Basir and 
Yuan, 2007). 
" Fuzzy expert system (FES) 
FES is an Al technique designed to mimic how experts solve problems. With this 
technique the decision making process must be explicitly modelled and the relevant 
ambiguities and uncertainties must also be properly taken into consideration. For the 
uncertainties, overlapping Fuzzy Functions (FFs) can be used to quantitatively represent 
the input and output values. For the relevant ambiguities, fuzzy rules can be used to 
constitute the knowledge base clarifying the decision making process. Such expert 
system framework is called FES. Different interpretations of the fuzzy rules are used, 
thus, different procedures for the association of an output conclusion to a given input 
fact can be considered for expert system modelling. As well as this, different methods 
have been applied for the defuzzification of an output fuzzy conclusion to crisp value 
(Dubois and Prade, 1996). 
A fundamental characteristic of a FES is that it must be able to generate an explanation 
of its conclusions by allowing the researcher to systematically trace the steps of its 
reasoning. To assist this aim, the expert system is equipped with an explanatory 
interface that facilitates communication between the user and the expert system. This 
should enable the user to know how the expert system obtained the final conclusion or 
why specific information is being requested from the user. This capability is crucial for 
building user confidence in the expert system. It is also very important for the 
identification of errors, omissions, and inconsistencies in the developed model (Klir and 
Yuan, 1995; Zio et al., 2009) 
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HRA is a fundamental element in the PSA of any techno-logical system. Within HRA 
the assessment of dependence among human failure events is an important activity. 
Current HRA practice for dependence assessment has a number of limitations 
(Hollnagel, 1998a; Zio et al., 2009; Podofillini et at., 2010). To overcome these 
limitations, Zio et al. (2009) and Podofillini et al. (2010) proposed FES to overcome 
some of the above limitations. The capability of the FES is a major added value of the 
proposed procedure. Terano (1983) and Richei (2001) have applied the modelling 
paradigm of FS theory (Zadeh, 1965) to HRA. The vast majority of these applications 
exploit FL for its capability to formally represent qualitative and ambiguous statements, 
rather than to build a FES-capturing expert knowledge. An early approach to applying 
FS theory in HRA focuses on the description of human behaviour in FL terms (Terano, 
1983; Onisawa, 1988). The models thereby derived lead to the evaluation of a 
subjective reliability measure, quantitatively represented by a FS, and which can be 
directly incorporated into a fuzzy fault tree analysis (Onisawa, 1988; Onisawa, 1996; 
Suresh et al., 1996, Huang, 2001). In principle, this allows evaluation of the system 
failure probability while propagating both the uncertainty of the failure rates of the 
hardware components and the ambiguity of the reliability of the human actions. More 
recently, rule-based FESs have been developed to account for the vagueness of the 
linguistic statements associated with the evaluation of the context (Huang, 2001), and 
eliciting expert knowledge to complete classical HRA methods. For example, in 
Konstandinidou (2006), Marseguerra (2006) and Yang et at. (2010) rule-based FES is 
applied to compute human error probabilities via the CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998a), by 
converting the characterization of the CPCs into fuzzy numbers. 
" AHP 
The AHP is a decision aiding method developed by Saaty (1980). It aims to quantify the 
relative importance of a given set of alternatives on a ratio scale, based on the judgment 
of the decision maker. It also stresses the importance of the intuitive judgments of a 
decision maker and the consistency of the comparison of alternatives in the decision 
making process (Saaty, 1980). Since a decision maker intuitively bases his/her 
judgments on knowledge and experience in making decisions, the AHP approach agrees 
well with the behaviour of a decision maker. The strength of this approach is that it 
organizes tangible and intangible factors in a systematic way, and provides a structured 
yet relatively simple solution to the decision making problems (Skibniewski and Chao, 
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1992). In AHP, a hierarchical system is used to analyse a problem in a descending order 
from large to smaller criteria, and it would be possible to connect, through simple paired 
comparison judgments, the small to the large (Kamal, et al. (2001). 
The use of pair-wise comparisons and the hierarchical formulation of criteria is a major 
feature of AHP. One of AHP's strengths is the possibility of evaluating criteria and 
alternatives qualitatively and quantitatively on the same preference scale. These can be 
numerical, verbal or graphical. The use of verbal responses is intuitively appealing, 
user-friendly and more common in our everyday lives than numbers. It may also allow 
some ambiguity in non-trivial comparisons (Ishizaka and Labib, 2011). 
" Entropy 
Entropy is an inherent characteristic of a data sample. In information theory, entropy 
can be used as a measurement for an event knowledge uncertainty, which would decline 
by the increase in the amount of information, as the structure of a system becomes more 
regular, or the function of a system becomes more comprehensive. As a result, entropy 
could be used as an objective measurement of disorder in order to evaluate the implicit 
uncertainty of each attribute based on probability theory. Therefore, the implicit 
information disorder of each attribute can be indicated by its entropy value (Zhang et 
al., 2007). 
" TOPSIS 
TOPSIS is a MCDM model usually developed by DMs to organize the problems to be 
solved. It includes a set of developed decision alternatives and a set of evaluation 
criteria. DMs carry out analysis and comparisons, and use TOPSIS algorithms to 
preference rank the developed decision alternatives. Accordingly, the selection of a 
suitable decision alternative(s) can be made. The base of TOPSIS is rather 
straightforward. It originates from the concept of a displaced ideal point from which the 
compromise solution has the shortest distance (Belenson and Kapur, 1973; Zeleny, 
1974). Hwang and Yoon (1981) have further proposed that the ranking of alternatives 
should be based on the shortest distance from the Positive Ideal Solution (PIS) and the 
farthest from the Negative Ideal Solution (NIS). The ideal solution that maximizes the 
benefit criteria and minimizes the cost criteria is also called PIS; whereas the NIS is also 
called an anti-ideal solution that maximizes the cost criteria and minimizes the benefit 
criteria. The so-called benefit criteria are those for maximization, while the cost criteria 
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are those for minimization (Ziya Ulukan and Kop, 2009). TOPSIS simultaneously 
considers the distances to both PIS and NIS, and a combined measure of these two 
distance is used to preference order the decision alternatives according to their relative 
closeness (Shih et al., 2007). 
2.6. Conclusions 
HRA methods and models are critically investigated to structure a concept for selecting 
an appropriate HRA method. This method is inevitably needed to mitigate the 
contribution of erroneous human actions to the drawbacks of maritime safety. The 
preceding review of HRA methods and models has touched upon their strengths and 
weaknesses. However, a common problem with task-related methods is the difficulty of 
selecting a task within the list of tasks that compares closely with the actual task being 
analysed. This could lead to difficulties in selecting the relevant HEPs. Additionally, 
there are a number of different data sources of HEPs and PSFs used within these HRA 
models. While some are free-standing and have been used by some investigators, others 
draw upon the use of expert judgment from a known domain expertise to provide a HEP 
estimate. Another interesting source of data is from simulator records, however there are 
some limits to its use. 
Context-related methods are based upon knowledge of how the context sets up the 
probability of erroneous human actions. These methods also rely on the same sources of 
data stated above. Though there are questions raised about the appropriateness of this 
data, it seems that there is a need not only for a HRA model to be developed, but also 
for the inclusion of an associated database as part of its work. In this respect, one thing 
that can be done is to accept the model or method but not the data, because it is clear 
that if the original database was constructed from another industry, it cannot be fully 
defended in maritime operations. In fact, the concept of consistency of the used model 
seems to be more important than the accuracy of data, because the latter could lead to a 
situation in which all are unsafe systems to some degree or in some situations. Given 
that expert judgment has been used during the earlier studies of HRA applications and 
in a progressive manner to satisfy an immediate need to estimate the impact of a PSF on 
an HEP, expert judgment could also be used to estimate HEPs for given human 
performance situations in incident/accident scenarios. This data could be collected and 
stored for successive use in model validation. 
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HRA methods could be used to improve human actions and promote safety culture in 
maritime operations. Given that, the preceding review and the differential assessments 
of HRA methods are developed to guide the selection of the appropriate HRA method. 
CREAM is seen as the appropriate HRA method, due to its relative novelty, 
consistency, simplicity, and comprehensiveness. CREAM COCOM-CMs and CPCs 
effect levels could be used to derive a probability value for erroneous human actions. 
CREAM also includes a consistent human performance analysis model that could be 
used to identify the well thought-out initiating events or root causes of incident and 
accident. 
To establish CREAM models for human performance reliability assessment, Al 
technique characteristics can be used to define and update the knowledge and 
uncertainties of human performance in marine engineering operations. Some typical 
uncertainty treatment methods used in this study are reviewed and critically analysed. 
The CREAM HRA method in association with probabilistic models can be developed to 
achieve the aim of this study. As evaluating human action in terms of cognition 
functions' failure in observation, identification, planning and execution in maritime 
operations is difficult to verify, less reliance will be put on the selected method 
associated with database and more reliance will be placed on judgment from a known 
domain expertise to provide estimates of discrete probabilities. Through the 
comprehensive review, it is realised that the application of CREAM needs the support 
of many new models dealing with its inherent shortcomings exposed in the other 
applications, including modelling the interdependencies of CPCs, elicitation of 
subjective data and consideration of multiple criteria in RCO selection to improve HFPs 
etc. Next, such problems will be analysed and addressed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Adequacy of organisation 
Summary 
In this chapter, the human, organisational and technological PIFs and sub PIFs 
affecting the adequacy of organisation reliability are identified. A hierarchical process 
is developed, in which PIFs and sub PIFs are grouped horizontally according to their 
cause/effect relationships, and categorised vertically according to their functioning 
levels. This process underlies the first step of the developed methodology, to establish a 
BN model for the adequacy of organisation reliability assessment in maritime 
operations. Throughout the methodology development, BN's qualitative and 
quantitative characteristics are dealt with, to enable the establishment of a BN model. A 
case study is investigated to validate the established adequacy of organisation BN 
model. BN model sensitivity analysis is also conducted. Finally, the developed technical 
work achievements in this chapter are concluded. 
3.1. Introduction 
Focusing on the human contribution to accident sequences, a well known theoretical 
framework distinguishes between erroneous human actions made at different levels of 
the organisation (Reason, 1987; Reason, 1990c). This framework hypothesises that the 
generation and evolution of an accident depends on the level of the organisation at 
which errors are made: errors made at the highest level of the organisation do not 
necessarily become immediately visible, but remain in a latent state. They propagate 
and expand throughout the organisation, affecting a large number of subsequent 
decisions and then become apparent at the level of active plant operation and control 
(Maurino et al., 1995). In these contexts, adequacy of organisation - one of the nine (in 
CREAM) CPCs - is considered as a major source and cause, affecting human behaviour 
in the active control of marine engineering operations. 
Adequacy of organisation is a backbone CPC in CREAM COCOM-CMs' reliability 
assessment (Hollnagel, I998a). There is little quantitative research associated with its 
assessment and in the literature, specifically in maritime ergonomics. As a concept, 
adequacy of organisation means the ability to safely and reasonably assure the 
organisational requirement for sequential or special configured marine engineering 
operations. In this context, usually systems and equipment utility, operational and 
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reference data, and crew and supervisor competence control, are carefully coupled, 
structured and arranged. Therefore, the effect of adequacy of organisation on 
supervisors and operators needs to be further expanded to identify the relevant PIFs and 
sub PIFs, which affect operators' ability to perform an action in the context of marine 
engineering operations. This includes the operational core and the administrative 
support, containing a body of cognitive knowledge characterised by uncertainty. 
However, to acquire a new inferred quantitative knowledge regarding the organisational 
certainty of system operation demands a method that is able to probabilistically reason 
the effect of identified PIFs and sub PIFs. In this respect, probabilistic theory is the 
prevailing method for dealing with uncertainty, leading to the underlying concept of 
BNs (Tensen and Nielsen, 2007; Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008). 
The probability assessment of adequacy of organisation as an effect of its influencing 
factors is carried out with respect to four discrete states. These are very efficient, 
efficient, inefficient, and deficient. Adequacy of organisation is directly influenced by 
the discrete state levels of variables' operational processes, organisation culture and 
resources management. 
In this technical chapter, Section 3.1 provides the introduction. Section 3.2 provides the 
literature review, including BN's background, fundamental principles of Bayesian 
probabilities, and identification of PIFs and sub PIFs of expanded adequacy of 
organisation in maritime operations. Section 3.3 provides the methodology for 
establishing a BN generic model for the adequacy of organisation reliability 
assessments. Section 3.4 presents a specific case study to validate the established BN 
generic model. Section 3.5 discusses the conclusion regarding the use of a BN 
probabilistic model for adequacy of organisation reliability assessment. 
3.2. Literature review 
3.2.1. BN's background 
BN modelling technique plays an important role in the research of knowledge and 
coupled uncertainty. BN has been successfully applied to different fields due to the 
flexible nature of its network modelling. BN is a high level representation of a 
probability distribution over a set of variables that are used for building models of 
specific problem domains such as adequacy of organisation. BN is represented by a 
graphical model where nodes represent the variables and arcs represent the statistical 
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dependence among the variables (see Figure 3.2). The flexibility of choosing variables 
and of modelling relationships among them based on domain specific nature and strong 
statistical support leads to a high and reliable performance of the BN. This offers a 
convenient way to tackle a multitude of problems in which a researcher wants to come 
to conclusions probabilistically. BN shows the dependence-independence relations in a 
comprehensible form that eases the tasks of decomposition, feature selection, or 
transformation, besides providing a sound inference mechanism (Mittal and Kassim, 
2007). The benefits of using BN representation in this study lie in the way that the 
structure can be used as a compact representation for naturally occurring and complex 
PIFs and sub PIFs affecting, e. g., adequacy of organisation in maritime operations. 
Though BN technique is an effective way of capturing uncertainties, the required 
knowledge and engineering efforts needed to create conditional probability values per 
each given variable in a network are quite high. Additionally, current algorithms that 
can be used to learn prior and conditional probabilities from data are often complex and 
cumbersome to employ and data is not always available. Even though prior probabilities 
can be elicited from experts, they sometimes raise the problem of accuracy in values. 
However, translating experts' qualitative knowledge into numerical probabilistic values 
is a daunting and often complex task. 
BN explicitly represents uncertainty in a way that can be clearly understood. Although 
it can be used to do so, BN is not ideally suited to situations where it is necessary to 
represent complexity in great detail or where concepts of cause and effect are not 
enough to capture ideas of how the model functions. Moreover, in BN the 
representation of uncertainty requires information on what that uncertainty might be. 
This needs an increase in the amount of information that has to be put into the model. 
Therefore, it is unavoidable to have information associated risks assessed. 
3.2.2. Fundamental principles of Bayesian probabilities 
BNs as graphical models provide a natural way of dealing with two major problems, 
uncertainty and complexity. In addition, they provide intuitive ways in which both 
humans and machines can model a highly interactive set of random variables, as well as 
complex data structures, to enable them to make logical, useful, and valid inferences 
from data. Basically, in mathematical notation, a graph (G) is simply a collection of 
vertices (V) and edges (E), that is, G= (V, E) and a typical graph (G) is associated 
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with a set of variables (nodes) N=( Xl, X2 ... Xn} and by establishing one to one 
relationships among the variables in (N), each edge in a graph can be either directed or 
undirected. 
Directed graphs in particular consist only of directed edges. Directed Acyclic Graph 
(DAGs) are special kinds of directed graphs that do not include cycles. One of the 
advantages of directed graphs over undirected graphs is that DAGs can be used to 
represents causal relationships among two or more variables, for example, an arc from 
(A) to (B) indicates that (A) causes (B). Such a feature can be used to construct a 
complex graph with many variables. Additionally, directed graphs can encode 
deterministic as well as probabilistic relationships among variables. BNs are an example 
of DAGs, where nodes represent random variables and the arcs represent direct 
probabilistic dependences among the variables (Pearl, 1988). 
Building on graph theory and conditional probability, Bayesian modelling is the process 
of using initial knowledge and updating such belief using Bayes' theorem in relation to 
the probabilistic theory, resulting in BNs (belief networks, causal probabilistic 
networks, or causal networks). Bayesian interpretation of probability is based on the 
principles of conditional probability theory. In Bayesian statistics, conditional 
probabilities are used with partial knowledge about an outcome of an experiment 
(Daniel et al., 2005). For example, such knowledge is conditional on relationships 
between two related events (A) and (B), such that the occurrence of one will affect the 
occurrence of the other. Suppose event (B) is true, that is, it has occurred, and then the 
probability that (A) is true given the knowledge about (B) is expressed as P (AIB). This 
notation suggests the following two assumptions: 
1. Two events (A) and (B) are independent of each other if P(A) = P(AIR) 
2. Two events (A) and (B) are conditionally independent of each other given C if 
P(AIC) = P(AIB, C) 
From the above two assumptions, Bayes' theorem swaps the order of dependence 
between events. For instance: 
3. P(AIB) = P(A'B)P(A) P 
P(AID) = P(BIA)P(A) P(B) 
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p(AIB) - 
P(BIA)P(A) 
Tj P(BIAJ)P(A1) 
where j indicates all possible states of (A); 
"P (AFB) is posterior probability given evidence (B). 
"P (A) is the prior probability of (A). 
"P (BIA) is the likelihood probability of the evidence given (A). 
"P (B) is the marginal probability of (B). 
3.2.3. Identification of PIFs and sub PIFs of expanded adequacy of organisation in 
maritime operations 
3.2.3.1. The hierarchical process of PIFs and sub PIFs 
The hierarchical process of expanded adequacy of organisation categorises the 
identified PIFs and sub PIFs vertically into four categories. They are designated from 
top down respectively as root cause, sub-condition, condition and functional PIFs. 
Horizontally, the PIFs and sub PIFs are classified into three groups, specified from left 
to right as process, culture, and resources (see Table 3.1). PIFs and sub PIFs' 
relationship as children-parents, descendents-ancestors, can be identified intuitively 
from the following sections definitions and the mapping of adequacy of organisational 
BN shown in Figure 3.2. 
The PIFs and sub PIFs' relationships are structurally based on their compatibility to the 
real world of maritime ergonomics. Their relationships are identified in connection with 
their definitions. To simplify and eliminate the uncertainty associated with PIFs and sub 
PIFs' subjective assessment approach, their assessment is carried out on two discrete 
state levels. However, the adequacy of organisation is assessed on four discrete state 
levels, in order to qualify and agree the proposed model assessment results with 
CREAM - one of the nine CPCs' discrete state levels - in quantifying COCOM-CMs' 
reliability. 
The identification of PIFs and sub PIFs in maritime ergonomics is carried out with 
reference to the literature available on the research of HRA from the leading nuclear, 
aviation, health, and chemical industries. To adapt PIFs and sub PIFs in maritime 
operations, a corporate management generic structure is followed. The generic structure 
is derived from the literature references stated in association with the definition of each 
PIF and sub PIF. Thus, a hierarchical process is developed to arrange the identified PIFs 
and sub PIFs (see Table 3.1). This process underlies the first step of the developed 
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methodology, to establish a BN model for the adequacy of organisation reliability 
assessment. 
Table 3.1: Adequacy of organisation extended PIFs and sub PIFs hierarchical process 
PIFs groups Process Culture Resources 
PIFs categone 
Root cause Management commitment. Management commitment. Proactive control 
Crew involvement. Crew involvement. measures. 
Proactive control measures. Reactive control measure. 
Reactive control measure. Availability of 
Standards, equipments and records. 
Policy. Quality of equipments 
Communication. and records. 
Strategy and objectives. Availability of condition 
Maintenance procedures. monitoring and controls. 
Contingency procedures. Trust of condition 
Operational procedures. monitoring and controls. 
Skill of human resources. 
Knowledge of human 
resources. 
Motivation of human 
resources. 
Sub-condition Controls. Controls. 
Safety culture. 
Norm. 
Condition Human resources. Safety culture. Operational processes. 
Organisational culture. Norm. Organisational structure. 
Management quality. Organisational structure. Safety management 
Organisational structure. Operational processes. system. 
Safety management system. Equipments and records. 
Condition monitoring and 
performance control. 
Human resources. 
Functional Operational processes Organisational culture Resources management 
End point effect Adequacy of organisation 
3.2.3.2. Operational processes 
Operational processes involve a dynamic set of human actions. In these processes the 
competences of operators or supervisors in controlling marine engineering operations 
are affected by working contexts. Operational processes constitute the core functions of 
an effective and efficient system operation (Mullins, 2005; Kondalker, 2007). The 
probability assessment of operational processes is based on two state levels, these are 
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effective and ineffective. Organisationally, the operational process effect is directly 
influenced by the discrete state levels of variables' SMS, organisational structure, and 
management quality. 
3.2.3.3. Management quality 
Management quality reflects the follow up and support of managerial process tools such 
as standards, polices, and controls used to govern the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
operational process in correlation with the SMS and organisational structure (Schein, 
1985; Mullins, 2005; Kondalker, 2007). The probability assessment of management 
quality is based on two state levels, high and low. Management quality effect is directly 
influenced by the discrete state levels of variables' standards deployed, policy followed, 
and proactive and reactive control measures implemented. 
3.2.3.4. Standards 
Standards are the acknowledged measure of comparison in a form of rules, regulations 
and guidelines established by recognised bodies such as classification societies, 
legislative organisation and system manufacturers (Schein, 1985; Mullins, 2005; 
Kondalker, 2007). Their probability is assessed with respect to two state levels, adapted 
and not adapted. 
3.2.3: 5. Policies 
Policies are mandatory general guidelines adapted from standards to be implemented. 
Policies are required to be considered by operators and supervisors while performing 
their managerial, operational, maintenance, and contingency tasks. As guidelines, they 
are changeable, considering the situation at a particular time. For example, policies lay 
down broad parameters under which the job is undertaken by individuals to attain the 
overall organisational goals (Schein, 1985; Mullins, 2005; Kondalker, 2007). Their 
probability is assessed using two state levels, clear and unclear. 
3.2.3.6. Controls 
Controls are a set of proactive and reactive measures and procedures performed by 
required control bodies. They are in place to assure that a human is safely performing 
the effective and efficient operational process with respect to the operational standards 
(Schein, 1985; Mullins, 2005; Kondalker, 2007). The probability assessment of controls 
is based on two state levels, effective and ineffective. Controls effect is directly 
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influenced by the discrete state levels of variables' proactive control measures and 
reactive controls measures. 
3.2.3.7. The proactive and reactive control measures 
Proactive control measures are dedicated to prevent, detect, protect, recover and contain 
the events that may combine to initiate an accident; while reactive control measures are 
used to learn the lessons of past experience and to develop appropriate feedback 
mechanisms. Reactive control measures deductively investigate accidents' initiating 
events, and analyse their root causes. Proactive control measures cover a wide spectrum 
of applications comprising both safety assessment and design approaches. In particular, 
they are exploited for PSA, safety analysis of maximum credible accidents, design of 
standard and emergency procedures, design of decision support tools, and operator 
training (Maurino et al., 1995). 
Proactive controls are measures that can be used before an event occurs to assess the 
safety level of the system as a whole (Reason, 2002; Vervloesem, 2000). Their 
probability can be assigned on two discrete states, good and poor. 
Reactive controls are measures which can be applied in context disturbances and after 
the occurrence of an event (Reason, 2002; Vervloesem, 2000). Their probability is 
assessed based on two discrete states good and poor. 
3.2.3.8. Organisational structure 
Organisational structure is the mapping of the formal and informal consistency of 
operational processes. Formal consistency has well defined lines of command and 
control, delegation of authority, and a system where effective coordination can be 
carried out; it lays down detailed policies, procedures, and standing orders, so that 
everybody is aware of his/her duties and obligations towards the effective and 
ineffective operational processes. In other words, organisational goals are set and 
individual tasks are assigned, and supervision and control strictly exercised. An 
informal organisational structure is developed in the shadow of the formal 
organisational structure in a form of organisational culture. Informal organisation has 
group goals, social roles to play, leader-follower relationship, unwritten behaviour 
patterns, and a code of conduct. It enhances the effectiveness of organisational 
communication channels. The informal organisational structure is a powerful instrument 
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and runs parallel to the formal organisational structure. The leaders of the informal 
organisation train subordinates and assist them when necessary, in order to ensure 
welfare, promotional, financial and social obligations are fulfilled by the management. 
The power of the informal organisations is immense: sometimes it means a failure or a 
success for an organisation, which must be understood by the management (Schein, 
1985; Mullins, 2005; Kondalker, 2007). 
Two state levels, effective and ineffective are developed to assess the conditioned 
probability of an organisational structure of a maritime entity on the level of ship 
owners/management as well as onboard ships. The organisational structure of a 
maritime entity is directly influenced by communication, strategy and objective, 
management quality, and organisational culture. 
3.2.3.9. Objectives 
The success of a maritime organisation is measured by the progress of its employees 
towards goals set. Management has a responsibility to clarify organisational goals and 
to attempt to integrate personal competence goals with the overall objectives of an 
organisation. The degree of integration can be improved by directing individuals' efforts 
towards the success of an organisation in an effective operational process (Schein, 1985; 
Mullins, 2005; Kondalker, 2007). An organisation's goals may be pursued in 
accordance with organisational principles, which are based on employee beliefs, values 
and attitudes. Organisational principle determines the culture of an organisation and 
provides a set of standards that govern the overall conduct of an organisation (Brown, 
1992). 
Clearly defined and agreed objectives are the first stage in the design of an 
organisation's structure. They help to facilitate systems of communication between 
different parts of the organisation. The ability to communicate corporate objectives to 
those responsible for seeing that those objectives are achieved is also an essential 
characteristic of an effective incentive payment scheme for all the organisation's 
employees (Richardson and Thompson, 1994). 
The choice of objectives is an essential part of a decision-making process involving 
future courses of action. Objectives may be set out either in general terms or in more 
specific terms. General objectives are determined by top management. Specific 
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objectives are formulated within the scope of general objectives and usually have more 
defined areas of application, and time limits. 
Although objectives may sometimes be implicit, however, the formal explicit definition 
of objectives will help to highlight the activities that an organisation needs to undertake 
and the comparative importance of its various functions. An explicit statement of 
objectives may assist communication and reduce misunderstandings, and provide more 
meaningful criteria for evaluating organisational performance. Objectives should not be 
stated in such a way that they detract from recognition of possible new opportunities, 
potentially dangerous areas, and the initiative of staff or the need for innovation or 
change. Objectives can be measured through assigning probabilities on two discrete 
states, clear and unclear. 
3.2.3.10. Strategy 
An explicit strategy is necessary for the operational process due to the following 
reasons. First, there is a need for individuals to co-operate in order to achieve the 
benefits of their mutual reinforcement. Secondly, there is a need to consider the effects 
of changing ergonomic conditions. The absence of an explicit concept of strategy may 
result in members of the organisation working at cross-purposes. The intentions of top 
management may not be communicated clearly to those who are expected to implement 
these intentions. Obsolete patterns of behaviour become very difficult to modify. 
Changes will become increasingly unreliable as subjective or intuitive assessment 
increases. To develop a successful statement of strategy demands a creative effort. This 
may require different methods of behaviour and often a fundamental change in the 
nature of interactions among managers. Effective strategic management creates a 
productive alliance between an organisation's culture and the resources it has at its 
disposal (Richardson and Thompson, 1994; Tilles, 1969). Hence, if the operational 
processes are to be successful then the organisation's structure must be related to its 
objectives and strategy. The structure should be appropriately designed to suit 
environmental influences, continuing development, and management of opportunities 
and risks. Strategy probability can be assessed using two discrete state levels, clear and 
unclear. 
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3.2.3.11. Communication 
Communication is the most vital element of any organisation. Without communication 
an organisation would only be an inoperative assembly of people, objects and processes. 
Organisational effectiveness depends on the quality of communication, which gives life 
to organisational structure. Communication holds operational processes and 
organisational structure together. If communication stops, the organisation will cease to 
exist. Communication is a dynamic force that shapes an organizational behaviour. The 
strength and weakness of this force are highly dependent on the effective downstream' 
and upstream' patterns of communication. Communication is vital for the very 
existence of ergonomics as there is a need to communicate with external organisations 
and agencies, and incorporate various inputs for survival and growth. Communication 
shifts information of value acquired from the environment to various departments, crew 
and individuals. Effective communication is an essence of successful managers, 
supervisors and operators. Effective management is an output of successful 
communication. Poor communication or ineffective communication is a source of 
frustration, interpersonal conflict and stress. Effective communication is essential for 
management to successfully perform its functions. It is an essential ingredient in 
managing employee relationships. The operational processes are meaningless unless 
everyone is willing to put in an effort together to achieve its objectives. Communication 
is essential to keep the entire organisation functioning at an optimum level, enabling 
management personnel to achieve their highest effectiveness. Yet management needs to 
confide in employees and make them aware of organisational policies, problems and 
vision, and this is where communication plays an essential role (Mullins, 2005). To 
measure communication, two discrete state levels, effective and ineffective are 
proposed. 
3.2.3.12. SMS 
SMS forms an actual management attitude for occupational safety and environmental 
protection. SMS is a comprehensive control of safety and includes the management of 
methods, procedures and people. Safety management comprises both preventive and 
corrective actions that aim to improve the working environment. It emphasises the role 
of management as a body that controls and takes charge of safety. The management is 
responsible for setting goals, providing resources and supervising implementation 
(Kuusisto, 2000; Hale et al., 1997; Hale and Baram, 1998; EPSC, 1996; HSE, 1997). 
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While SMSs may vary considerably in their practical implementation, they are all used 
to control the following fields: 
" Safety policies and plans (including the definition and prioritisation of safety 
objectives, and the development of their implementation programmes). 
" Organisation structure and communication effectiveness (definition of 
responsibilities and creation of communication channels). 
" Risk management (identification and assessment of risks, and risk control methods). 
" Auditing and assessment (conducting proactive and reactive control measures) 
(Booth and Lee, 1995). 
SMS suffers from the problems of massive management systems and documentation of 
information. In practice, the focus of SMS audits and inspections is easily drawn to the 
organisational structures and processes instead of their contents (B. S. 8800,2004; 
Reason and Hobbs, 2003). Therefore, it can only be used to aim at ensuring safety. 
SMS can be measured using two state levels, effective and ineffective. SMS of a 
maritime organisation at the levels of ship owners/management as well as onboard ships 
is directly influenced by management quality and procedures. 
3.2.3.13. Procedures 
Procedures are written instructions as to how tasks are to be done, what they involve, 
and the sequence to be undertaken. An organisation's SMS lays down operational, 
maintenance, and contingency procedures. Considering the occupational culture, it is 
worth noting that standing orders, policies, rules and procedures should be carefully 
drafted. It would be desirable if procedures are provided in a shortened form to the 
crews and supervisions, preferably in an understandable language. This will assist in 
simplifying the functioning of the whole organisation. Too many instructions in the 
form of standing orders, policies, rules and procedures may lead to false perceptions by 
operators and supervisors (Mullins, 2005; Vervloesem, 2000). Procedures are usually 
not considered to be a tool that operators can use to control the process; instead, they are 
thought of as something that controls the operators (Schulman, 1996). Procedures are 
typically designed in accordance with the constraints and characteristics of the 
operational process to be controlled, instead of taking into consideration the 
characteristics of the users (Dien, 1998). Procedures can be assessed using two state 
levels, performed and not performed. 
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3.2.3.14. Organisational culture 
Organisational culture consists of norms, values and unwritten rules of conduct as well 
as management styles, priorities, beliefs and interpersonal behaviours that prevail. 
Together they create the climate that influences the issue as to how well people can 
communicate, plan and make decisions (Sinn and Larry, 1991; Kondalker, 2007). In 
other words, organisational culture consists of (Schein, 1985): 
" Practices (e. g. work order procedure, incident reporting system). 
" Norms (if one is not sure about how to carry out task, then ask for assistance). 
" Values (occupational safety, efficiency, skills). 
" Conceptions (one becomes a professional by doing, not by reading) 
" Assumptions (if there is an event, someone has made an error. Technology is more 
reliable than human beings). 
The main functions of organisational culture (Mullins, 2005): 
" It gives members an organisational identity (i. e., sharing norms, values and 
perceptions), and gives people a sense of togetherness that helps promote a feeling of 
common purpose. Culture provides a shared pattern of cognitive perceptions or 
understanding about the values or beliefs held by the organisation. This enables the 
members in the organisation to think and behave as they are expected to. 
" It facilitates organisational members' cooperative commitment. The common 
purpose that grows out of shared culture tends to elicit strong commitment from all 
those who accept the culture as their own. It provides the organisational members 
with a shared pattern of feeling in terms of value and belief. 
" It promotes system stability. By encouraging a shared sense of identity and 
commitment, culture encourages lasting integration and cooperation among the 
members of an organisation. It enhances social stability by holding the organisational 
members together and providing appropriate standards for which they should stand. 
" It shapes behaviour by increasing members' awareness of their surroundings. An 
organisational culture serves as a source of shared meaning that explains why things 
occur in the way they do. Organisational culture is not fully visible but is able to be 
felt. At a less visible level, culture reflects the value shared by organisational 
members. 
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" It provides a boundary. Culture creates distinction between one organisation and the 
other. Such a boundary definition helps identify members and non-members of the 
organisation. Culture serves as a control mechanism that guides and shapes the 
attitude and behaviour of organisational members. 
" It helps organisational members stick to conformity and an expected mode of 
behaviour. Culture ensures that everyone thinks and behaves in a prescribed manner. 
Organisational culture assessment is carried out based on two state levels, acquired and 
not acquired. Organisational culture of a maritime organisation on the levels of ship 
owners/management and onboard ships is directly influenced by safety culture and 
norm. 
3.2.3.15. Safety culture 
The concept of safety culture aims at drawing attention to the principles underlying safe 
operations that guide daily activities, and its associated decision-making. It is closely 
related to the notion of organisational culture. Safety culture is used to study 
organisational activities of safety in a normative concept. It is also used to assess an 
organisation's performance in terms of safety. It also sets requirements for the 
organisation (Harvey et al., 2002). 
The safety culture Of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation's health and safety 
management. Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by 
communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of 
safety, and by confidence in the efficiency of preventive measures (HSE, 1997). As 
indicated by its definition, safety culture is an evaluative concept that includes criteria 
for the operation of good safety critical systems. These include: the positive attitude of 
crew and supervisors towards safety rules; management opinion prioritised on safety 
issues must always be based on risk assessment over economy; and the disclosure of 
safety investigation results from which preventive measures can be learned. Safety 
culture has also been assessed using different kinds of indicators for the performance of 
organisations. Such indicators include accidents, and events reported to the authorities, 
as well as crew and supervisors' participation in safety training (Schein, 1985; Booth, 
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and Lee, 1995; Kuusisto, 2000; Clarke, 2003; Kondalker, 2007; Lee and Harrison, 
2000). 
To assess safety culture two discrete state levels, acquired and not acquired are 
developed. Safety culture of a maritime organisation at the levels of ship 
owners/management and onboard ships are directly influenced by crew involvement and 
management commitment. 
3.2.3.16. Norm 
Norm is acceptable standards of behaviour that are shared by a group of members 
(Schein, 1985; Mullins, 2005). When agreed to and accepted by the group, norms act as 
a means of influencing the behaviour of its members with a minimum of external 
control. Group norms that are favourable to the organisation are associated with 
organisational pride, team work, honesty, security planning, and relationship. The 
behaviour of an individual as a group member must be acceptable to all the other 
members; this will give an individual good standing and recognition in the group. If 
norms are violated by an individual, corrective measures should be applied. 
The following norms are generally found and practised by all organisations: 
" Performance norms are the standards set by the individual worker and approved by 
the superiors. 
" Appearance norms are related to dress code and code of conduct in the organisation. 
These norms are built into the organisational culture. With regards to code of 
conduct, an individual is expected to be loyal and display total dedication to the 
organisation he/she serves. Group norms are a very powerful tool for high 
productivity and maintenance of peaceful relationships among crew members. 
" Behavioural norms are guidelines for general behaviour issued by the management 
so that all the employees display behaviour in an accepted manner. These norms 
eventually take the form of organisational culture and are very useful for bringing 
down conflict or stress level among the group members. Norms are developed over a 
long period of time. It may take sufficient time for them to be formalized and 
understood as norms that will not be violated by group members (Kondalker, 2007). 
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Norm can be estimated using two state levels, committed and not committed. The norm 
of a maritime organisation at the levels of ship owners/management and onboard ships 
is directly influenced by crew involvement and management commitment. 
3.2.3.17. Management commitment and crew involvement 
Management commitment and crew involvement are crucial for obtaining an efficient 
organisational culture. Organisations with positive cultural alignment demonstration are 
generally more resistant to the unsafe conditions and hazards that may occur when a 
system fails. A positive safety culture does not guarantee accident-free operations, but 
rather illustrates an organisation committed to proactive and collaborative solutions in 
the continual battle against system error. Key indicators of safety culture include 
organisational commitment to safety, operational interactions, formal safety indicators, 
and commitments to norms. 
Organisational commitment to safety refers to the degree to which an organisation's 
management prioritises safety in decision making, and allocates adequate resources to 
safety management. In particular, an organisation's commitment to safety is reflected in 
three sub- factors, including (Thaden and Gibbons, 2008): 
" Safety values: These are expressed in words and actions by leadership. This reflects 
the commitment to safety at the top level of the organisation. Safety performance 
should be actively managed and monitored with the same systematic effort and 
attention given to the goals of company finances. 
" Safety fundamentals: This means compliance with regulated aspects of safety such as 
training requirements, manuals and procedures, equipment maintenance, and 
coordination of activity within and between supervisors and crew. At this level, the 
organisation should encourage safe practices as a way of operating systems and 
provide a solid framework to meet those safety requirements. 
" Going beyond compliance: This is the priority to allocate company resources with 
regard to safety (e. g., equipment and personnel time) even though they are not 
required by regulations. This may be reflected in areas such as human resources 
management, scheduling of shift work and rest time, providing advanced technology 
when essential, fatigue management programmes, and other scientifically based risk 
management systems. 
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Distinctive relationships between crew supervisors, middle management, and other 
operational personnel who take safety into account during their work reflect typical 
operational interactions. This refers to the degree to which those directly involved in 
supporting work or the supervision of crews are actually committed to safety and 
reinforce the safety values espoused by upper management, when these values are 
positive. They include (Thaden and Gibbons, 2008): 
" The safety concerns and involvements of senior officers, superintendent engineers, 
and designated persons ashore on the part of maritime organisation responsibility, 
particularly their proactive concern for crew and system safety, and their ability to 
ensure a safe environment. 
" The extent to which those who offer and provide safety training are deemed 
effective, and deal with the actual risk issues associated with particular system 
operations in the marine domain. In other words, is safety training integrated across 
all operational personnel? Are the personnel trained to the best industry practice 
standards? 
" Effectively managing, maintaining, and inspecting the safety integrity of the 
equipment, tools, and procedures, etc., and conveying information through 
conducting safety briefings. 
Management commitment and crew involvement being influencing variables in the 
adequacy of the organisation model can be measured using two state levels, high and 
low. 
3.2.3.18. Resource management 
Resource management is related to the efficient and effective deployment of an 
organisation's resources when they are needed. Such resources may include human 
skills, knowledge and motivation, availability and trust of condition monitoring and 
performance control technology utilized in system operational processes, and quality 
and availability of equipment and records' inventory (Kelly, 2006). 
Resource management can be estimated by two state levels, effective and ineffective. 
Resource management of a maritime organisation on the levels of ship 
owners/management and onboard ships is directly influenced by system condition 
monitoring and performance control, equipment and records, and human resources. 
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3.2.3.19. Condition monitoring and performance control 
Condition monitoring and performance control are sophisticated automation systems. 
They are becoming apparent everywhere in marine engineering operations; they are as 
diverse as process control and information retrieval application. Automation is 
technology that actively selects data, transforms information, makes decisions, or 
controls processes. Such technology exhibits tremendous potential to extend human 
performance and improve safety. However, recent disasters indicate that automation is 
not uniformly beneficial. On one hand, people may trust automation even when it is not 
appropriate, thus failing to intervene and take manual control action when necessary 
(Lee and Sanquist, 2000). On the other hand, people are not always willing to put 
sufficient trust in automation, thus undermining its potential benefits. As automation 
becomes more prevalent, poor partnerships between people and automation will become 
increasingly costly and catastrophic. Such flawed partnerships can be described in terms 
of misuse and disuse of automation (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997). Misuse refers to the 
failures that occur when people inadvertently violate critical assumptions and rely on 
automation inappropriately; whereas disuse signifies failures that occur when people 
reject the automation's capabilities. Misuse and disuse are two examples of 
inappropriate reliance on automation that can compromise safety and profitability. 
Automation can be a very complex combination of many modes, and reliance is often a 
more graded process. Automation reliance is not a simple binary process; however, 
understanding how to mitigate disuse and misuse of automation is a critically important 
problem with broad ramifications. Recent research suggests that misuse and disuse of 
automation may depend on certain feelings and attitudes of users' trust-based 
competence control complemented by automation availability (Lee and See, 2004). 
Condition monitoring and performance control in the adequacy of the organisation 
model can be measured using two state levels, reliable and not reliable. Condition 
monitoring and performance control of marine systems onboard ships is directly 
influenced by system trust and availability. 
3.2.3.20. Trust 
Trust, as a social psychological concept seems to be particularly important for 
understanding human-automation partnerships. Trust can be defined as the attitude that 
an agent will help achieve an individual's goals in a situation characterized by 
uncertainty and vulnerability (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997). This basic definition must 
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be elaborated on in order to consider the appropriateness of trust, the influence of 
context, the goal-related characteristics of the agent, and the cognitive processes that 
govern the development and erosion of trust. In this definition, an agent can be an 
automation or another person that actively interacts with the system's operation on 
behalf of the operator (Lee and See, 2004). Many studies have demonstrated that trust is 
a meaningful concept to describe human-automation interaction in both naturalistic 
(Parasuraman and Riley, 1997) and laboratory settings (Muir and Moray, 1996; Lee and 
Moray, 1992; Halprin et al., 1973; Lewandowsky et al., 2000). These observations 
demonstrate that trust is an attitude towards automation that affects reliance and that it 
can be measured consistently. People tend to rely on automation they trust and reject 
automation they do not. By guiding reliance, trust helps to overcome the cognitive 
complexity people face in managing increasingly sophisticated automation. Human- 
automation trust and reliance depends on characteristics of the automation, the 
individual, organisational, and cultural context. This context affects initial levels of trust 
and how people interpret information (Lee and See, 2004). 
Trust as a discrete variable in the adequacy of organisation model is assessed based on 
two state levels, high and low. 
3.2.3.21. Availability 
Availability of condition monitoring and performance control systems is determined by 
reliability (the probability of the system effectively working) and maintainability (the 
ability to restore the system to service). Availability is the measure of the time at which 
the system is in an operational state compared to the total life time (Benbow and 
Broome, 2008). 
Availability of condition monitoring and performance control systems in the adequacy 
of an organisation model is measured on two state levels, high and low. 
3.2.3.22. Human resources 
Human resources are the scarcest and most crucially productive resource that creates the 
largest and longest lasting advantage for an organisation. It resides in the knowledge, 
skill, and motivation of humans, who are under the right conditions learn and grow 
better with age and experience, which no other resources can do (Kelly, 2006; 
McGregor, 1987). 
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Human resources as a discrete variable in the adequacy of an organisation model can be 
measured using two state levels, sufficient and insufficient. Human resource in a 
maritime organisation is directly influenced by human skill, knowledge and motivation. 
3.2.3.23. Knowledge 
Knowledge in engineering and science can be defined as a body of justified true beliefs 
(such as laws, models, objects, concepts, know-how, processes, and principles) acquired 
by human beings about a system of interest, where the justification condition can be met 
based on the reliability theory of knowledge. The most basic knowledge category is the 
cognitive knowledge acquired through human senses. The next level is based on correct 
reasoning from hypotheses. The third category is belief, denoting intellectual or 
emotional acceptance of a proposition. In other words, knowledge is based on inference 
with incomplete or unreliable evidence. These categories constitute the human cognition 
of knowledge that might be different from a future state of knowledge achieved by an 
evolutionary process (Ayyub and Klir, 2006). Knowledge can be modelled using two 
state levels, good and poor. 
3.2.3.24. Skill 
Skill is the ability and capacity acquired through deliberate, systematic, and sustained 
effort to smoothly and adaptively carry out complex activities or job functions involving 
ideas (cognitive skills), things (technical skills), and/or people (interpersonal skill) 
(Mullins, 2005; Kondalker, 2007). Skill in the adequacy of an organisation model is 
estimated using two state levels, high and low. 
3.2.3.25. Motivation 
Motivation is the internal and external factors that stimulate desire and energy in 
humans to be continually interested in and committed to a job, role or subject, and to 
exert persistent effort in attaining a goal. Motivation is the energizer of behaviour and 
mother of all action. It results from the interactions among conscious and unconscious 
factors such as the intensity of desire or need, incentive or reward value of the goal, and 
expectations of the individual (Schein, 1985; Mullins, 2005; Kondalker, 2007). To use 
probability to model motivation in the adequacy of an organisation model two state 
levels, high and low are created. 
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3.2.3.26. Equipment and records 
Equipment is the tangible properties characterised by a durable nature which is useful in 
the operation of systems. Examples of equipment include devices, machines, tools, 
spares and stores. Records are documents that memorialize and provide objective 
evidence of activities performed, events occurred, results achieved, or statements made. 
Records are created/or received by an organisation in respect of technical services 
related to system operations. 
Equipment and records in the adequacy of an organisation model can be 
probabilistically assessed using two state levels, effective and ineffective. The 
equipment and records of a maritime organisation are directly influenced by their 
quality and availability. 
3.2.3.27. Availability 
Availability of equipment and records is characteristic of resources that are 
committable, operable, or usable upon demand to perform their designated or required 
functions. It is the aggregation of the resources' accessibility, reliability, 
maintainability, serviceability, secure-ability and readability. 
Availability of equipment and records in the adequacy of an organisation model is 
measured on two state levels, high and low. 
3.2.3.28. Quality 
Quality of equipment and records is a measure of fineness or state of being free from 
defects, deficiencies and significant variations. A standardised definition of quality is 
described as the totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that bears 
its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs. 
Quality of equipment and records in the adequacy of an organisation model can be 
measured on two state levels, high and low. 
3.3. Methodology of establishing a BN generic model for adequacy of an 
organisation reliability assessment 
3.3.1. Procedures for building Bayesian models 
The construction of BNs consists of several steps (see Figure 3.1). The first step 
involves identification of the relevant variables constituting the problem to be modelled 
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and its definitions. This step is dealt with in Section 3.2.3. Once the variables are 
arranged (see Table 3.1), the second step is to determine the relationships among them, 
i. e., their direction dependent separation (d-separation) properties; and establish the 
graphical structure of the model (see Figure 3.2). In the third step, variable states are 
defined (they are detailed in the definitions of each PIF and sub PIF) and their relevant 
prior probabilities are assigned (Druzdzel and Gaag, 2000). Probability values are 
normally estimated or appropriated based on certain sources of evidence such as 
empirical data, expert's belief, literature review, or intuition. The fourth step is to apply 
Bayesian rules to compute the marginal probability value of each of the variables in the 
model. This implies the use of a machine learning tool to establish a Bayesian model 
which shows the evidence that has been added and propagated through the model and 
the result of posterior probabilities. The fifth stage is to run a sensitivity analysis to 
assess the performance of the model against its parameters. Sensitivity analysis is a 
process of model validation. It takes place by further optimising and refining CPTs that 
comply with assessment objective conditions. The sixth stage of model building 
requires development of scenarios to train and update the model. The modelling steps 
are normally conducted to reach a stable computational model (Mittal and Kassim, 
2007). 
Identify variables 
Determine graphical structure 
Assign conditional probability 
Elicit &compute marginal probabilities 
Conduct sensitivity analysis 
Build scenarios to update model 
Computational model 
Figure 3.1: The essential steps and procedures in building BN models 
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3.3.2. The process for obtaining an initial graph 
BN is a direct model of a real world environment rather than a model of reasoning (e. g., 
neural networks) process, carried out in many knowledge representation schemes. After 
identifying the relevant PIF and sub PIF variables affecting adequacy of organisations 
and their causal relations, it is possible to start drawing links between them and 
constructing a qualitative network, which represents all the relevant variables and their 
dependencies (see Figure 3.2). The knowledge about BN and the intuitive understanding 
of the various dependencies among variables are then used to construct the causal 
structure of adequacy of organisation. Here the graphical representation becomes very 
handy. It permits users to directly express the fundamental qualitative relationships in 
terms of direct or indirect influence (Yang, 2006). 
When deciding how to capture a particular idea, it is important to consider the spatial 
area characteristics and time period which the constructed BN represents. Consequently, 
the process for obtaining an initial graph is implemented along the following lines. First, 
an algorithm of four categories of variables (nodes) is adapted for the graphical 
structure, which provides a useful starting point to meet BN end point node that effects 
the adequacy of organisation as a variable. The four categories are root cause variables, 
sub-condition variables, condition variables, and functional variables. Variables' 
relationships are structured with respect to the probabilistic causation theory, implying 
the effect is produced by specified directed or known causes and an unspecified indirect 
cause such as error and unknown causes (Anderson and Vastag, 2004; Anderson et al., 
2004). This idea can be represented by a conditional probability as p (effect I cause) p 
(effect fl cause) lp (cause), which forms the basis for Bayesian modelling that can be 
used directly within the BN to model information elicited from a domain of assessment. 
This would explicitly develop the idea that the BN represents uncertainty in a way that 
can be clearly understood. Accordingly, nodes associated with root cause (sub PIF) 
variables, which are not directly influenced by any other identified variables can be 
defined as root cause nodes. All the variables (sub PIFs) that are directly influenced by 
the root cause nodes can be discovered and the nodes associated with them can be 
defined as sub-condition/condition nodes. A given sub-condition/condition variable 
node has as its parents all those root cause nodes that directly influence this particular 
sub-condition/condition node. A set of child-parent links is then drawn, which now 
serve as edges of the graph. Thereby all variables that are directly influenced by the 
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condition variable nodes can be discovered and the nodes associated with them can be 
defined as functional nodes. A given functional variable node has as its parents all those 
condition nodes that directly influence this particular functional node. However, 
dependency between condition nodes, condition nodes and functional nodes among 
model variable nodes is allowed for, and their influencing edges are drawn in the graph. 
Finally, the end point effect node (the objective of the model) has as its parents all those 
functional nodes that directly influence this particular effect node. A set of child-parent 
links is then drawn, which now serve as edges of a graph. This process continues until 
all variables have a place in the graph and all child-parent links are accounted for by 
edges of the graph. 
Reactive contrd measures 
Figure 3.2: BN modelling the adequacy of organisation expanded PIFs and sub PIFs 
3.3.3. BN d-separation characteristics' check 
In building a BN model, oriented influencing links need to be verified by checking their 
direction dependent separation (d-separation) characteristics. This is to ensure that the 
model's integrity is in compliance with BN characteristics, matching a perception of a 
real world (Jensen, 2001), and showing how mutual information is conditionally 
propagated among model variables (Jensen, 1996). 
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A BN structure is useful if its nodes are identical to the set of variables representing the 
real world. Therefore, the nodes criteria used to learn a BN structure should represent 
the real world variables criteria, in a way that its compatibility does not distinguish the 
among BNs nodes (Chickering, 2002). 
A major advantage of BNs over many Belief Networks is in the use of a knowledge- 
based system to represent uncertain knowledge by means of both graphical structure and 
associated numerical parameters. In a BN, the qualitative component (the graph) 
represents dependence and independence statements. The absence of some arcs means 
the existence of certain conditional independence between variables, while the presence 
of arcs may represent the existence of direct dependence. Learning the structure of a 
belief network from data using independence-based criteria contributes to the ability to 
determine parameters' dependencies strength and increase the reliability of the learned 
structure (Cheng et al., 2002). 
Basically, the mutual information between dependent variables, for instance (A) and (B), 
measures the expected information gained about (B), after observing the value of the 
variable (A). In BNs, if two nodes are dependent, knowing the value of one node will 
give some information about the value of the other node. In this context, the mutual 
information between two nodes can indicate if the two nodes are dependent and if so, 
how close their relationship is (Cheng et al., 2002). 
For any three nodes (X), (Y) and (Z) of a BN structure in the form (X-Y-Z), there are 
only three possible structures: 
(1) X->Y --*Z (serial connection structure). 
(2) X4-Y-+Z (divergent connection structure). 
(3) X--+Y'-Z (convergent connection structure). 
It is only the third type, convergent connections, that can let information pass from (X) 
to (Z) when (1) is observed and active by given evidence. Consequently, only 
convergent connections can make (X) and (Z) conditional dependent on (Y). 
Divergent connections and serial connections can allow information pass from (X) to 
(Z) when (Y) is hidden (Cheng et al., 2002). 
D-separation (conditional independence) is a very important concept in Bayesian 
probability theory, because it assists in modifying the initial networks towards a more 
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effective model; it also provides the basis of the quantitative computation, as well as 
combines the probabilities representing uncertainty in a BN. D-separation can be well 
explained by means of the "Bayes Ball" concept (Shachter, 1988). Two (sets of) node(s) 
(A) and (B) are d-separated given a (set of) node(s) (C) if and only if there is no way for 
a ball to get from (A) to (B) in the graph, where the allowable/unallowable movements 
of the ball are shown in Figure 3.3. Hidden nodes are nodes whose values are not 
known, and are depicted as not shaded; observed ones, which are conditioned, are 
shaded. The dotted arcs indicate the directions of flow of the ball with respect to BN 
connection characteristic. 
To demonstrate the "Bayes Ball" concept, firstly, consider the first column of Figure 
3.3, showing the converging connections in a BN, in which two converging arrows from 
the nodes (A) and (B) point to the node (C). If (C) is hidden, then (A) and (B) are 
conditionally independent, and hence the ball does not pass through, which is indicated 
by the curved arrows. However if (C) is observed, then (A) and (B) become dependent, 
and the ball does pass through. Other graphs can also be analysed in a similar way, for 
instance, in the diverging or serial connections, if (C) is observed, all balls cannot get 
through, which indicates that (A) and (B) become conditionally independent (Yang, 
2006). The use of a d-separation concept to check the accuracy of a qualitative BN in 
presenting a realistic situation can be demonstrated in the following example. 
Figure 3.3: BN d-separation concept illustration adapted from Yang (2006) 
80 
Suppose the main diesel engine of a ship failed to start during manoeuvring. Engine 
failure to start was investigated by the engineers on board. Two potential reasons were 
analysed: ether lack of fuel supply, or the fuel cut-off device was activated by the safety 
interlock. To disclose the truth, the fuel supply could be checked by diagnosing two 
parameters, which are the fuel supply pressure reading, and the fuel supply booster 
pump running condition; simultaneously the fuel cut-off device could be checked for 
possible activation. For this special case, an initial BN is built up as shown in Figure 
3.4a. Now by using the d-separation concept to verify the network, the relationship 
between node (B1) fuel cut-off device and node (Cl) lack of fuel supply is first 
investigated. Provided that node (A1) engine failed to start is observed and that node 
(B1) fuel cut-off device is found with a new piece of evidence of not being activated, 
then node (Cl) lack of fuel supply will be affected with a higher probability. Therefore, 
node (B1) fuel cut-off device and node (Cl) lack of fuel supply are dependent and suit 
the concept of d-separation. As a result, the links and directions are sound. However, 
when a similar analysis is employed to investigate the relationship between nodes (D1) 
fuel booster pump running condition and (El) fuel pressure reading, the result is 
different. With the evidence of node (Cl) lack of fuel supply, the dependent connection 
between nodes (D1) and (El) cannot be constructed. Further careful analysis assists in 
identifying their right family relationship, shown in Figure 3.4b, in which node (C2) is 
the parent of node (E2) because the situation of the fuel supply decides the fuel pressure 
reading. 
Figure 3.4: An example of using d-separation concept to check BNs qualitatively 
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To assure that the adequacy of the organisational BN model, encodes the probability 
density function governing the set of expanded PIFs and sub PIFs, model links d- 
separation characteristics are verified, as illustrated in the following read. 
The root cause nodes of adequacy of organisation model (see Figure 3.2) are the parents 
of sub-condition/condition nodes. The edges of the graph represent the assertion that 
variables are conditionally dependent on their parents. For instance, for root cause nodes 
of management commitment and crew involvement, each is connected in a divergent 
connection of a BN structure; therefore, their associated influencing edges on safety 
culture and norm nodes (conditions nodes) need to check their d-separation properties 
by using the "Bayes Ball" concept. This is approached by giving evidence to the crew 
involvement root node. Its observation in a BN divergent connection blocks the mutual 
information between norm and safety culture nodes. Consequently, they become 
conditionally independent, asserting that the connection structure of crew involvement 
root node is compatible with the real world equivalent criteria. This process continues 
until all the connections in the network are verified. 
3.3.4. Defining variable states 
Special skill and degree of imagination are required to realistically represent the real 
world in the form of a simple model. Therefore, a network structure, names of the 
nodes, and names of the states of the nodes are of equal importance in capturing the 
logic underlying the ideas to be represented. 
During the construction of a BN, it is very important to know if all the variables have 
been included. It may be possible to delete some entirely or combine two or more ideas 
into one variable. Equally it may be possible to reduce the number of states given to 
each variable. Therefore, it is important to be sure that all characteristics of a variable 
are identified and differentiated. However, they should only be included in the BN if 
they are considered to be a key factor in the functioning of the real world to be 
modelled. In all respect, states selected should fit within the logic of the BN structure as 
a whole. In other words, the states given to the children should be logical, as all their 
parents have appropriate influence on them. 
A simple guide to select states for each variable can be described, first to decide on how 
to describe the variable state at the time of selection, then the state towards which the 
variable will move under the proposed assessment plan. Finally any intermediate states 
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that are expected to allow the variable to pass through can be described with or without 
the critical significance to the assessment plan objectives (Cain, 2001). Subsequently, it 
is imperative to focus on those states that are of interest to the assessment plan 
objectives. It is also important to remember that the chosen states' assessment must add 
to a complete unit that a node should take. Nevertheless, focusing strongly on 
assessment plan needs will help keep the BN to a manageable size. Quantifying the 
chosen states should not be restricting. It is more important to ensure that the BN is 
logical and expresses all the necessary vital ideas to a model as it would be possible to 
adapt it later to help fill in the CPTs (Cain, 2001). 
3.3.5. The approach to assigning prior probabilities to model nodes 
The prior probabilities of all root, sub-condition, condition, functional, and effect nodes 
variables states are assigned subjectively due to the lack of objectively measured data. 
Further investigation could be done to measure states' probability based on empirical 
data and structured surveys in order to reduce the bids caused by data subjectivity. The 
unconditional probabilities of all root cause nodes of the generic adequacy of an 
organisational BN model are equally disrupted on each node stats (see Figure 3.5). 
Three maritime experts were interviewed to provide their subjective elicitation of 
conditional probabilities of sub-condition, condition, functional, and end point effect 
nodes. Elicited conditional probabilities (CPs) are aggregated and normalised by using 
Equation 3.1 (Klir and Yuan, 1995), to develop the CPTs that are used to establish the 
generic adequacy of an organisational BN model shown in Figure 3.5. 
CP = 
Ee=1 e(x) 
n .............................................. (3.1) 
where, CP is the aggregated and normalised value of conditional probabilities elicited by 
n experts, e(x) is the conditional probability given by the eth expert. 
Verbal Elicitor (VE) developed by Hope et al. (2002) will be used in supports of the 
qualitative elicitation of unconditional probabilities of leaf nodes, as listed in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: VE cue words and their associated probabilities 
Cue word Probability 
Certain 100% 
Probable 90% 
Expected 70% 
Fifty-fifty 50% 
Uncertain 30% 
Improbable 15% 
Impossible 00% 
3.3.6. Technical description of the BN of adequacy of organisation 
The BN of adequacy of organisation is composed of following elements: 1) Set of nodes 
representing the PIFs and sub PIFs as discrete variables; each with a limited set of 
mutually exclusive states in constituting the domain of adequacy of organisation, and 
the possible probabilistic values may each take, explain the state of the node. 2) Set of 
links representing causal relations between nodes. 3) Set of probabilities for each node; 
specifying the degrees of belief that a node will be in a particular state given states of its 
parent nodes. These are called CPTs and used to express relationships between nodes. 
The above elements create a fully-functioning generic BN (see Figure 3.5). The 
structure of this BN diagram encodes the perception that adequacy of organisation is 
affected by the causes of functional nodes operational process, organisational culture, 
and resources management. These in turn are, affected by the causes of the 
condition/sub condition nodes depicted in the model. The other relationships 
represented by the model can be read in a similar way. Underlying each node in the BN 
(not shown in Figure 3.5) are the CPTs. For example, the Table 3.3 shows the generic 
CPT, describing the relationships between adequacy of organisation (child node) and 
operational process, organisational culture and resources management (parent nodes), as 
well Table 3.4 shows the generic CPT, describing the relationships between operational 
processes (child node) and safety management system organizational structure and 
management quality (parent nodes). The remaining generic CPTs for this methodology 
are provided in Appendix 1. It should be noted that the CPT contains entries for every 
possible combination of the states of the parents. CPTs are assigned following the 
approach stated in Section 3.3.5. For example, the adequacy of organisation conditional 
probability on combination of operational processes' "Effective", Organizational 
culture' "Acquired" and resources management' "Ineffective" shown in Table 3.3, is 
aggregated and normalised by the use of Equation 3.1 as follows. 
84 
CP - 
92+90+88 
3= 
90 
In a similar way the remaining CPs are obtained and presented in the perspective CPTs. 
Once all the CPTs are completed, the BN can be compiled and used for analysis. In 
general terms, this is performed by altering the states of some nodes while observing the 
effect this has on the others. As a BN is a network, the impact of changing any variable 
is transmitted right through the network in accordance with the relationships expressed 
by the CPTs. Changes in any node simply arise from the combined effect of changes in 
all the nodes linked to it either directly or indirectly. In formal terms, the BN encodes a 
joint probability distribution over all the nodes. Every time the state of a node changes, 
the joint distribution is updated through the iterative application of Bayes' theorem. 
Changes in the BN are observed as changes in the chance that a node is in a particular 
state. Due to the uncertainty in the CPTs, it is rare for a node to definitely be in one state 
or another and it is far more common for probability distributions across all the states of 
a node to be observed (Cain, 2001). 
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Figure 3.5: Fully-functioning generic BN model of adequacy of organisation 
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Table 3.3: Adequacy of organisation CPT 
Adequacy of organisation C. P. T. (%) 
Operational 
processes 
Effective Ineffective 
Organizational 
culture 
Acquired Not acquired Acquired Not acquired 
Resources 
management 
Effective Ineffective Effective Ineffective Effective Ineffective Effective Ineffective 
Very efficient 100 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 
Efficient 0 90 85 45 55 5 0 0 
Inefficient 0 0 5 55 45 85 90 0 
Deficient 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 100 
Table 3.4: Operational processes CPT 
O tiona! rocesses C. P. T. (% 
Safety management system Effective Ineffective 
Organizational structure Effective Ineffective Effective Ineffective 
Management quality High I Low Hi Low High Low High Low 
Effective 100 80 75 20 80 25 20 0 
Ineffective 0 20 25 80 20 75 80 100 
3.3.7. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis basically examines the relationship between input and output 
changes of a mathematical model. In the case of a BN model, the input can be 
observation of prior probabilities of influencing nodes (parents), and the output is belief 
of posterior marginal probabilities of the influenced nodes (child) or vice versa. 
In this technical work two types of sensitivity analysis are used in evaluating the 
established adequacy of an organisational BN. The first type is termed, "sensitivity to 
findings", in order to consider how the established BN's end point effect node posterior 
probability distributions change due to the influence of different assigned observations 
of the leaf nodes. The second type is termed, "sensitivity to parameters", and considers 
how the established BN's posterior probability distributions change when the most 
influential parameters in a BN are altered. Both sensitivity analysis are needed for a 
careful and thorough investigation of BN properties (Coupe and Gaage, 2002; Laskey 
and Mahoney, 2000; Rieman et al., 2001). In this context, sensitivity analysis is used to 
identify variables, which are highly influential to the target node probabilities change, 
so that quantification efforts in subsequent model iterations can be well focused. 
3.3.8. Sensitivity to findings 
Sensitivity to findings (evidence) can use the properties of d-separation to determine 
whether observations related to one variable may influence belief in a query variable(s) 
(Korb and Nicholson, 2004). The d-separation occurs when nodes in a causal graph are 
conditionally independent, given evidence. Using sensitivity to findings, it is possible to 
rank evidence nodes. This process allows the expert to identify whether a variable is 
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sensitive or insensitive to other variables in given conditions of particular context, 
which in turn may help to identify errors in either the network structure or the CPTs. 
Findings information can also be used to provide guidance for collecting further data or 
to direct expert elicitation and evaluation efforts. Sensitivity to findings can be 
determined using two types of measures, entropy and mutual information. Both 
measures are implemented using Netica software (Pollino et al., 2006). 
Entropy, H, is commonly used to evaluate the uncertainty or randomness of a variable 
(A) characterised by a probability distribution P(x) (Korb and Nicholson, 2004; Pearl, 
1988). 
H(X)= - ZxEX P(x) 1092 P(x) 
Mutual information is used to measure the effect of one variable (X) on another (Y) 
(Korb and Nicholson, 2004): 
I(X, Y) = H(X) - H(X IY) 
where, I(X, Y) is the mutual information between variables, measuring the expected 
degree to which the joint probability of (X) and (Y) diverges from what it would be if 
(X) were independent of (Y) (Korb and Nicholson, 2004). If I(X, Y) is equal to zero, (X) 
and (1) are mutually independent (Pearl, 1988). The following are the properties of 
mutual information: 
Intuitively, I (X, Y) is the amount of information that (X) and (Y) contain about each 
other; 
" I(X, Y)>_Oandl(X, Y)=I(Y, X); 
"I (X, 1) is a measure of the dependence between (X) and (Y): 
" I(X, Y) =0 if and only if (X) and (Y) are independent; 
"I (X, Y) grows not only with the dependence of (X) and (Y), but also with H(X) and 
H(Y); 
"1 (X, X) =H(X); entropy as "self-information". 
Mutual information measures a relationship between two random variables that are 
sampled simultaneously. In particular, it measures how much information is 
communicated, on average, about one random variable due to the other. The 
relationship between mutual information and entropy can be visualized using a Venn 
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diagram (see Figure 3.6), which clearly indicates that entropy reduction is equal to the 
mutual information. 
Figure 3.6: Venn diagram indicating entropy reduction is equal to the mutual information. 
3.3.9. Sensitivity improvement 
The process of building a BN model often includes a number of tasks, one of which is 
the quantification of the BN, which often requires specifying a huge number of CPTs. 
Therefore, certain parameters CPT should be specified with a higher degree of precision 
than the others for the convenience of an assessment. This can be approached by first 
performing BN sensitivity analysis in order to identify the most important (most 
critical) parameters, and then further updating those parameters' probabilities to obtain 
more accurate values. Such process is repeated until refining the probabilities any 
further does not improve the performance of the BN, or until the cost of further 
elicitation outweighs the benefits of higher accuracy. Practically, the stopping rules 
should include: a) satisfactory behaviour of the BN is achieved, and b) higher accuracy 
can no longer be attained due to lack of knowledge. In this iteratively repeated 
procedure, the domain experts can focus their attention on parameters' probabilities to 
which the BN's behaviour shows high sensitivity. Those less influential parameters can 
be left with crude estimates (Pollino et al., 2006; Wang, 2006). 
3.4. A specific case study scenario: The grounding accident of M. V. HANJIN 
DAMPIER 
The main reasons behind the selection of M. V. HANJIN DAMPIER grounding accident 
as the case study to validate the developed adequacy of organisation BN model are: the 
direct dependency influence of Master', pilot' and Chief engineer' competence control 
on vessel safety; the need for an efficient organisational structure and effective SMS to 
achieve the effective level of crew competence control, and the vital need for an 
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effective communication that would shape the safest departure process. Organisationally 
the chief engineer failed to communicate the seriousness of the generator problem to the 
Master and this failure of communication directly contributed to the grounding incident. 
3.4.1. The circumstances 
At 1032 on 25 August 2002, the Korean flag bulk carrier "HANJIN DAMPIER" 
departed from the port of Dampier, Western Australia. A pilot was conducting the 
navigation of the ship, which was loaded with iron ore and had a displacement of 
233,158 tonnes with draughts of 17.94 m forward and 18.10 m aft. At 1127, two of the 
ship's three main generators stopped, leaving only one generator running and connected 
to the main switchboard. At 1152, the third generator's circuit breaker tripped open. 
With the total loss of power to the main switchboard the main engine stopped and the 
ship lost steering. The rudder had stopped at 100 to starboard. As the ship slowed, it 
started to turn to starboard towards shallow water. The emergency generator failed to 
start automatically and, as a result, steering was not restored for some four minutes. At 
1202, "HANJIN DAMPIER" touched bottom. The ship suffered only minor damage to 
the bottom shell plating, but the consequences of this incident could have been a lot 
worse. 
3.4.2. The analysis 
There would have been no incident if there had been no loss of electrical power on the 
vessel. Water had entered the port diesel oil storage tank through a broken manhole 
gasket. This water was then transferred, during a normal fuel transfer operation, to the 
diesel oil settling tank. However, due to the engineers' use of an incorrect sized gravity 
disc in the diesel oil purifier, and their incorrect setting of the purifier's fuel outlet line 
back pressure, the water in the diesel fuel in the diesel oil settling tank was passed to the 
diesel oil service tank. From here the water reached the three diesel generator engines, 
leading to the loss of electrical power on the vessel. The emergency generator then 
failed to start automatically upon the loss of the main source of electrical power, due to 
a faulty starting battery. Had the emergency generator restored power automatically to 
the emergency switchboard within the 45 seconds required by the SOLAS regulations, 
the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) concluded that it was likely that the 
grounding would have been avoided (ATSB, 2003). 
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The ATSB (2003) report states that numbers one and two generators tripped off the 
main switchboard, and stopped, at about 1128. At this time the ship was still in the 
buoyed channel, and being fully laden she had little room for manoeuvre, the open sea 
still being more than an hour and a quarter away. Given his uncertainty regarding what 
had caused the first two generators to shut down, and his awareness of the ship's critical 
navigation situation, the Chief Engineer should have discussed the situation more fully 
with the Master. This would have given the Master the opportunity to form a 
contingency plan, in consultation with the pilot, to mitigate the risk to the ship. With 
number three generator continuing to supply power for a further 24 minutes, there was 
adequate time at this point in the passage to stop the ship either in the channel or, after it 
had cleared the channel, in deeper water, and to call for tug assistance. In the event, the 
Chief Engineer did not communicate the gravity of the generator problem to the Master 
and this failure of communication directly contributed to the grounding. 
The lack of effective communication between the Chief Engineer and the Master meant 
that the bridge team were unaware of the risk to the vessel after the first two generators 
had stopped, and thus precluded the possibility that they could take pre-emptive action 
to reduce the level of risk to the vessel. The ATSB report contained the following 
statement: "Had there been more effective communication between the Chief Engineer 
and Master at the critical time after the first two generators had shut down, it is likely 
that the grounding of Hanjin Dampier could have been averted" (ATSB 2003; Grey, 
2005). 
3.4.3. The scenario conclusion 
Based on the above stated incident analysis, the following facts (observations) could be 
derived in consistency with BN model root cause variables states. The ineffective 
communication between the Chief Engineer and the Master had initiated the low crew 
involvement that led to contingency procedures not being performed. Such an action 
reasonably could be manifested in low crew skill and knowledge capability, which had 
affected their motivation and stimulated their low trust in interaction with the 
functionality of control systems. As a result, the crew was not able to infer the main 
reasons for the tripping of the main power supply circuit breakers; indeed such 
uncertainty would reduce the crew competence control in restoring of power supply 
system high availability; moreover, the situation was aggravated by the failure of the 
emergency generator starting system, due to a faulty starting battery. 
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In addition, the duty engineers' failure to drain the settled water in the diesel oil settling 
and service tanks on a daily bases, and to detect the low performance of purification 
equipment, are considered as nonconformity with the operational procedures. 
Furthermore, the wrong installed gravity disc and faulty starting battery for the 
emergency generator indicated that maintenance procedures were not followed properly. 
These conditions reasonably reflect the possibility of unclear maintenance policy 
basically aggravated by low management commitment and low crew involvement. 
Maintenance and operational procedures were not followed possibly due to unclear 
operational and maintenance policies, which are commonly caused by non-adaptable 
standards, and the lack of proactive control measures. As a result, the performance of 
the purification system and emergency generator starting system had deteriorated. 
Based on these findings, and in association with the model root cause nodes, the prior 
probability assessment are provided as input observations into the BN generic model 
shown in Figure 3.5. However, the adequacy of organisational BN generic model 
revised marginal probabilities (see Figure 3.7) in the light of new evidence reasonably 
satisfies the qualitative assessment approach. A better model outcome marginal 
probability could be achieved by updating the model CPTs through optimising the 
assigned conditional probability of adequacy of organisation node, and subsequently 
optimising the assigned conditional probability of functional and condition nodes. 
The new probable observation probabilities assigned to the prior probabilities of the leaf 
nodes' crew involvement, availability, contingency procedures, operational procedures, 
communication, trust, maintenance procedures, skill and knowledge, are based on the 
probable cue word of VE and its associated probability value given in Section 3.3.5. On 
the other hand the root cause nodes' management commitments, standards, policies, 
equipment and records availability, proactive control measures, reactive control 
measures, quality and motivation are left with their generic prior probabilities, as they 
are not observed or verified in incident analysis. 
Model readout posterior probabilities of the condition, sub-condition, functional nodes, 
and end point effect node (adequacy of organisation) are conditionally inferred based on 
their associated CPTs and the prior probabilities of their respective influencing parent 
nodes and the assigned prior probability of root cause nodes. Consequently, BN model 
end point effect node (adequacy of organisation) inferred marginal probabilities are 
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6.33% very efficient, 20.9% efficient, 38.2% inefficient and 34.4% deficient. 
Accordingly, the model inferred quantitative belief certainty on inefficient and deficient 
states is compatible to the qualitative finding of the incident analysis. The new beliefs of 
adequacy of organisation are sensitive to the assigned probable observations of 9 leaf 
nodes and the likelihood findings of the other 9 root cause nodes. However, further 
investigation in context of incident analysis would provide the necessary knowledge 
needed to clear the uncertainty of the 9 negative root cause nodes. 
Deductively, a prognosis scenario as proactive measure to formulate plans for 
eliminating the possibility of the occurrence of such incidents in future could be 
developed. It is important to note that some of the assigned observations are not directly 
based on observed evidence, i. e., verifiable. However, this is a first step to come up with 
more cases to train and validate the model. This phase of a model development helps 
experts to examine the model further and refine it based on their domain knowledge. 
The Bayesian model therefore serves as an interactive tool that enables experts to create 
a probabilistic model, simulate scenarios, and reflect on the results of the inference. 
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Figure 3.7: The Grounding of "M. V. HANJIN DAMPIER" case analysis based on the BN modelling of 
adequacy of organisation 
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3.4.4. Manual computation of marginal probabilities 
To demonstrate how the model infers for specific links of the model structure, a manual 
calculations case is simulated (see Figure 3.7). In this calculation, the concerned nodes' 
CPTs, and their prior/marginal probability are used. The case computation pathway and 
the findings are illustrated in Tables 3.5-3.10: 
Table 3.5: Condition monitoring and performance control node assigned CPT 
c Root cause variables prior Condition monitoring and performance control (CM&PC) 
probabilities CPT 
E 
Ü 
Availability P (A) Trust P (T) Reliable P (CM&PC JA, T) 
Not reliable P 
IA, T) (CM&PC 
1 0.9 High 0.1 High 1 0 
2 0.9 High 0.9 Low 0.6 0.4 
3 0.1 Low 0.1 High 0.4 0.6 
4 0.1 Low 0.9 Low 0 1 
Table 3.6: Condition monitoring and performance control deduced marginal probabilities 
combination 
Reliable P (CM&PC IA, T) x P(A) x 
P(T) 
Not reliable P(CM&PC IA, T) x P(A) x 
P(T) 
1 0.090 0 
2 0.486 0.324 
3 0.004 0.006 
4 0.0 0.090 
21 1 0.580 (Reliable) 0.420 (Not reliable) 
Table 3.7-3.10 show two examples of manual calculations applied to obtain the 
marginal probabilities of resources management and adequacy of organisations nodes. 
Table 3.7: Resources management node assigned CPT 
Condition variables marginal probabilities 
Resources management 
CPT 
°' 
Human Condition 
Effective 
Ineffective 
resources 
monitoring and Equipments Management P(RMIHR, C P(RM I HR, 
E P(HR) 
Performance and Records quality M&PC CM&PC 
Control P(E&R) P(MQ) , 
E&R, MQ) 
, E&R, MQ) P( CM&PC 
0.18 
Sufficient 0.58 Reliable 
0.50 
Effective 
0.50 High 1 0 
2 0.18 
Sufficient 0.58 Reliable 
0.50 
Effective 0.50 
Low 0.85 0.15 
93 
Table 3.8: Resources management deduced marginal probabilities 
Possible combination 
Effective P(RM IHR, CM&PC 
, 
E&RMQ)x P(HR)x P( CM&PC )x 
PE&RxPM 
Ineffective P(RM IHR, CM&PC 
, 
E&R, MQ) P(HR)x P( CM&PC )x 
PE&RxPM 
1 0.0261 0 
2 0.0222 0.0039 
0.432 (Effective) 0.568 (Ineffective) 
Table 3.9: Adequacy of organisations node assigned CPT 
Functional variables marginal probabilities Adequacy of Organisations CPT 
c Very Efficient Inefficient 
Deficient 
Operational Organisational Resources efficient P(AO 10 P(A010 
f' processes culture management P(AO 10 P OC R 
P(AO IOP, O 
P OC R Ü P(OP) P(00 P(RM) P, OC, R C, RM) 
Al) Al) Al) 
1 0.274 0.30 Acquired 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Effective ti ve 
2 0.274 0.30 Acquired 8e 
Ineffective ctive 
0.1 0 0.9 0 0 
Table 3.10: Adequacy of organisations deduced marginal probabilities 
c g Very efficient Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
,a P(AO 1 OP, OC, RM) P(AO IOP, OC, RM) P(AO 1 OP, OC, RAI) P(AO 1 OP, OC, RM) 
z P(OP)x P(OC)x P(OP) x P(OC) x P(OP) x P(OC) x P(OP) x P(OC) x 
u 
P(RM) P(RM) P(RAI) P(RM) 
1 0.0355 ' 0 0 0 
2 0.0047 0.0420 0 0 
ý 0.0633 0.2090 0.3820 0.3450 
The manual calculation of the revised marginal probabilities of the end point effect 
node' adequacy of organisation shows how the Bayes theorem is used in a BN to infer a 
new belief that would explain the assessment associated uncertainty. The uncertainty of 
the assessment could be explained further as more information is obtained about the 
route cause nods that are left with their generic prior probabilities. 
3.4.5. BN model sensitivity analysis 
The compiled BN model of adequacy of organisation shown in Fig. 3.7 shows the belief 
bars for each node. These belief bars represent the initial beliefs (presented as 
probabilities) about the determinants of adequacy of organisation marginal probabilities 
as evidenced by the data used. In this respect, the performance of the BN model is 
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evaluated in two ways. The first involved calculating the sensitivity of the adequacy of 
organisation node to findings in all the other nodes of the BN, to identify nodes that 
have the most influence on adequacy of organisation and the causal relationships of 
importance using the mutual information values (Korb and Nicholson, 2004). The 
mutual information, is symmetric between two nodes, and is a measure of the 
magnitude with which a finding at one node is expected to alter the beliefs at another 
node (Pearl, 1988; Korb and Nicholson, 2004; Pollino et al., 2006). Netica software is 
used to display a typical output of sensitivity analysis shown in a bar chart in Figure 3.8 
and Table 3.11 (Pollino et al., 2006), in which nodes are ranked according to the degree 
of influence of their findings on the outcomes of the adequacy of organisation node 
calculated as a measure of mutual information (entropy reduction). Operational 
processes PIF is the most influential factor causing the largest entropy reduction of 
25.9% in adequacy of organisation reliability. Resources management and 
organisational culture variables are also showing a strong conclusive influence on 
adequacy of organisation reliability with 15.2 % and 11.5 % entropy reduction 
percentage values respectively. These are followed by organisational structure, 
management quality and norm with 6.35 %, 6.08 % and 5.01 % entropy reduction 
percentage values respectively. The remaining nodes entropy reduction can be read 
from Figure 3.8 and Table 3.11 that are showing the knowledge node entropy reduction 
with the least influential percentage value of 0.0645 %. Nodes mutual information 
calculation is based on the influence of the new entered observations of the leaf nodes 
on the prior probabilities of the dependent nodes in the compiled model. The new 
beliefs that are shown in Figure 3.7 indicate the change of the adequacy of organisation 
marginal probabilities. The changes reveal the high sensitivity of model measured by 
the increased inefficient (38.2 %) and deficient (34.5%) stats probability, and reduced 
efficient (20.9 %) and very efficient (6.33 %) stats probability. 
The second way of model performance evaluation involved the root cause nodes of the 
highest and the lowest mutual information being altered individually and subsequently 
both together over a defined probability space and changes in the adequacy of 
organisation are observed. This also intuitively reflects the sensitivity behaviour of 
every intermediate root cause node of the model. 
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Model sensitivity to findings is developed in scenarios that are graphically represented 
in Figures 3.9,3.10,3.11 and 3.12. These figures show the patterns of model sensitivity 
in linear relations; depicting the outcome of the model sensitivity to findings concurs 
with the assigned observations of both "knowledge" and "management commitments" 
as specified in each case. Linear relations-derived mathematical characteristics are 
provided in each figure's associated table. The best fit values (data) define the extent 
and the direction of model inference, represented in linear relations intersection with the 
graph axes, as well linear relations slope indicates the rate of change of model outputs in 
respect of input observations, which can be used to investigate dependent nodes, 
assigned CPTs. The coefficient of determination (? ) describes how well the linear 
relation approximates to the assigned data. It gives the proportion of the variance 
(fluctuation) of model output beliefs that are predictable from the input observations. It 
is a measure that allows users to determine how certain they can be in making 
predictions from a certain model/graph. 
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Table 3.11: Sensitivity to findings of adequacy of organisation node due to the finding at all nodes, 
expressed in terms of mutual information/reduction in entropy of the target node belief distribution, due 
to findings at the varying nodes. 
Node Degree of mutual information/entropy reduction 
Adequacy of organisation 1.78414 100% 
Operational processes 0.46246 25.9 % 
Resources management 0.27074 15.2 % 
Organisational culture 0.19956 11.2 % 
Organisational structure 0.11325 6.35 % 
Management quality 0.10844 6.08 % 
Norm 0.08936 5.01 % 
Safety culture 0.08936 5.01 % 
Safety management system 0.07458 4.18 % 
Management commitments 0.05391 3.02 % 
Condition monitoring &Performance control 0.04016 2.25 % 
Standards 0.02591 1.45 % 
Crew involvement 0.01893 1.06% 
Human resources 0.01388 0.778 % 
Equipments and records 0.00974 0.546 % 
Controls 0.00925 0.519% 
Policies 0.00925 0.519 % 
Availability 0.00525 0.294 % 
Equipment & records availability 0.00350 0.196 % 
Contingency procedures 0.00300 0.168 % 
Operational procedure 0.00294 0.165 % 
Communication 0.00281 0.157 % 
Trust 0.00241 0.135% 
Proactive control measures 0.00231 0.129 % 
Reactive control measures 0.00231 0.129 % 
Maintenance procedure 0.00175 0.0979% 
_Quality 
0.00155 0.0871 % 
Skill 0.00148 0.0831 % 
_Strategy 
and objectives 0.00141 0.0789 % 
Motivation 0.00134 0.0752 % 
Knowledge 0,00115 0.0645 % 77d 
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Figure 3.8: Sensitivity to findings of adequacy of organisation node due to the finding at all nodes 
3.4.6. Sensitivity to parameter 
It can be extremely time-consuming to examine a complex BN's sensitivity to 
parameter using this type of analysis. Coupe and Gaag (2002) seek to address this 
limitation by identifying a "sensitivity set" of variables, which are defined as being the 
most influential in BNs. Sensitivity to parameter is done by calculating the output 
posterior probability of a query node by systematically changing the input parameters of 
the sensitive set of variables. It is these parameters that are most influential in 
calculating query node posterior probabilities and it is these parameters on which 
quantification efforts should be focussed (Coupe et al., 1999). If the graphed sensitivity 
function does not behave as an expert expects, e. g., its slope rate, and direction, or range 
of sensitivity is unexpected, this may indicate errors in the network structure or CPTs. 
For example, Figure 3.13 shows the graphed sensitivity function, depicting its slope 
rate, direction and ranges, due to model input observation at node "operational 
processes", which has the highest mutual information with the query node "adequacy of 
organisation". Such a result is in line with the model objective. Sensitivity to parameters 
reflects how sensitive the end point node is to the changes of parameter i. e. CPT of the 
selected node. Such test can be used to debug nodes assigned CPTs in a way that should 
reflect the real world problem assessment. It is a frequent task intended to tune model 
assessment with a minimum error rate of the tested cases. 
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Figure 3.9: Sensitivity results 
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Sensitivity results due to knowledge node input observations on "Good" stale, and adequacy of 
organisation node output belief on "Very efficient ", "Efficient ", "Inefficient " and "Deficient " stales. 
The provided table states the derived mathematical characteristics of sensitivity results linear relation. 
Table 3.12: Sensitivity results due to knowledge node input observations on "Good" state, and adequacy 
of organisation" node output belief on "Very efficient", "Efficient", "Inefficient" and "Deficient" states. 
Knowledge (Good %) Very efficient Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
0 6.20 20.8 37.9 35.1 
20 6.45 21.0 38.6 33.9 
40 6.71 21.2 39.4 32.8 
60 6.96 21.4 40.1 31.5 
80 7.21 21.6 40.9 30.3 
100 7.47 21.8 41.6 29.1 
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Figure 3.10: Sensitivity results 
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0 25 50 75 100 125 
Management commitments input observation 
Very efficient Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
Best-fit values 
Slope 0.08403 ± 0.0002757 0.07614 ± 0.0003869 0.05686 ± 0.0003869 -0.2110 ± 0.02681 
Y-intercept 2.122 ± 0.01669 17.11 ± 0.02343 35.39 ± 0.02343 45.90 ± 1.624 
X-intercept -25.25 -224.7 -622.4 217.5 
1/slope 11.90 13.13 17.59 -4.739 
95% Confidence Intervals 
Slope 0.08326 to 0.08479 0.07507 to 0.07722 0.05578 to 0.05793 -0.2854 to -0.1366 
Y-intercept when X=0.0 2.076 to 2.168 17.04 to 17.17 35.33 to 35.46 41.39 to 50.41 
X-intercept when Y=0.0 -26.01 to -24.51 -228.7 to -220.9 -635.4 to -610.0 172.6 to 310.1 Goodness of Fit 
r= 1.000 0.9999 0.9998 0.9393 
Sensitivity results due to management commitments node input observations on "High" state, and 
adequacy of organisation node output belief on "derv efficient", "Efficient", 'Inefficient' and 
"Deficient " states. The provided table states the derived mathematical characteristics of sensitivity 
results linear relation. 
Table 3.13: Sensitivity results due to management commitments node input observations on "High" state, 
and adequacy of organisation node output belief on "Very efficient", "Efficient", "Inefficient" and 
"Deficient" states. 
Management commitments (High %) Very efficient Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
0 2.11 17.1 35.4 45.4 
20 3.8 18.6 36.5 41.1 
40 5.48 20.2 37.7 36.7 
60 7.20 21.7 38.8 37.3 
80 8.85 23.2 39.9 28.0 
100 10.5 24.7 41.1 23.6 
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Figure 3.11: Sensitivity results aggregation 
Knowledge and management 
commitments 
A Very efficient 
  Efficient 
" Inefficient 
v Dicient 
Input observation 
Very of icint rzfficient Inefficient Dificient 
Best- it values 
Slope 0.04836 ± 0.01153 0.04307 ± 0.01061 0.04707 3 0.007676 -0.1356 ± 0.03061 
Y-intercept 4.160 ± 0.6979 18.95 ± 0.6424 36.64 ± 0.4648 40.51 ± 1.853 
X-intercept 
-86.04 -440.1 -778.4 
298.8 
1/slope 20.68 23.22 21.24 -7.376 
95% Confidence Intervals 
Slope 0.02268 to 0.07404 0.01943 to 0.06671 0.02997 to 0.06417 -0.2038 to -0.06738 
Y-intercept when X=0.0 2.606 to 5.715 17.52 to 20.39 35.60 to 37.67 36.38 to 44.64 
X-intercept when Y=0.0 -244.5 to -34.40 -1037 to -265.1 -1252 to -557.1 
213.2 to 553.0 
Goodness of Fit 
r' 0.6377 0.6224 0.7899 0.6624 
Sensitivity results aggregation due to knowledge and management commitments nodes input observations 
", on "Good" and "High" states, and adequacy of organisation node output belief on "fi"ery efficient 
"Efficient ", "Inefficient ", and "Deficient " states. The provided table states the derived mathematical 
characteristics of sensitivity results linear relation. 
Table 3.14: Sensitivity results due to knowledge and management commitments nodes input observations 
on "Good" and "High" state, and adequacy of organisation node output belief on "Very efficient", 
"Efficient", "Inefficient" and "Deficient" states. 
Knowledge' (Good %) and Very e fficient Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
Management commitments` 
(High %) 1 2 1 2 1 2 I 2 
0 6.20 2.11 20.8 17.1 37.9 35.4 35.1 45.4 
20 6.45 3.8 21.0 18.6 38.6 36.5 33.9 41.1 
40 6.71 5.48 21.2 20.2 39.4 37.7 32.8 36.7 
60 6.96 7.20 21.4 21.7 40.1 38.8 31.5 37.3 
80 7.21 8.85 21.6 23.2 40.9 39.9 30.3 28.0 
100 7.47 10.5 21.8 24.7 41.6 41.1 29.1 23.6 
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Figure 3.12: Sensitivity results aggregation 
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Input observation 
Very efficint Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
Best-f it values 
Slope 0.1034 ± 0.002331 0.08543 ± 0.0006999 0 07443 ± 0.007648 -0.2631 ± 0.005556 
Y-intercept 1.856 ± 0.1411 17.03 ± 0.04238 35.43 ± 0.4631 45.69 ± 0.3364 
X-intercept 
-17.95 -199.3 -476.0 173.6 
1/slope 9.673 11.71 13.44 -3.800 
95% Confidence Intervals 
Slope 0.09692 to 0.1099 0.08349 to 0.08737 0.05320 to 0.09566 -0.2786 to -0 2477 
Y-intercept when X=0.0 1.464 to 2.248 16.91 to 17.15 34.14 to 36.71 44.76 to 46.62 
X -intercept when Y=00 -22.99 to -13.44 -205.2 to -193.7 -686.2 to -359.0 166.5 to 
181.6 
Goodness of Fit 
r' 0.9980 0.9997 0.9595 0.9982 
Sensitivity results due to knowledge and management commitments nodes simultaneous input 
observations on "Good" and "High" states, and adequacy of organisation node output belief on "{'eiy 
efficient", "Efficient ", "Inefficient", and "Deficient' states. The provided table states the derived 
mathematical characteristics of sensitivity results linear relation. 
Table 3.15: Sensitivity results due to knowledge and management commitments nodes simultaneous input 
observations on "Good" and "High" states, and adequacy of organisation node output belief on "Very 
efficient", "Efficient", "Inefficient" and "Deficient" states. 
Knowledge and Management commitments 
(Good and High %) 
Very efficient Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
0 2.07 17.00 34.7 46.2 
20 3.88 18.7 37.1 40.3 
40 5.82 20.5 39.0 34.8 
60 7.88 22.2 40.4 29.5 
80 10.1 23.9 41.5 24.5 
100 12.4 25.5 42.2 19.9 
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Figure 3.13: Sensitivity results aggregation 
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Sensitivity results due to operational processes input observations on "Effective" state, and adequacy of 
organisation node output belief on "1 en. " efficient ", "Efficient ", "Inefficient " and "Deficient " states. 
The provided table states the derived mathematical characteristics of sensitivity results linear relation. 
Table 3.16: Sensitivity results due to operational processes input observations on "Effective" state and 
adequacy of organisation node output belief on "Very efficient", "Efficient", "Inefficient" and 
"Deficient" states. 
Operational processes (Effective %) Very efficient Efficient Inefficient Deficient 
0 0.0 6.91 45.5 47.5 
20 4.62 17.1 40.2 38.0 
40 9.24 27.4 34.9 28.5 
60 13.9 37.6 29.5 19.0 
80 18.5 47.8 24.2 9.51 
100 23.1 58.1 18.8 0.0 
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3.5. Conclusion 
The adequacy of organisation is one of CREAM's nine CPCs. The qualitative 
definitions of its expanded PIFs and sub PIFs and their cause-effect relationships 
enabled in this work to structure the hierarchical process needed to develop the 
qualitative idea of their inevitable effect. As a result, an advanced BN model for 
proactive assessment of the marginal probability of adequacy of organisation effect 
levels is developed. 
BN is an effective tool helping to model the adequacy of organisation knowledge and 
associated uncertainty, which may arise in reality due to a variety of causes, for 
instance, imprecision, complexity and ignorance or volatility of domain knowledge. The 
established BN model can be used as a tool for identifying and expressing uncertainty; 
hence, it is also a means for potential reduction of uncertainty. The uncertainty of 
adequacy of organisation can be identified by including more specific information in the 
analysis. This could be provided in terms of PIF and PIFs information uncertainty 
statements and in terms of the model structure itself. BN modelling added flexibility to 
the probabilistic assessment since it allowed the expression of uncertainty in the format 
found most appropriate to obtain the objectives of the assessment. The adequacy of 
organisation CPC is a backbone in the assessment of human Contextual Control Model- 
controlling mode (COCOM-CMs) of CREAM. Its effect on human action reliability 
will be investigated further in Chapter 4 and 5. 
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Chapter 4 
Quantifying human action probability 
Summary 
This chapter presents the methodology for establishing a CREAM BN model of human 
COCOM-CMs' reliability assessment. Fundamentally, human COCOM-CMs are 
influenced by the dynamic impact of the effect levels of context-CPCs while the person 
is performing an action. In the methodology, BN characteristics are used to 
conceptualise CREAM CPCs' dependency. BN qualitative features such as nodes' 
cause-effect relationship and d-separation properties are also used to introduce the new 
attributes and their sub-attribute nodes. These enable the use of a BN divorcing concept 
to limit the number of possible combinations of influencing nodes of the COCOM-CMs 
one and to simplify the CPTs assignment of BN nodes. Fuzzy rule bases are used to 
elicit the CPT of the COCOM-CM node in the BN. The introduction of new attributes to 
the BN will therefore reduce the number of fuzzy rules required. Fuzzy set theory is used 
to transform the COCOM-CMs' node marginal probabilities to a crisp HFP value. A 
case study is investigated to validate the established CREAM BN model. BN model 
sensitivity analysis is also conducted. Finally, the developed technical work 
achievements are concluded. 
4.1. Introduction 
Investigation into the state of HRA has revealed that the main perspective on how 
technological systems should be designed, built, operated, and maintained has changed 
dramatically since the middle of the last century. However, technological development 
had reached a level where the capabilities of unaided human action started to become a 
limiting factor for the performance of the overall system. Consequently, the human 
factor was taken into account in the design of systems to ensure that the demands of 
human performance did not exceed his/her natural capabilities. The concern was 
initially focused on perception capabilities (Fitts, 1951) but was later expanded to cover 
the higher order human functions, in particular cognition, as represented by the 
information processing descriptions of decision making and problem solving. 
Furthermore, the need to consider the development of the human factor was also 
motivated by a growing number of major accidents (Kemeny, 1979; Casey, 1993) and 
by a changed function of technological systems, both of which made the interaction 
105 
between humans and machines a main issue (Perrow, 1984; Woods et al., 1994; 
Hollnagel, 1998a). 
The growing complexity of technological systems and the dependency of people's ways 
of life on their proper functioning have clearly revealed that human actions constitute a 
major source of vulnerability to the integrity of human-technological systems' 
interaction. In whatever field they are used, incorrect or erroneous human actions are 
thus a cause of great concern (Hollnagel, 1998a). This view is valid even if the focus of 
interest shifts to the area of organisations (Reason, 2002). 
Human action and context coupling level was first recognised as part of deferent 
technological systems operational control. Experience has shown that it is equally 
important in relation to their design and maintenance. Good examples are nuclear power 
plants, gas and oil production technology, aviation, maritime industry, industrial 
production processes (see Figure 4.1) and modem hospitals' intensive care units. These 
systems have often been the focus of considerable concern because of their potential 
role in any severe accidents that may arise. 
Regardless of the domain, somewhere in the range 60-96% of all systems failure seems 
to be attributable to erroneous human actions (Hollnagel, 1993; Chengi, 1996, 
Hollnagel, 1998a; Rothblum, 2000; Clifford, 2004; Hetherington et al., 2006). 
However, for natural reasons, maritime operations have been the lowest widespread 
user of HRA PSA/PRA in comparison to the above stated technological systems. For 
example, Figure 4.2 shows the extent to which these assessment tools have played a 
significant role in controlling the risk of erroneous human action failure to a defined 
acceptable level (Everdij and Blom, 2008). 
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Figure 4.1: Human-technology interaction and degree of coupling in deferent contexts (Perrow, 1984). 
Figure 4.2: HRA/PSA domains of application (Everdij and Blom, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the growing number of cases where erroneous human actions actually are 
the cause of accidents has been attributed to a combination of human, technological, and 
organisational factors (see Figure 4.3) (Hollnagel, 1998a, b; Kontogiannis, 1999; 
Hollnagel, 2002; Kim and Jung, 2002; Hollnagel, 2004; Hollnagel, 2008a, b). In this 
context the human has become more prone to incorrect actions and erroneous human 
actions. As a result, the complex changes in system constituents leading to a tighter 
degree of couplings between context and human action have increased performance 
demands, thus reducing the operational safety margins. Therefore, it is vital to improve 
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the understanding of the multiplicity of factors that are at play. This requires a 
conceptual framework that adequately accounts for how actions are shaped by the 
context in which they take place. This effectively enables the identification of the most 
important conditions associated with the causes of incorrect actions (Hollnagel, 1998a; 
Kontogiannis, 1999; Kim and Jung, 2002; Hollnagel, 2002; Hollnagel, 2004). 
Figure 4.3: Causes of accidents have been attributed in different ways over the years (Hollnagel, 2002; 
Hollnagel, 2004) 
Deterministic analysis of systems failure in various types of process, known as 
sufficient detail-working conditions, requires an examination of the links between every 
possible cause and every possible consequence of component failure. This analysis may 
practically be difficult to perform, due to incomplete anticipation of the specified links. 
A common solution is to conduct a probabilistic analysis, with the objectives of 
reducing the probability that an adverse event occurs and minimising the consequences 
of uncontrolled developments in accident conditions, such as the potential for injuries 
and loss of human life, or negative impact on the environment and to the system itself. 
Therefore, theories, models, and methods that can be applied to solve these problems 
are in high demand (Hollnagel, 1998a). 
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4.2. Literature review 
Reliability models can be developed for technological systems with relative ease, 
because they are designed with a specific known set of functions and structure. 
However, it is extremely difficult to do so for humans, who evolved naturally, as it is 
difficult to know what basis human actions have in internal, mental or cognitive 
functions. The second generation HRA methods advocate human performance 
characteristics in a given context and can be observed and used as a point of reference. 
Consequently, human reliability modelling cannot be deduced from fundamental 
psychological principles but must rather start by recognising the inherent variability of 
human performance in a context and come to terms with the situations where this 
variability leads to failures rather than successes. Nevertheless, one of the undisputed 
assumptions in all HRA approaches is that the quality of human performance depends 
on the conditions under which the tasks or activities are carried out. These conditions 
have generally been referred to as PSFs. If the reliability model is to serve as the basis 
for making proactive assessment about likely performance, it must necessarily provide a 
set of principles for how the PSFs are to be taken into account (Hoiinagel, 1998a; 
Forester, 2007; Reer, 2008 Partl&2; Bell and Holyroyd, 2009). 
HRA has been carried out within the shell of PSA to meet mandatory safety goal 
regulations focused on the plant-specific characteristic. This shell is not capable of 
modelling characteristics beyond the specified building and operational concept and 
thus it does not support any larger perspective where humans are involved in the design 
and construction, operation and maintenance of a system, and in management 
(Hollnagel and Wreathall, 1996). Human reliability can obviously play a role in every 
phase of a system's life cycle, although the outcome of action failures in many cases 
may not be immediately visible. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of human action in context. As it is imperative to account for reliability 
in relation to cognition rather than manual action, it may to some extent be reasonable 
to describe the likelihood that a manual operation will succeed or fail in the same way 
that a first generation HRA does. In this respect, the second generation HRA methods 
such as CREAM are supposed to provide the corresponding probability value 
(Hollnagel, 1998a; Kontogiannis, 1999; Hollnagel, 2005). 
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4.2.1. The introduction of CREAM 
The term cognition of CREAM actually means with the full complexity of the human 
mind during an action in the context of human, organisational and technological factors. 
Therefore, any attempt to understand human performance at work must include the role 
of human cognition under the impact of context. As a result, cognition, context, and 
action (competence) control cannot be separated (Hollnagel, 1993; Hollnagel, 1998a; 
Hollnagel, 2005). Since erroneous human actions usually develop due to causes and 
consequences going wrong, inevitably they involve a degree of cognition. In this 
respect, CREAM accounts for cognitive reliability importance by indicating the upper 
and lower bounds of the variability of human performance (Hollnagel, 1998a; 
Kontogiannis, 1999; Hollnagel, 2005). 
The primary purpose of CREAM is to offer a practical bidirectional approach to both 
performance analysis and assessment. In order to be used properly it is necessary to 
supplement it with specific information related to its application domain, e. g., values for 
specific performance parameters that define operational process context knowledge 
(Hollnagel, 1998a; Kontogiannis, 1999; Adhikari et al., 2009; Bell and Holyroyd, 
2009). This will enable an analyst to achieve the following (Adhikari et al., 2009; 
Hänninen, 2008; Bell and Holyroyd, 2009): 
1. Identify those parts of the work as tasks or actions that require or depend on human 
cognition and therefore may be affected by variations in cognitive reliability. 
2. Determine the conditions under which the reliability of cognition may be reduced 
and where, therefore, these tasks or actions may constitute a source of risk. 
3. Provide an appraisal of the consequences of human performance on system safety 
that can be used in a PRA/PSA. 
4. Develop and specify modifications that improve these conditions, hence serve to 
increase the reliability of cognition and reduce the risk. 
Steps 1-3 are the core of CREAM. Step 4 is developed in this study to serve the 
purpose of ensuring that the proper conclusions are drawn from the analysis, and that 
the necessary changes to a targeted system scenario are correctly specified. 
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4.2.1.1. Model fundamentals 
CREAM application essentially acknowledges that any description of human actions 
must be recognised to occur in a context, and that the model that is used as a basis for 
describing human actions is capable of accounting for how the context influences these 
actions. In this respect the CREAM model is able to account adequately for how context 
and actions are coupled and mutually dependent (Hollnagel, 1998a; Gore, 2002; 
Hollnagel, 2005). 
While human competence describes what a person is capable of doing, human control 
describes how the competence is realised over a situation's context. Therefore, if there 
is better control of the actions, then it is less likely that any given action will fail. 
Consequently, a higher degree of control means that the person has a better chance of 
detecting incorrectly performed actions (Hollnagel, 1998a). However, the fundamental 
principle of cognitive system engineering (see Figure 4.4), which advocates that human 
action is intentional as well as reactive, is reflected as an outcome of a controlled use of 
competence adapted to a requirement of a situation, rather than a result of 
predetermined sequences of responses to events. 
Competence can be defined in a relatively small range of cognitive functions that 
appear, to a greater or lesser extent, in most contemporary attempts to model the 
essential characteristics of human cognition. In addition, competence includes a 
person's skills and knowledge that may have been compiled into familiar procedures, 
and the person's response patterns. As a result, cognition should be described as a 
controlled use of the available competence (skills, procedures and knowledge) and 
resources. Yet, the human control mode can be described by referring to a continuum, 
going from a situation where a human has little or no control over events to conditions 
where events are under complete control, and by emphasising characteristic modes of 
control along the continuum. Hollnagel (1993) suggested, as a minimum, the 
subsequent four control modes: scrambled control, opportunistic control, tactical 
control, and strategic control. This leads to the Contextual Control Model (COCOM) 
(see Figure 4.5). The control modes are important. First, they provide a way to include 
the influence of external conditions in performance assessment, which differs from the 
traditional HRA PSFs. Second, they open the possibility of linking the classification 
scheme and the method with semi-dynamic models of cognition in performance 
analysis. These are of particular interest for attempts to base HRA more explicitly on 
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models of cognition (Hollnagel, 1993; Woods et at., 1994; Hollnagel, 1998a; Hollnagel, 
2005). 
Figure 4.4: The principles of cognitive systems engineering (Hollnagel, 1998a; Woods et al., 1994) 
Figure 4.5: COCOM of cognition adapted from Hollnagel (1998a) 
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4.2.1.2. Four control modes 
Control is necessary to organise an action within a person's time horizon. Practically, 
effective control is an ability to plan future actions. Operator level of control is 
influenced by contexts as it is experienced, by operator cognition goals (Bainbridge, 
1991), by knowledge or experience of dependencies between action preconditions; and 
by expectations about how a situation is going to develop, in particular about which 
resources are and will be available to an operator for use. In COCOM a distinction is 
made among four characteristic control modes (see Figures 4.6 and 4.7) (Hollnagel, 
1993; Woods et al., 1994; Hollnagel, 1998a; Hollnagel, 1998b; Gore, 2002; Hänninen, 
2008; Bell and Holyroyd, 2009). 
Figure 4.6: Representation of COCOM-CMs (Gore, 2002) 
Figure 4.7: Proposed relation between control mode and reliability (Hollnagel, 1998a) 
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The four control modes of an operator, which may occur during performance of an 
action, are defined as follows (Hollnagel, 1998a): 
" Scrambled control: the choice of the forthcoming action is unpredictable. The 
situation in question may be portraying rapid alterations in unexpected ways, thus 
eliminating the operator's ability or opportunity to make deductions about the next 
action required. 
" Opportunistic control: the next action is determined by superficial characteristics of 
the situation, possibly through habit or similarity matching. The situation is 
characterised by lack of planning, and this may possibly be due to the lack of 
available time (De Keyser, et al., 1988). 
" Tactical control: performance typically follows planned procedures while some ad 
hoc deviations are still possible. 
Strategic control: plentiful time is available to consider actions to be taken in the 
light of wider objectives to be fulfilled and within the given context. 
A particular control mode determines the level of reliability that can be expected in a 
specific setting and this in turn is determined by the collective characteristics of the 
relevant CPCs. 
4.2.1.3. Basic principles of the classification scheme 
The classification scheme obviously contains description of most, if not all, possible 
manifestations of erroneous actions as well as the majority of possible causes. Clearly, 
the classification scheme on one hand must be detailed enough to prevent valuable 
information from being lost, and on the other hand sufficiently simple to make the 
assignment of events to categories manageable. This optimum level of detail cannot be 
defined analytically but must be based on practical experience. Therefore, clear 
principles are given in CREAM for how the classification scheme can be modified, 
either making it simpler or more detailed (Holinagel, 1998a; Adhikari et al., 2009; 
Hänninen, 2008 Holyroyd, 2009). 
CREAM' classification scheme for human performance analysis clearly separates 
genotypes (causes) and phenotypes (manifestations), and furthermore proposes a non- 
hierarchical organisation of categories, as they are linked by means of the sub- 
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categories called antecedents and consequents (Hollnagel, 1998a). A more detailed 
elaboration on CREAM' classification scheme will be provided in Chapter 6. 
4.2.1.4. Context evaluation, CPCs' level descriptors and their specific effects on 
performance conditions 
CREAM context CPCs are limited in number and dimensions (effect levels) for 
practical reasons (see Table 4.1). CPCs are intended to have a minimum degree of 
overlap, although they are not independent of each other. Table 4.1 shows the basic 
qualitative descriptors that are suggested for each CPC. 
Context CPCs' evaluation descriptors/effect levels have typical values they can take; 
and it is necessary to relate these values to the potential effect on performance 
reliability. This can be done using the general principle that advantageous performance 
conditions may improve reliability, and then the operators are expected to fail less often 
in their tasks, whereas disadvantageous conditions are likely to reduce reliability and 
then operators will fail more often. However, the CPCs' descriptors are directly 
amenable to such an assignment in terms of their semantic contents, and their results are 
shown in Table 4.2. The middle region corresponds to the category of no significant 
effect. This means that it is impossible to predict whether the effect will be positive or 
negative, and furthermore that the effect in general will be relatively small (Hollnagel, 
1998a; Adhikari et al., 2009; Hänninen, 2008; Holyroyd, 2009). 
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Table 4.1: Context-CPC evaluation and effect level descriptors (Holinagel, 1998a) 
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Table 4.2: CPCs' level descriptors and their expected effect on performance reliability (Hollnaael. I998a) 
4.2.1.5. Dependency between CPCs 
To determine the effects of CPCs on performance it is necessary to describe the 
dependency between CPCs. In other words, it is necessary to develop a model that 
describes how the CPCs affect each other, subsequently describing how they affect 
performance (Hollnagel, 1998a; Kim et al., 2006). However, by referring to the CPCs' 
evaluation and level descriptors stated in Table 4.1 and the general understanding of 
human performance, rather than to any specific domain or type of situation, the 
following is an illustration of what this might produce (Hollnagel, 1998a). 
The dependencies can be summarised as shown in Table 4.3 and also shown by means 
of a diagram, in Figure 4.8, where they are shown by means of arrows, indicating that 
each CPC influences another. Black arrows denote a direct influence (increase-increase, 
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decrease-decrease) while light gray arrows denote an inverse influence (increase- 
decrease, decrease-increase). For instance, adequacy of organisation has an influence on 
working conditions, adequacy of training and experience, availability of 
procedures/plans, and adequacy of MMI. As can be seen from Figure 4.8, adequacy of 
organisation has a direct influence, and does not depend on any of the other CPCs. 
Adequacy of organisation is therefore a background variable, which can be assumed to 
be available during variant conditions. Similarly, the main dependent CPCs with inverse 
influence are available time and number of simultaneous goals, corresponding to the 
recognised importance of the level of workload (Hollnagel, 1998a). Both CPCs - 
number of simultaneous goals and available time - are assumed to depend on the 
working conditions. If the working conditions improve, then the number of 
simultaneous goals, i. e., the number of tasks that the operator has to attend to at the 
same time, is assumed to reduce. Similarly, if the working conditions are improved then 
the available time is also assumed to improve. Both of these are assumed to be direct 
influence dependencies. 
Hollnagel (1998a) stated that in the case of working conditions and available time, the 
criterion for changing the primary assigned effect level is that four out of five of the 
related CPCs are pointing in the same direction (indicating reduced or improved 
reliability). In the case of the number of simultaneous goals, the criterion is that two out 
of three related CPCs are pointing in the same direction. In the case of crew 
collaboration quality, the criterion is that both related CPCs point in the same direction. 
These simple rules provide a way of taking the interaction between the CPCs into 
account, without making unnecessarily complex modelling assumptions and without 
requiring excessively difficult computations (Hollnagel, 1998a). 
Table 4.3: CPCs dependencies (Hollnagel, 1998a) 
118 
Figure 4.8: CREAM CPCs' dependency model (Hollnagel, 1998a) 
4.2.1.6. CREAM assessment models 
CREAM, compared to other second generation methods, takes a very different approach 
to modelling human reliability. It is provided in basic and extended versions of 
technique, both of which have in common two primary features: first, an ability to 
identify the importance of human performance in a given context; and second, a helpful 
cognitive model-associated framework, usable for both prospective and retrospective 
analysis. While prospective analysis allows for the likely human errors to be quantified, 
retrospective analysis identifies the causes of initiating events that have already 
occurred (Hollnagel, 1998a). Retrospective analysis has been widely researched in 
literature. Therefore, this study will focus on prospective analysis. 
4.2.1.7. CREAM basic method 
The basic method is used to assess the overall human performance reliability. Its 
outcome is a generic estimate of COCOM-CMs' probability for the task as a whole. As 
a result, this outcome is used in an extended method, to take a closer look at the parts of 
the task that should be investigated more precisely, to provide a probabilistic estimate. 
The first step of the CREAM basic method is to identify the safety task or event 
scenario to be analysed. An event sequence is then constructed and the CPCs are 
assessed to describe the effects of the context. Nine CPCs and their evaluation level 
descriptors are listed in Table 4.1 and 4.2. For each of the CPCs, a set of discrete 
possible descriptors are defined. For example, the adequacy of organisation descriptors 
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is: very efficient, efficient, inefficient and deficient. Also, for each descriptor, the 
expected effect level on performance reliability is described using an identical set of 
states: improved, not significant, significant. Based on CPCs' dependency effects on 
performance reliability, a combined CPCs score can be expressed as 
CPCs score = (reduced, Enot significant, improved). 
In CREAM basic it is assumed that the value of CPCs score not significant will not 
make a serious difference. In other words, it is the values of reduced and improved 
that are important. Although this does not reduce the number of values of the combined 
CPC score, it reduces the components of assessment to two. This suggests that the 
possible values of the CPC score can be plotted in a Cartesian co-ordinate system. If 
this is done, the control modes can be defined as regions or areas in the system, as 
delineated in Figure 4.9. 
In COCOM, a HFP is assessed based on the degree of control mode that a person has 
over a situation. The control mode can be estimated based on the CPCs score and the 
plot, which originally shows the number of improved reliability CPCs (0... 7) on the 
vertical axis and the number of reduced reliability CPCs (0... 9) on the horizontal axis 
(see Figure 4.9). For example, if the CPCs score is (2,5) then the control mode is 
opportunistic. Generic HFP intervals have been assessed for the control modes, and they 
are also presented in Table 4.4. 
The intention of the CREAM basic is to provide a screening technique for the purpose 
of identifying whether a detailed analysis is required and further studies need to be 
carried out in an extended CREAM (Kim et al. 2006; Adhikari et al., 2009; Hänninen, 
2008). 
Table 4.4: COCOM-CMs' features and their corresponding HFP interval (Holinagel, 1998a) 
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Figure 4.9: Basic diagram of CREAM for operator COCOM-CMs (Konstandinidou et al., 2006) 
4.2.1.8. CREAM extended 
The extended method needs to be done in cases where the generic action probability 
derived from the basic method is unacceptably high; in other words, the uncertainty is 
unacceptably large. The method consists of the following three steps: (1) to identify the 
cognitive activities of the tasks performed in order to build a cognitive profile; (2) to 
identify a most likely CFF for each identified cognitive activity; and (3) to determine 
the probability for each identified CFF. The method provides a total of 13 generic 
failure types in cognitive activities of observation, interpretation, planning and 
execution; and each has a nominal failure probability, as presented in the work by 
Hollnagel (1998a). Subsequently, the characteristics of nine CPCs are used to adjust the 
nominal CFP values to get the final error probability. The extended method cannot be 
used without the basic method generating information (see Figure 4.10) (Hollnagel, 
1998a). 
Figure 4.10: CREAM basic and extended method framework (Hollnagel, 1998a) 
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4.3. The proposed methodology 
In this technical chapter, a new methodology for application of CREAM in the maritime 
domain is developed to estimate seafarers' error probability in marine engineering 
operations. The developed generic methodology incorporates BN characteristics to 
model CPCs' dependency. CPCs will be coupled according to their direct influences on 
the newly designated attributes and sub-attributes. CPC coupling will be tailored to 
match BN characteristics, in terms of conditional independence properties and nodes 
divorcing concept. As a result, both FRB and Bayesian inference will be used 
effectively to simplify incorporation of expert judgments in the assignment of the CPT 
of the COCOM-CMs node and to employ a Bayesian inference mechanism to aggregate 
all the rules associated with a seafarer's task, to estimate its failure probability. 
Consequently, the developed framework can be used consistently to model the 
relationship between the nine CPCs and the four COCOM-CMs in a simple way. The 
outcomes of this work can also make available an observable assessment tool to realise 
the instant estimation of human performance reliability for a specific scenario/task. A 
real case analysis will be described and evaluated with the use of the developed 
CREAM methodology for the assessment of seafarers' failure probability. Finally, the 
BN model sensitivity analysis is verified and the interpretation of the model findings is 
justified to help explain how the model reacted to different sets of evidence. The 
methodological framework steps are shown in Figure 4.11. 
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To establish the nine CPC dependency influences using a BN model 
To couple the nine adjusted CPCs according to their direct influences on the new designated 
attributes and sub attributes 
- -- - ------- --- 
To establish fuzzy IF-THEN classical rule bases to simplify the incorporation of expert 
judgments in the assignment of the CPT of HFP 
To employ a Bayesian inference mechanism to aggregate all the rules associated with a 
seafarer's task for estimating its failure probability 
`, / 
To elaborate the bases of validating the established model 
ýýý 
To perform a real case study analysis 
I 
To validate a real case study model 
Figure 4.11: Methodological framework 
4.3.1. The use of BNs to adjust CPCs' dependency 
I 
BN technique is used to model the nine CPCs dependency in a graphical representation, 
adjusting their direct effects as shown in Figure 4.12, where four newly adjusted CPCs 
are created to simplify the complex relationships between the nine CPCs. The newly 
adjusted CPCs are "Adjusted working condition", "Adjusted number of simultaneous 
goals", "Adjusted available time" and "Adjusted crew collaboration quality". The 
adjusted CPCs' CPTs are assigned deterministically as per CREAM dependency criteria 
(See Table 4.5). For instance, the direct effect state of "Adjusted crew collaboration 
quality" will be automatically updated into the improved/reduced state when "Crew 
collaboration quality" has no significant effect on human reliability, provided the two 
CPCs that affect "Crew collaboration quality" have a simultaneous improved/reduced 
dependency direct effect on human reliability. The direct effect state of "Adjusted 
working condition" will be automatically updated into the improved/reduced status 
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when "Working condition" has no significant effect on human reliability, provided that 
four out of five CPCs affecting working conditions have simultaneous 
improved/reduced dependency direct effects on human reliability. In a similar way. all 
the interactive relations between the CPCs' direct effects can be modelled, and 
consequently the estimations of all the nine original root cause CPCs will be adjusted 
and presented by the states of the new nine sequel root cause CPCs of which the four 
adjusted CPCs replace their original antecedents. As it can be seen in Figure 4.12, the 
model outcome marginal probabilities for the four adjusted CPCs are not evenly 
distributed, owing to the effect of the CPCs dependency rules, and the deterministic 
assignment of CPTs of adjusted CPCs. 
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Figure 4.12: BNs for adjusting CREAM nine CPCs dependency direct effect 
Table 4.5: Part of the adjusted crew collaboration quality CPT. 
Crew Adequacy of 
Adjusted crew collaboration quality 
collabo ti 
Adequacy of deterministic probability ra on i training and V quality organ sation experience Deficient Inefficient Efficient 
ery 
efficient 
Deficient Deficient Inadequate 1 0 0 0 
Inefficient Very Adequate with high 0 0 0 
efficient experience 
Efficient Very Adequate with high 0 0 0 1 
efficient experience 
Inefficient Efficient Inadequate 0 1 0 0 
Efficient Very 
efficient 
Inadequate 0 0 I 0 
Very 
Deficient Adequate with 0 0 0 1 
efficient limited experience 
Very Very Adequate with high 
efficient efficient experience 
0 0 0 1 
4.3.2. Simplifying the assignment of the conditional probability of COCOM-CMs 
The assessment of HFP in maritime operations involves the evaluation of CREAM 
context through the effects level of nine CPCs. By utilising BN characteristics, it is 
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possible to graphically map the influence of the nine CPCs in a convergent connection 
to infer COCOM-CMs' probability. In this context, each CPC is described by a number 
of discrete states, including four states for three CPCs, and three states for the remaining 
six CPCs. Such type of convergent connection will result in 46,656 (43x36) discrete 
conditional probabilities to be assigned. However, assigning such huge numbers of 
discrete conditional probabilities subjectively by experts, in the light of a lack of 
objective data, will be of great difficulty. Therefore, introducing a method that could 
simplify the task of assigning subjective probabilities will be beneficial and is urgently 
needed. 
Basically, CPCs and human actions are coupled and mutually dependent. The CPCs 
provide a comprehensive and well structured basis for characterising context conditions 
under which human performance is expected to take place (Holinagel, 1998a; Gore, 
2002; Hollnagel, 2005). As a result, the derivation of the combined CPCs score must 
take into account the way in which CPCs are coupled or dependent (Hollnagel, 1998a). 
Three newly introduced attributes: "Action load" (A), "Working environment" (W) and 
"Operator preparedness" (0) are created and presented in the BN model, based on the 
BN divorcing principle (see Figure 4.13). Basically, divorcing is used to simplify the 
modelling and to overcome the difficulty of assigning the huge numbers of discrete 
conditional probabilities subjectively by experts. It is closely related to the bottom-up 
principle in modelling, often combined with a top-down approach. The bottom-up 
principle means that one looks at how CPCs combine to define the sub-attributes and 
attributes that make the BN work (Jensen, 2001). The new attributes are believed to 
directly influence COCOM-CMs' reliability based on a reasonable qualitative judgment 
addressed by Marseguerra et al. (2007). Each CPC has a different influence on these 
attributes, following the lines of reasoning underlying in CPCs' evaluation (Hollnagel, 
1998a). 
As seen from Figure 4.13, the attribute "Working environments", is influenced by five 
CPCs. To simplify its CPT assignment, two new sub-attributes, "Adequacy of working 
culture" and "Adequacy of perception conditions" are introduced. Following the 
bottom-up modelling principle, the introduction is based on, firstly, when the 
"Adequacy of organisation" and the "Adjusted crew collaboration quality" CPC are 
conditionally independent in a convergent connection of the BN shown in Figure 4.13. 
The "Adequacy of organisation" affects the official structure of "Crew collaboration 
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quality" between crew members, the level of trust, and the general social climate among 
crew members. These affects will influence the newly introduced sub-attribute 
"Adequacy of working culture". According to Schein's (1985) theory a culture has two 
tasks: It maintains internal integration in an organisation collaboration quality and 
creates ways to meet task demands. Culture is a metaphor for an organisation. As a 
result, the concept of culture is a tool used to analyse the organisation core task (Reiman 
and Oedewald, 2007; Reiman, 2007). 
Secondly, the introduction of sub-attribute "Adequacy of perception of conditions" is 
developed based on the causes of "Adequacy of MMI operational support" as 
information and control options provider, "Adjusted working conditions" as a physical 
affect that may not always be fully recognised and "Time of the day (circadian rhythm)" 
related to disruption due to shift work and the changes of time on long vessel routes. 
The conditional independence properties of these CPCs will affect human external 
perception of conditions, e. g., observation; as a result, human cognition function, such 
as interpretation, planning and execution are also affected. In this context, the CPCs' 
conditional independence concurs with the external perception conditions deemed to be 
sufficient as a visual input to allow humans to interact with the environment (Shorrock, 
2007) in situational awareness (Lockhart et al., 1993; Leveson, 1997; Endsley, 2000). 
Attributes and sub-attributes CPTs are assigned reasonably in a uniform distribution, 
based on the logical order of their defined effect levels, in a way that would result in a 
logical distribution of their nodes' marginal probabilities in a generic BN (see Figure 
4.13). Table 4.6 shows the uniform distribution of action load CPT. CPTs of other 
attributes and sub-attributes are provided in A2.1, A2.2, A2.3, and A2.4. 
Table 4.6: Action load CPT distribution 
No. Action load CPT % 
Adjusted number of simultaneous 
goals 
Adjusted available time inappropriate Acceptable Appropriate 
1 Continuously inadequate More than actual capacity 100 0 0 
2 Continuously inadequate Matching current capacity 50 50 0 
3 Continuously inadequate Fewer than actual capacity 33.4 33.3 33.3 
4 Temporarily inadequate More than actual capacity 75 25 0 
5 Temporarily inadequate Matchin current capacity 25 50 25 
6 Tern oraril inadequate Fewer than actual capacity 0 25 75 
7 Adequate More than actual capacity 33.3 33.3 33.4 
8 Adequate Matching current capacity 0 50 50 
9 
-Adequate 
Fewer than actual capacity 0 0 100 
126 
Mummn aoEon p. rlormano. 
Strrepe 21.2 'ý 
r. a zs2 i! 
Opponum. uc 29. ý 
ScnmrW 212 ; 
Aetlon k. a 
knppopnM" 43a 
Att"q"eY 1l2 
MwopM" n. e 
ý 
--- AGeqweysypmpeeneyeenGinens Adeqwayeyworsingculture 
Fapprppeate J68 Mppmpaia J5i 
AccapuGe 32.2 Accapaw 22.8 '. 
II 8ate 38.8 I 
\\ 
Ne 281 
"ajuba rwmwr e1 "ýnuM. n.. us 
AMqwayetoryariveen ýý Wor4igtendltlem 
DNCMN 250 1-ý, 
CoýrNýtiEY ]]. J 
MTCnM 25.0 I 
Eft- 25 0 gUyýrRpwuý 11.2 
VrryElAU- 25 .0 
..., ua. ti.,. 
"a. y... y. fm. n m. ýýn. 
arFiip. nvircnm. nn 
ujue. a. erxinao. ýmuen. I 71 I Ayureenw«n. eer. noenýa' 
1W. G. Npty "r pro<"m. a uk pl. n 
er... al. e... u. 0 awmy 
o. k- 250 
F. Ilci.. rc 25.0 
EIkwM 25 0 
V El. ci. nl 250iý 
. 
Figure 4.13: CREAM based human performance reliability assessment BNs generic model. 
The divorcing concept in a BN has no significant effect on model mathematical 
inference (Kim et al., 2006), if attributes and sub-attributes CPTs are assigned properly. 
Finally, the use of the divorcing concept simplifies the assignment of CPTs of the 
developed CREAM BN model. It also makes it possible to introduce FRB to facilitate 
experts' subjective elicitation of COCOM-CMs node CPT. The interactive logical 
relation between the effect levels of the three attributes "Action load", "Working 
environments" and "Operator preparedness", and the four COCOM-CMs can therefore 
be established (see Table 4.7). 
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Table 4.7: The FRB construct for the linguistic variables of the three new attributes (k =I, 2,3 descriptor) 
Antecedents Consequence 
IF And, And, Then Rule 
No. Operator 
Preparedness 
LK 
Action Load 
(L2 ) 
Working 
Environment 
LN 
Strategic 
(DI) 
Tactical 
(D2) 
Opportunistic 
(D9) 
Scrambled 
(D4) 
1 Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate 0 0 0 1 
2 Inappropriate Inappropriate Acceptable 0 0 0.1 0.9 
3 Inappropriate Inappropriate Appropriate 0 0 0.2 0.8 
4 Inappropriate Acceptable Inappropriate 0 0 0.25 0.75 
5 Inappropriate Acceptable Acceptable 0 0 0.3 0.7 
6 Inappropriate Acceptable Appropriate 0 0 0.4 0.6 
7 Inappropriate Appropriate Inappropriate 0 0.1 0.4 0.5 
8 Inappropriate Appropriate Acceptable 0 0.2 0.4 0.4 
9 Inappropriate Appropriate A roriate 0 0.2 0.5 0.3 
10 Acceptable Inappropriate Inappropriate 0 0.1 0.9 0 
11 Acceptable Inappropriate Acceptable 0 0.2 0.8 0 
12 Acceptable Inappropriate Appropriate 0 0.25 0.75 0 
13 Acceptable Acceptable Inappropriate 0 0.3 0.7 0 
14 Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable 0 0.5 0.5 0 
15 Acceptable Acceptable Appropriate 0 0.6 0.4 0 
16 Acceptable Appropriate Inappropriate 0 0.7 0.3 0 
17 Acceptable Appropriate Acceptable 0 0.8 0.2 0 
18 Acceptable Appropriate Appropriate 0 0.9 0.1 0 
19 Appropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate 0.3 0.5 0.2 0 
20 Appropriate Inappropriate Acceptable 0.4 0.4 0.2 0 
21 Appropriate Inappropriate _ Appropriate 0.5 0.3 0.2 0 
22 Appropriate Acceptable Inappropriate 0.6 0.4 0 0 
23 Appropriate Acceptable Acceptable 0.7 0.3 0 0 
24 Appropriate Acceptable A ro riate 0.75 0.25 0 0 
25 Appropriate Appropriate Inappropriate 0.8 0.2 0 0 
26 Appropriate Appropriate Acceptable 0.9 0.1 0 0 
27 Appropriate Appropriate Appropriate 1 0 0 0 
Three maritime experts with significant domain knowledge were interviewed to provide 
their subjective elicitation on the Consequence of the rules base listed in Table 4.7. The 
three elicited conditional probabilities are aggregated and normalised by the use of 
Equation 3.1. For example, the conditional probability CP of scrambled COCOM-CM 
on rule number 4 listed in Table 4.7 is obtained as follow: 
CP = 
0.75 +0.73+0.77 
3 = 0.75 
In a similar way the remaining CPs are calculated to develop the CPT listed in Table 
4.7. CPT is used to establish the CREAM based human performance reliability 
assessment BNs generic model. 
4.3.3. Use of FRB logic-Bayesian reasoning for human failure quantification 
FRB logic has gained a significant achievement due to its application in many fields. It 
is a relatively new approach. It has the capability of modelling highly complex 
problems linguistically rather than numerically. The nature of its modelling ensures that 
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the rule structure provides a human-like intuition process and, most importantly, it 
captures expert knowledge in the real world of experience (Opricovis and Tsang, 2003). 
In this technical study a FRB is introduced to structure the interactive relation between 
the COCOM-CMs and the three parents "Action load", "Working environments", and 
"Operator preparedness" in a logical form, as described in the following sub section: 
4.3.3.1. Construction of multiple-input multiple-output rule base 
To model the interactive relations between the new attributes and COCOM-CMs in a 
logical form, FL can be used to construct IF-THEN rules. These have two parts: an 
antecedent that responds to the fuzzy input of the three new attributes and a 
consequence associated with the COCOMs' four control modes which provide the fuzzy 
output. In classical FRB systems, such input and output are usually expressed by single 
linguistic variables with 100% certainty, and the rules constructed are considered as 
multiple-input single-output cases. However, in this study a collection of multiple-input 
multiple-output FRB is defined as follows (Yang et al., 2010): 
RN: IF L1K and L2K and L3K, THEN (D1, D2, D3, D4) ................................................ 
(4.1) 
In a fuzzy rule RN if the input satisfies the antecedent linguistic vector(s) L1K (i = 1,2, 
3), the output Dn (n =1,2,3,4) represents the belief degree(s) to which a control 
mode(s) is believed to be the consequence. Linguistic vector LiK is defined with its 
nature of having "Appropriate" (improved), "Acceptable" (not significant) or 
"Inappropriate" (reduced) effects on COCOM-CMs. Obviously, if L1 is "Action load", 
then L1Kcan be any of the three linguistic variables used to describe "Action load", 
which are Inappropriate (L11), Acceptable (L12), and Appropriate (L13). The following 
illustrative rules are developed to interpret the above two RN (see Table 4.7). 
RI: IF the "Action load" is "Appropriate" AND the "Working environments" is 
"Appropriate" AND "Operator preparedness" is "Appropriate", THEN the belief 
degrees of operator COCOM-CMs would be 100% "Strategic", 0% "Tactical", 0% 
"Opportunistic", and 0% "Scrambled". 
R3: IF the "Action load" is Inappropriate AND the "Working environments" are 
Appropriate AND "Operator preparedness" is Inappropriate, THEN the belief degrees 
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of operator COCOM-CM would be 0% "Strategic", 0% "Tactical", 10% 
"Opportunistic", and 90% "Scrambled". 
They can be further simplified and presented as a rule base: 
RI: IF L11, AND L22, AND L33, THEN (D1,1), (D2,0), (D3,0), and (D4,0). 
R2: IF L11, AND L23, AND L31, THEN (D1,0), (D2,0), (D3,0.1), and (D4,0.9) 
where LiK (i &k=1,2,3) indicates the Li new attribute and the associated km 
linguistic variable descriptor (see Table 4.8). Such a rule base represents the possible 
functional mappings of uncertainty between the three new attributes and the four control 
modes. It provides a more informative, realistic scheme than a simple IF-THEN rule 
base does on uncertain knowledge representation (Yang et al., 2008). 
Table 4.8: Main/sub-attributes' descriptor and their effect levels 
No. Main attribute Linguistic variable Effects 
Inappropriate reduced 
1 Action load Acceptable not significant 
Appropriate improved 
Inappropriate reduced 
2 Working environments Acceptable not significant 
Appropriate improved 
Inappropriate reduced 
3 Operator preparedness Acceptable not significant 
Appropriate improved 
Sub-attribute Linguistic variable effects 
Inappropriate reduced 
I Adequacy of perception conditions Acceptable not significant 
Appropriate improved 
Inappropriate reduced 
2 Adequacy of working culture Acceptable not significant 
Appropriate improved 
4.3.3.2. Aggregation of rule base output using a Bayesian reasoning mechanism 
The established rule base system (see Table 4.7), enables experts to infer, from the 
observation of given antecedent linguistic variables, the corresponding consequent 
COCOM-CMs' output belief degrees. The kernel of this inference is to appropriately 
transform belief degrees in the rule base into subjective conditional probabilities that 
can be used in a Bayesian mechanism (Yang et al., 2008). For example, the simplified 
R2 stated in the first step can be further expressed in the form of conditional probability 
as follows: 
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Given L11, AND L23, AND L31, THEN the probability of D,, (n = 1,2,3,4) is (0,0,0.1, 
0.9) or 
P (Dn I L11, L23, L31) _ (0,0,0.1,0.9) ..................................................................... (4.2) 
where "I" symbolizes conditional probability. 
Once the output belief degrees of the rule base are transformed into conditional 
probabilities, a BN technique can be used to aggregate COCOM-CMs' marginal 
probability. This could be transformed further into HFP. 
By using the established rule base in Table 4.7, the required CPT, p (D,, I Li K) for the 
child node COCOM-CMs' (ND) associated four control modes (Dn) (see Figure 4.13) 
are obtained. Having transferred the rule base into a Bayesian format, the marginal 
probabilities of the three new attributes Li (see Figure 4.13) and ND CPT can be used in 
a Bayesian mechanism to calculate the control modes' (Dn) marginal probabilities - see 
(Table 4.9). As an example Equation 4.3 can be used to demonstrate the derivation of 
combination No 1 in Table 4.8. 
P (DnI LiK, L2 K, L3K) XP (LiK) XP (LZK) XP (L3K) (n = 1... 4) & (K=1,2, 
3) ................................................................................................................................ (4.3) 
P(D41L11, L21, L31)xP(L1) xP(L21)xP(L31); 
where the value of conditional probability P (D41 L11, L21, L31) is stated in Table 4.7 
rule No. 1, and the marginal probabilities P(L, 1), P (L21), P (, L31) are inferred by a 
BN model (see Figure 4.13). 
1x0.333 x 0.420 x 0.378 = 0.0529; 
To marginalize control modes (Dn), P (Dn I LiK) (see Table 4.8), Equation 4.4 can be 
used as (Jenson, 2001): 
P(Dn) = Ek1=1Ekz=1 Ek3=1 P(DnILk) (n= 1,2,3,4), (i=1,2,3), (k=1,2,3)..... (4.4) 
131 
Table 4.9: Control modes' aggregated marginal probabilities (k = 1,2,3 descriptor) 
c 
E 
P(D1IL1K, L2K, L3K) 
x P(L1K) x 
P(LZK) X P(L3K) 
Strategic 
P(D21 L1K, L2K, L3K) 
x P(L1K) x 
P(L2K) X P(L3K) 
Tactical 
P(D31 L1K, L2K, L3K) 
x P(L1K) x 
P(L2K) X P(L3K) 
Opportunistic 
P(D4 L1K, L2K, L3K) 
x P(L1K) x 
P(L2K)x P(L3K) 
Scrambled 
0 0 0 0.0529 
2 0 0 0.0046 0.0413 
3 0 0 0.0082 0.0329 
4 0 0 0.0089 0.0266 
5 0 0 0.0092 0.0216 
6 0 0 0.0110 0.0166 
7 0 0.0038 0.0150 0.0188 
8 0 0.0065 0.0130 0.0130 
9 0 0.0058 0.0146 0.0088 
10 0 0.0053 0.0476 0 
11 0 0.0092 0.0367 0 
12 0 0.0103 0.0308 0 
13 0 0.0106 0.0248 0 
14 0 0.0154 0.0154 0 
15 0 0.0166 0.0110 0 
16 0 0.0263 0.0113 0 
17 0 0.0260 0.0065 0 
18 0 0.0263 0.0029 0 
19 0.0159 0.0265 0.0106 0 
20 0.0184 0.0184 0.0092 0 
21 0.0206 0.0124 0.0082 0 
22 0.0214 0.0142 0 0 
23 0.0216 0.0093 0 0 
24 0.0208 0.0069 0 0 
25 0.0301 0.0075 0 0 
26 0.0294 0.0033 0 0 
27 0.0293 0 0 0 
1 0.2075 0.2605 0.2997 0.2323 
4.3.3.3. Transformation of COCOM-CMs' probability into HFP 
To quantify HFP, the COCOM-CMs' linguistic terms D. (n = 1... 4) require the 
assignment of appropriate utility values. In this respect, fuzzy sets are normally used to 
model the four COCOM-CMs corresponding HFP interval (Yang et al., 2010). 
COCOM-CMs' fuzzy functions mapping the probability distributions are shown in 
Figure 4.14. In order to regain calculated crisp HFP values for each control mode, the 
assignment of appropriate utility values Uon to the 4 four COCOM-CMs can be 
obtained using defuzzifecation. The crisp utility values can be obtained by defuzzifying 
the fuzzy membership functions of the four control modes shown in Figure 4.14, using 
the centre of gravity Equation 4.5 (Andrews and Moss, 2002; Yang et al., 2010). For 
example, Uon can be calculated as follows: 
an+bn+cn Upn =3........................................................................................................... (4.5ý 
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where (ar, b, c) each is the fuzzy number of the ith COCOM-CM mapped in Figure 
4.14. As a result, the Uon values (n= 1... 4) can be calculated as 2.24 x 104 for 
strategic, 0.01 for tactical, 0.0708 for opportunistic and 0.316 for scrambled (Yang et 
al., 2010). Accordingly, a new HEP index can be calculated as: 
HFP = Zn =i P(Dn) Upn ............................................................................................ (4.6) 
where the larger the value of HFP, the lower the reliability level of human performance. 
1 
A 
Strategic Tactical Opportunistic Scrambled 
Lodlo (Prob DUIty) 
Figure 4.14: Fuzzy membership functions mapping probability distributions for the COCOM-CMs 
corresponding HFPs adapted from Yang et al. (2010) 
4.3.3.4. BN model validation 
Validation is an important aspect that provides a reasonable amount of confidence to the 
results obtained from the established generic model. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis for 
partial validation of a developed model could be carried out based on the following 
axioms (Yang, et al. 2008): 
Axiom 1: A slight increase/decrease in the prior subjective probabilities of each parent 
node should certainly result in the effect of a relative increase/decrease of the child node 
COCOM-CMs' probability. 
Axiom 2: The total influence magnitudes of the combined subjective probability 
variations of the set X CPCs (evidence) on the child node COCOM-CMs' probability 
values should be always be greater than the total influence magnitudes of the combined 
subjective probability of the set X-Y (YE X) CPCs (sub-evidence). 
In this technical work the approach for sensitivity analysis is slightly different than the 
approach used in chapter 3. Sensitivity to finding, tests how sensitive a network model 
is to changes in overall findings, where the influence of each node on a query node in a 
network can be measured, by calculating the mutual information or entropy reduction. 
-5.3 -4.3 -33 _23 .tA . A_ Irin. /»rob 
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The results of a sensitivity analysis can be used for model later development cycle. 
Axiom 1 and axiom 2 are explicit examples of sensitivity to parameter and implicit 
examples of sensitivity to finding; such approach aims to find changes in each variable 
in the model. The goal is to determine whether more precision in estimating variables is 
required and whether it can be useful in a later iteration of model development cycle 
(Mittal and Kassim, 2007). 
4.4. Case study: Heeling Accident on M/V Crown Princess, Atlantic Ocean off Port 
Canaveral, Florida, 18th July, 2006 
The main reasons underlie the selection of MN Crown Princess heeling accident as a 
case study to validate the developed COCOM-CMs BN model are: the accident analysis 
results was based on VDR' audible and visual data, which had helped investigators to 
perform an objective analysis; the vessel age was just about three months off her 
maiden voyage; the vessel was built in a well reputed ship yard, as well it was classed 
by two of the IACS' calcification societies; the vessel passenger ship safety certificate 
was issued by the USCG and her officers competency was well recognised. Although a 
similar accident was experienced by officers on board other vessel, and its genotype 
root cause factors was identified and circulated by the USCG to the owners of the 
vessels that were trading within the premises of the USCG maritime safety 
administration, stakeholders organisationally did not consider the root cause factors 
negative consequence. Such hidden information provoked the misuse of MN Crown 
Princess INS by her officers at full speed and in shallow water; as a result, the vessel 
was subjected to the heeling accident. 
The accident on the cruise ship Crown Princess was initiated by the Second Officer's 
steering action during his command subsequent to the vessel's departure, in which the 
vessel heeled at a maximum angle of about 24°, resulting in injuries to 298 passengers 
and crew members. The Crown Princess was travelling at 20 knots, nearly full speed, 
when it heeled. The vessel was in relatively shallow water at the time of the accident. 
The ship's Captain, Staff Captain (second in command), relief Captain, Second Officer, 
two Fourth Officers, and two Helmsmen were on the bridge during an uneventful 
departure from Port Canaveral, Florida, United States. The analysis refers to those on 
watch during the accident sequence. 
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4.4.1. Vessel history and construction information 
The Crown Princess's sea trials were conducted in March 2006, subsequent to her 
construction in Monfalcone, Italy, by Fincantieri Cantieri. The Crown Princess's Dwt is 
113,561; she was dual-classed by Lloyds Register (LR) and Registro Italiano Navale 
(RINA), under a Bermuda flag registration; and her passenger vessel certificate of 
compliance was issued by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) subsequent to the 
vessel's examination (NTSB/MAR-08/01,2008). 
4.4.2. Propulsion, steering and voyage data recordering 
The Crown Princess was powered by electric propulsion motors driving two fixed-pitch 
propellers. The steering port and starboard rudders were synchronized, so that the same 
rudder order from the bridge control system went to each steering gear unit. The Crown 
Princess was equipped with an Integrated Navigation System (INS) - the most modern 
equipment at the time she was launched. The vessel's steering gear units were 
controlled through one of two electronic steering control systems on the bridge. The 
first was a basic heading control system or autopilot, including a manual steering- 
control system. The second was the track-pilot system. A steering mode selector switch 
was located on the bridge centre control console. In general, the track-pilot was used 
mainly in open waters, with manual steering normally used when arriving at and 
departing from port or in pilotage waters. The officer on watch was allowed to select the 
steering mode with respect to Watch keeping Policies and Procedures stating that watch 
keepers had the discretion to steer using an automated INS mode or manually, within 
the standards that the vessel captains established in their standing orders. The Crown 
Princess was equipped with a Voyage Data Recorder (VDR), which recorded inputs 
from specific audio, data channels, and a video source. The data were retained on a hard 
disk drive which was removed after the accident for further investigation analysis by the 
National Transport Safety Board'(NTSB) analysts (NTSB/MAR-08/01,2008). 
4.4.3. Factors included in the scope of the accident analysis 
The analysis first identifies factors that can be eliminated as causal or contributory to 
the accident, such as: the vessel's mechanical condition, weather, sea state, and 
behavioural or physiological impairment of the crew. It then discusses the following 
safety issues identified in the accident investigation: 
" Actions of Captain, Staff Captain, and Second Officer. 
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" Training in the use of INS. 
" Reporting of heeling incidents and accidents. 
" Emergency response following severe incidents. 
4.4.4. Accident 
The Crown Princess's departure from Port Canaveral was uneventful. After the pilot 
disembarked and the vessel entered the open ocean, the crew engaged the track-pilot 
and the Captain ordered an increase in the vessel's speed to stay ahead of forecast 
adverse weather. The Captain and Staff Captain left the bridge, turning the navigation 
watch over to the Second Officer. The Second Officer, concerned by indications of a 
high rate of turn to port, disengaged the track-pilot automatic steering mode of the 
vessel's INS and began steering the vessel manually in an effort to counteract a 
perceived high rate of turn to port. His first turn was opposite to his intended direction 
and then between port and starboard several times. A minute later, the vessel heeled 
hard to starboard. She was travelling at 20 knots, nearly full speed, when she heeled. 
The heeling caused passengers and crew to be struck by parts of the vessel's structure or 
unsecured objects, resulting in injuries to 298 people. The Crown Princess incurred no 
structural damage, although unsecured interior items were damaged. The vessel was in 
relatively shallow water at the time of the accident, with 8.3 metres (about 26 feet) of 
water under the keel (NTSB/MAR-08/01,2008). 
4.4.5. Analysis of Captain, Staff Captain and Second Officer's actions 
The following analysis is adopted from NTSB/MAR-08/01 (2008) 
Scenario 1: Captain and Chief Captain actions 
Case 1.1: Captain's action after the pilot disembarked and the vessel entered the open ocean 
Time Action description 
The Captain ordered an increase in the vessel's speed to stay ahead of forecast adverse 
weather, and the crew engaged the track-pilot at 15: 01 
Observations 
The vessel began to fluctuate around its designated 100° heading about 15: 03. Two minutes 
later, the track-pilot rudder limit alarm sounded. 
15: 01 
15: 18 
Evaluation 
The Safety Board therefore concludes that the Captain and Staff Captain did not recognize 
that high speed and shallow water were adversely affecting the vessel's course stability. The 
analysis results reflected inappropriate availability of procedures/plans and inadequate 
training and expertise, for performing this specific task. 
Casel. 2: Captain and Staff Catain's action (response) 
Action description 
The Staff Captain increased the rudder limit from 5° to 10°. At the time, the rudder economy 
was set to level 5, normally intended for rough seas. 
Observations 
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In addition to the effects of high speed in shallow water on vessel steering, the Staff Captain 
further enabled the vessel's course deviations by increasing the rudder limit, without realising 
the consequence of maintaining the track-pilot's rudder economy. This was inappropriately 
set at level 5 and was the initiating event of the rudder limit alarm, which should be based on 
the sea state and weather conditions 
Evaluation 
The Safety Board therefore concludes that the Captain and Staff Captain failed to adjust the 
rudder economy setting, which was inappropriate for the sea state and was exacerbating the 
course deviations. The analysis results reflected inadequate training and expertise in use of 
INS, lack of competence in recognising the effects of high vessel speed in shallow water on 
course stability, and inappropriate adequacy of MMI and operational support in regard to this 
spe ific task. 
Scenario 2: Captain, Staff Catain, and Second Officer's actions 
Case 2.1: Captain, Staff Catain, and Second Officer's actions 
Time Action description 
The Captain turned the command over to the Second Officer at 15: 18; this was 6 minutes 
before the Second Officer disengaged the track-pilot 
Observations 
The fluctuations in the vessel's heading that the Captain and Staff Captain had attempted to 
address through the INS continued. 
Evaluation 
The Captain transferred the command without determining the cause of the heading 
fluctuations, and worse, left the bridge without verifying that they were lessening. The 
evidence of his previous experience as Captain and his actions in turning over the command 
suggest that the Captain believed either that the INS would stabilise the heading or that the 
Second Officer would remedy the problem. The Safety Board therefore concludes that the 
Captain should not have transferred the command to the Second Officer and left the bridge 
unless he could verify that the vessel's heading fluctuations had diminished. The analysis 
results reflected inefficient quality in crew collaboration, aggravated by inappropriate 
availability of procedures/plans and inadequate training and expertise in regard to this 
specific task. 
Case 2.2: Second Officer's actions 
Action description 
+15: 18 
The Crown Princess was operating at nearly full speed when the Second Officer took the 
command. He immediately faced the problem of navigating a vessel that exhibited both 
increasing course deviations and high rates of turn. The Second Officer was concerned with 
15: 26 the red colour of the rate-of-turn indicator on the bridge, which indicated a high rate of turn 
to port. He responded immediately by disengaging the track-pilot (disengaging the track-pilot 
disengaged the rudder limit and rudder economy settings) and turning the wheel 10° to port, 
when he should have turned it to starboard to counteract the turn. After his initial turn to port, 
the Second Officer manually steered back and forth between port and starboard in 
increasingly wider turns, rather than remedying the problem. 
Observations 
The Second Officer's actions exacerbated the course fluctuations and high turn rates, and 
caused larger and larger heel angles. The result was an increasing heel to starboard that 
eventually peaked at about 24°. The Second Officer's wheel inputs increased the starboard 
heel over the duration of the event rather than decreasing it. His actions could be attributed to 
a "slip" (error of omission) (Reason, 1990a, b) or to a misdiagnosis of the situation, i. e., error 
of commission. 
Evaluation 
The Safety Board concludes that no deficiencies in the Second Officer's training or 
background could account for his inappropriate steering commands. The analytical results 
reflected inappropriate adequacy of MMI and operational support, inappropriate availability 
of procedures/plans, and inadequate training and expertise, specifically in the use of INS, not 
being able to recognise the effects of high vessel speed in shallow water on course stability, 
and the lack of emergency ship handling skills that would have allowed him to respond 
effectively to the vessel's unexpected behaviour in regard to this specific task. 
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4.4.6. Reporting of heeling incidents and accidents 
In examining other heeling accidents and incidents, the Safety Board found common 
antecedents - crew members not fully understanding the INS they were using, not 
anticipating the effect of their actions on the INS, or both. Further, neither the Maritime 
Administrations such as the Coast Guard nor the IMO requires licensed mariners to 
complete formal INS instruction before using an INS. There is also no requirement that 
mariners who have completed INS instruction take courses thereafter. A system that 
allows users to interact with such sophisticated systems as an INS with the training 
shortcomings noted is deficient and increases the likelihood that crewmembers will 
commit INS-related errors. As a result, the Safety Board issued a safety 
recommendation to the Coast Guard, which was classified as closed-acceptable action, 
after publicizing the circumstances of the accident. Partly because of this action, 
information on the squat effect was prominently posted on the Crown Princess's bridge. 
Such a follow-up could be characterised by inadequate organisation. 
4.4.7. Findings 
" The Captain and Staff Captain did not recognise that high speed and shallow water 
were adversely affecting the vessel's course stability. 
" The Captain and Staff Captain inappropriately adjusted the track-pilot's rudder limit 
in response to unintended deviations in the vessel's set heading; and they failed to 
adjust the rudder economy setting, which was inappropriate for the sea state and was 
exacerbating the course deviations. 
" The Captain should not have transferred the command to the Second Officer and left 
the bridge unless he could verify that the vessel's heading fluctuations had 
diminished. 
" The Crown Princess heeled because, after the Second Officer disengaged the track- 
pilot and turned the wheel to port rather than turning it to amidships and slowing the 
vessel as he should have, his subsequent steering commands to both port and 
starboard, at angles ranging from 101 to 45°, led to vessel responses that he did not 
expect, did not understand, and was therefore unable to correct. 
" No deficiencies in the Second Officer's training or background could account for his 
inappropriate steering commands. 
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" The errors of the Captain and Staff Captain in operating the INS resulted from 
inadequate training. 
" The systematic collection of data on mishaps related to INSs will enhance the 
systems' design, procedures, and training. 
" The Crown Princess accident demonstrates the need for obtaining and archiving data 
on vessel angles of heel (NTSB/MAR-08/01,2008). 
4.4.8. Probable Cause 
The NTSB determines that the probable cause of the Crown Princess accident was the 
Second Officer's incorrect wheel commands, executed first to counter an unanticipated 
high rate of turn and then to counter the vessel's heeling. Contributing to the cause of 
the accident was the Captain's and Staff Captain's inappropriate inputs to the vessel's 
INS while the vessel was travelling at high speed in relatively shallow water; their 
failure to stabilize the vessel's heading fluctuations before leaving the bridge; and the 
inadequate training of crew members in the use of INSs (NTSB/MAR-08/01,2008). 
4.4.9. Human COCOM-CMs marginal probability inference 
Based on CREAM CPCs evaluation and their possible descriptors stated in Table 4.1, 
Table 4.10 is adapted to show (in bold-face) the accident CPCs descriptors' observation 
and their associated expected effect levels on crew performance reliability. CPCs 
descriptors are assigned deterministically to be used as input observations of root cause 
nodes state in the established CREAM BN generic model (see Figure 4.13). CREAM 
BN mechanism is used to infer the probabilistic beliefs of human action COCOM-CMs' 
marginal probabilities, i. e., scrambled 71.7%, opportunistic 23.4%, tactical 4.66%, and 
strategic 0% (see Figure 4.15). Using Equation 4.6 and by substituting each of the above 
stated belief P(Dn) of COCOM-CM and its related utility value UDn (nominal human 
COCOM-CMs probabilities results) provided in Section 4.3.3.3, the following actual 
HFP portion derived out of the nominal human action control modes probabilities are 
listed in descending order: 
Scrambled = (71.7 x 0.316)/100 = 0.226572 = 0.2266 
Opportunistic = (23.6 x 0.0708)/100 = 0.0223 
Tactical = (4.66 x 0.01)/100 = 0.000466 -Z 0.0005 
Strategic = (0 x 0.000224)/100 =0 
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Finally, the above control modes results aggregation with use of Equation 4.6 would 
derive the total HFP as follows: 
HFP= 0.2266 + 0.0223 + 0.0005 +0=0.2494 failure/time; 
At this stage of validation, it is worthwhile to differentiate between the CREAM basic 
and the developed CREAM BN model results. In this context, the CREAM basic result 
is based on CPCs' evaluation scores improved and reduced (1,4); the plotting of these 
scores on the graph shown in Figure 4.9 reveals the result of opportunistic control mode 
and its related generic HFPs, whereas CREAM BN model inference and the associated 
FS model transformation revealed the final calculation of HFP 0.2494 Failure/time; this 
HFP inclusively lies within the overlapping range (0.1 < HFP < 0.5) of opportunistic 
and scrambled control modes related HFPs (see Table 4.4). Comparing the results of 
both approaches, obviously the specified HFP would provide a more focused result with 
a better resolution that would enable an assessor to establish the right preventative plan. 
Table 4.10: Accident context CPCs levels descriptors and their effect on performance reliability 
CPC name Level/descriptors 
Expected effect on 
rformance reliability 
Very Efficient Improved 
Adequacy of organisation Efficient Not Significant 
(CPC 1) Inefficient Reduced 
Deficient Reduced 
W ki Advantageous Im roved or ng conditions 
CPC 2 Compatible Not significant ( ) Incompatible Reduced 
Supportive Improved 
Adequacy of MMI and operational support Adequate Not Significant 
(CPC 3) Tolerable Not Significant 
Inappropriate Reduced 
A il bilit f d Appropriate Improved va a yo proce ures/plans 
(CPC 4 Acceptable Not significant ) 
Inappropriate Reduced 
N b f i Fewer than capacity Not significant um er o s multaneous goals 
CPC 5 Matching current capacity Not significant ( ) 
More than capacity Reduced 
A il bl Adequate improved va a e time 
(CPC 6 Tempo ly inadequate Not significant ) Continuously inadequate Reduced 
Day-time (6: 00-18: OOhr) 
(adjusted) Not significant 
Time of day (circadian rhythm) 
(CPC 7) 
Night(] 7: 00-24: 00hr) 
unadjusted Reduced 
Night-time(0: 00-7: 00hr) 
(unadjusted) Reduced 
Ad ft i i Adequate, high experience Improved equacy o ra n ng and expertise 
(CPC 8 Adequate, limited experience Not significant ) 
Inadequate Reduced 
Very efficient Improved 
Crew collaboration quality Efficient Not significant 
(CPC 9) Inefficient Not significant 
Deficient Reduced 
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4.4.9.1. Model finding interpretation 
Failing to comprehend the affect of shallow water and the increase of vessel speed on 
large vessel manoeuvring characteristics increased the squat effect. This effect had 
tangibly changed the designated steering behaviour of the ship. In this respect, the 
previously set parameters for the track-pilot ability believed to steer the ship would no 
longer match the resulted ship behaviour observation. Such a hidden situation was 
partially manifested in that the rudder limits alarm sounded and the vessel turned. The 
action taken by the Staff Captain in response to the rudder limits alarm sound was to 
increase the setting range of the rudder limits alarm without realising the main reasons. 
The Staff Captain and Captain's actions were based on their competences control on 
observation, interpretation, planning, and execution; these were determined by the 
salient futures of the context at that time, rather than on more stable intentions or goals. 
They did very little planning or anticipation, perhaps because the context was not 
clearly understood. In these situations, they were often driven either by the perceptually 
dominant feature of the context, or by the most frequently used experience or habit 
corresponding to a similar matching context. The result was often a functional fixation. 
Consequently, their corrective actions were structurally based on an opportunistic 
control mode, reasoning on the set parameters for the track-pilot's ability to steer the 
ship. However, such actions could not be updated, as command was transferred to the 
Second Officer. Nevertheless, the effect of squat due to instant speed increase reduced 
significantly the INS's yaw-checking and steering control ability as well. The new 
observation left no time for the Second Officer to structure his competence control on 
interpretation, planning and execution of his action, leading him to act on a scrambled 
control mode, characterised by disengaging the track-pilot and turning the wheel to port 
rather than turning it to amidships and slowing the vessel, as he should have done. His 
hand-steering commands to both port and starboard, at angles ranging from 10° to 45°, 
led to vessel responses that he did not expect, did not understand, and was therefore 
unable to correct. Yet, disengaging the track-pilot had eliminated the functionality of 
rudder limit and rudder economy settings. As a result, the vessel was dependent on the 
Second Officer's hand-steering action, and he had not realised that the instant squat 
effect had increased at higher speed and lower water depth, and had an effect on vessel 
yawing, steering, and heeling conditions. The hand-steering corrective action had 
aggravated the situation; as a result the vessel was subjected to a high heeling angle, 
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disrupting passenger and crew comfort, and a significant number of passengers and 
crew members were injured. The Relief Captain was the first person to return to the 
bridge when the vessel began heeling, and he immediately ordered, "Reduce the speed" 
Slowing the vessel moderated the situation. 
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Figure 4.15: BN model for M/V Crown Princess's Officers in charge COCOM-CMs marginal probability 
4.4.9.2. Accident BN model validation 
A sensitivity analysis is carried out in order to give a partial validation of the model. 
The model should at least satisfy the two axioms described in Section 4.3.4.4. Firstly, 
three examination scenarios including CPC "Adequacy of training and expertise" 
evaluation grades "Adequate with high experience", `'Adequate with limited 
experience" and "Inadequate" are used individually as input observations of the model 
shown in Figure 4.15. The revised COCOM-CM probabilities and their transformed 
HFPs findings stated in Table 4.11 satisfy the requirement of axiom I described in 
Section 4.3.4.4. Table 4.12 illustrates four scenarios' revised COCOM-CMs' 
probabilities and their transformed HFPs due to the combined effect of nine CPC states' 
being simultaneously set at levels of "Improved", "Not significant", and "Reduced". 
The results of the four scenarios shown in Table 4.12 show that the model inference and 
the final probability change are in agreement with logicality of input observations that 
satisfy the requirement of axiom 2. 
The above developed scenarios give a partial validation to the model. In order to carry 
out a full validation, model CPTs would need to be fine-tuned for a period of time based 
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on experts' knowledge in the applicable domain. Therefore, the established CREAM 
BN generic model for quantifying human action failure probability can be used with a 
greater accuracy in utility analysis and decision making than that of traditional 
qualitative means. 
Table 4.11: Human action failure probability change due to adequacy of training and expertise' 
descriptors' effect (CPC8) 
Axiom I 
CPC8 adequacy of training and expertise 
Model Inference output beliefs CPC 8 states assigned input 
observations Strategic Tactical Opportunistic Scrambled Final HFP 
(DI) (D2) (Di) (D4) 
Scenario Adequate with high 
42.3 29.1 20.5 8.14 0.02443 
1 experience 100% 
Scenario Adequate with limited 
14.2 31.5 38.5 15.7 0.080 
2 experience 100% 
Scenario L!! 
Inadequate 100% 7.08 16.5 29.1 47.4 0.1737 3 
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Table 4.12: Human action failure probability results due to the combined effect levels of nine CPC 
involved in the case study scenario 
Axiom 2 
Case study scenario nine CPCs 
c Model inference output beliefs 
e 
CPCs' states assigned input Strategic Tactical Opportunistic Scrambled 
vý observations (Di) (D2) (D 3) (D4) 
Final HFP 
(CPC 6) Improved 100% 
(CPC 7) Not significant 
100% 
I (CPC 2,5,9) Not significant 0 4.66 23.6 71.7 0.2493 
100% 
(CPC 1,3,4,8) Reduced 
100% 
(Non) Improved 100% 
(CPC 7,6) Not significant 
100% 
2 (CPC 2,5,9) Not significant 0 0 14.5 84.5 0.2773 
100% 
(CPC 1,3,4,8) Reduced 
100% 
(Non) Improved 100% 
(CPC 7) Not significant 
100% 
3 (CPC 2,5,6,9) Not 0 0 4 96.6 0.3081 
significant 100% 
(CPC 1,3,4,8) Reduced 
100% 
(CPC 1,3,4,8) Improved 
100% 
(CPC 7) Not significant 
4 100% 54.9 30.1 15.0 0 0.0131 
(CPC 7) Not significant 
100% 
(CPC 6) Reduced 100% 
4.5. Conclusion 
Although a good system design and operation plan normally take every contingency 
into consideration, practice has shown that even the best designed system can fail in 
operation due to erroneous human actions. Human actions are inherent characteristics. 
They are more difficult to regulate and assess than the functions of technological system 
components, thus presenting a special problem. 
The growing complexity of systems design provides ample opportunities for the 
harmful accumulation of several combined conditions, where each is necessary and 
none sufficient to bring about an accident by itself. The increased automation and 
functional sophistication of technology systems have become much more difficult for 
average seafarers to understand, making them prone to potential failures; this may 
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develop into contributing causes for active failures in the presence of triggering events. 
The potential failure conditions can arise from oversights or failure in design, 
construction, procedures, maintenance, training, communication, MMI and the like. 
The growing number of cases where human actions are actually the cause of accidents is 
caused by a combination of human, technological, and organisational factors, and has 
led to an increasing focus on human actions. Therefore, it is vital to improve 
understanding of the multiplicity of factors that are at play. This requires a conceptual 
framework that adequately accounts for how actions are shaped by the context in which 
they take place, and which effectively enables the identification of the most important 
conditions that reasonably can be said to be the causes of incorrect actions. 
In this respect, a new CREAM BN probabilistic approach is developed. The 
probabilistic approach is found to have several advantages over the existing method, 
from the fact that any discrete function can be expressed in a BN; as a result, a BN 
could produce equivalent results when the levels of CPCs are given discretely. In 
addition, it can also mathematically produce consistent results when levels of CPCs are 
given probabilistically for all possible scenarios where the CREAM basic method 
cannot produce a specific result. However, to enhance the potential of the new CREAM 
BN model in dealing with incomplete assessment of conditional degrees of belief, a 
methodological framework that uses an ER algorithm in synthesising experts' partial 
elicitation of conditional degrees of belief will be investigated in the next chapter. 
145 
Chapter 5 
Use of evidential reasoning for eliciting Bayesian subjective 
probabilities under incompleteness uncertainties 
Summary 
The subjective probability elicitation for a BN is often a daunting and complex task to 
perform. To create conditional probability values for each given variable in a BN 
requires high degree of knowledge and engineering effort. This chapter presents the 
methodology for combining an ER algorithm with Bayesian theory. It enhances the 
potential of the established CREAM BN model for COCOM-CMs' reliability 
assessments. The methodological framework uses ER algorithm in synthesising experts' 
partial elicitation of conditional degrees of belief and aggregation of root cause factors ' 
probability that are symmetrically affecting CREAM CPCs. The kernel of this approach 
is to develop the best and the worst possible conditional degrees of belief of COCOM- 
CMs' node. These conditional degrees of belief are then used in two established 
CREAM generic BN models to aggregate the marginal probabilities of the COCOM- 
CMs. FS theory is also used to transform the marginal probabilities of both CREAM BN 
models aggregated COCOM-CMs into HFPs, which are subsequently aggregated to 
crisp values of HFPs defining the boundaries of HFPs' range that can be averaged for 
a ranking purpose. A case study is investigated, while a sensitivity analysis to the case 
analysis is conducted, to validate the established CREAM BN models. Finally, the 
developed technical work achievements are concluded. 
5.1. Introduction 
A BN is a high-level representation of a probability distribution over a set of variables 
which are used for building a model of a specific problem domain. A BN shows the 
variables' dependence-independence relations in a logical form. This has eased the tasks 
of decomposition, feature selection and transformation. A BN also provides a sound 
inference mechanism (Mittal and Kassim, 2007). The flexibility of choosing variables 
and modelling relationships among variables leads to a high and reliable performance of 
the BN. Such reliable performance features in computing the distribution probabilities 
in a set of variables according to the observations of some variables and the prior 
knowledge of the others (Weber et al., 2010). 
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Although the BN technique is an effective way of capturing uncertainties, the 
knowledge and engineering effort needed to create conditional probability values for 
each given variable in a BN are quite high. As statistical data is not always available, 
subjective probabilities are often used. Even though prior probabilities can be elicited 
by experts, it sometimes raises the problem of accuracy in posterior probability values. 
As a result, translating experts' qualitative knowledge into numerical probabilistic 
values is a daunting and often complex task to perform (Mittal and Kassim, 2007). 
Moreover, Bayesian inference requires probability completeness. For these reasons, 
novel assessment techniques are required to provide precise bases for performing HRA 
in the context of engineering operations that may be incomplete, for which traditional 
quantitative approaches do not provide an adequate answer. 
Nevertheless, such assessment could be elicited with partial degrees of belief (Binaghi 
and Madella, 1999). In this regard, an ER algorithm has been developed on the basis of 
the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence (Dempster, 1968; Shafer, 1976), which is 
well suited to modelling subjective credibility induced by partial evidence observation 
(Smets, 1988). The ER synthesising capability of partial degrees of belief has enlarged 
the scope of traditional probability theory utilisations, particularly in describing and 
handling uncertain information by using the concept of the degrees of belief. An ER can 
model information incompleteness and ignorance explicitly (Yang and Singh, 1994; 
Yang and Sen, 1994; Wang et al., 1995; Wang et al., 1996; Yang and Sen, 1997; Yang, 
2001; Yang and Xu, 2002a, b; Liu et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2008). Therefore, the ER 
belief theory capability will be combined in BN probabilistic reasoning viability. Such a 
combination will enhance the applications of the BN model developed in Chapter 4 for 
quantifying COCOM-CMs' probabilities in an incomplete assessment of a context of 
marine engineering operation. The underlying desire behind combining ER and BN as 
an integrated tool is to tackle the incompleteness of HRA in BN. This will be solved by 
combining the best and worst evaluation grade incomplete degrees of belief masses 
(synthesised by ER) with the unassigned probability masses, to facilitate the elicitation 
of complete probability masses for two individual assessment scenarios, enabling 
CREAM BN models to infer the COCOM-CMs probabilities for both assessment 
scenarios. These probabilities will be transformed to HFPs for each control mode 
defining the boundaries of the HFP utility interval, which can be averaged into discrete 
values of HFPs for ranking; and finally aggregated into a crisp HFP value. The 
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combined techniques of ER and BN algorithms will allow them to capture high levels of 
uncertainty without loss of information. 
5.2. Literature review 
The literature shows that a large number of BN applications have been reported in 
various risk analyses. These include the classification of components and systems of 
NPP safety performance assessments (Ha and Seong, 2003) and the assessment of 
integrated fire prevention and protection systems (Gulvanessian and Holicky, 2001). 
Similarly, a BN has also been used to help in the design stage of the decision making 
process to estimate the distribution of the harm to people produced by fire in a building 
(Hanea et al., 2006). BN-based reliability formalism has also been used to find a 
suitable reliability framework for dynamic system component behaviours and 
interactions. The framework provides a basis for more advanced and useful analysis 
such as system diagnosis (Boudali and Dugan, 2004). The BN model has also been used 
in a study investigating the organisational causes of fatal accident in commercial 
aviation and how to reduce them (Luxhoj, 2003). 
The BN has been developed by Trucco et at. (2008) to quantify Human and 
Organisational Factors (HOFs) in risk analysis carried out at the preliminary design 
stages of high speed craft. The developed BN model of HOF has been correlated with 
the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) of collision accident technical elements. The approach 
has allowed for the probabilistic correlation between the basic events of a collision 
accident and its operational and organisational conditions. Conditional probabilities 
have been estimated by means of experts' judgment (Trucco et al., 2008). A BN has 
also been integrated with FTA to develop a model for assessment of the impact of 
organisational risk on accident probabilities in respect of aircraft maintenance planning. 
The developed model has provided an explicit path from organisational and 
management factors to the accident causes (Mohaghegh and Mosleh, 2006,2009). The 
same problem has been analysed in a framework on reduction of "Signal Passed At 
Danger" incidents in rail crashes on the UK rail network (Marsh and Bearfield, 2004). 
In this case a BN has been used to obtain the possible configurations of events leading 
to an accident and to the understanding of how factors in the organisation have 
interacted to contribute to the incident. 
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A BN has also been used for HRA in the context of power transmission line 
maintenance problems. This method has illustrated the development and application of 
human reliability elicitation procedure, concerning the replacement of isolator chains in 
power transmission lines (Firmino et al., 2006). A BN has been used to build a situation 
awareness assessment model and to conduct cause-effect reasoning and diagnosis of 
NPP safety. The technique quantitatively has identified the leading external influencing 
factors affecting operator situation awareness (Licao et al., 2010). An oil well 
production parameters availability assessment model has been developed by Droguett et 
al. (2008), in which the system dynamics is described via a continuous-time semi- 
Markovian process specified in terms of probabilities. The developed model has been 
integrated into a BN characterizing the cause-effect relationships among IFs affecting 
the repairman errors' probability during maintenance. The model has been validated in a 
real case of a mature oil well's management and control (Droguett et at., 2008). 
Efficient FRB Bayesian reasoning approach for prioritizing failures in failure mode and 
effects analysis has been developed by Yang et al. (2008), in which subjective belief 
degrees are assigned to the consequent part of the rules to model the incompleteness 
encountered in establishing the knowledge base. A Bayesian reasoning mechanism is 
then used to aggregate all the relevant rules for assessing and prioritizing potential 
failure modes. The reliability of the new approach is enhanced by using a well- 
established FRB ER method, contributing to the development of a more precise failure 
criticality analysis (Yang et al., 2008). A BN has also been proposed as a probabilistic 
method for determining the control mode of human performance in CREAM. The 
proposed BN is an extension of the existing deterministic method (Kim et al., 2006). 
With the use of a BN, it is expected that the best estimate of the control mode - given 
the available data and information about the context - can be obtained. A Fuzzy-BN 
model has been developed by Eleye-Datubo et al. (2008) for the assessment of maritime 
safety. FL possibility is deployed in the model to integrate the linguistic nature of vital 
PSF input variables in a probabilistic BN (Eleye-Datubo et al., 2008). A generic 
methodology has been developed by Yang et al. (2010), in which the prospective 
analysis of CREAM is modified, to facilitate the quantification of maritime human 
failures by effectively incorporating both FL ER and Bayesian inference mechanism. 
The framework uses ER to establish fuzzy IF-THEN rule bases with belief structures, 
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and Bayesian inference mechanism is employed to aggregate all the rules associated 
with a seafarer's task in order to estimate his/her failure probability (Yang et al., 2010). 
The above review revealed that a BN provides a computational model for many 
purposes in the real world. Large BNs of several nodes often exist in application 
domains. Their complexity is sometimes beyond the current knowledge of domain 
experts. In addition, conventional mathematical methods are not simply to apply. 
Therefore, heuristic methods based on "causal linkage" rather than detailed equations 
are the feasible way to proceed at present (McErleani et al., 1999). In this regard, the 
established CREAM BN model, as detailed in Chapter 4, cannot cope with the full 
network if complete and incomplete conditional degrees of belief are assigned by 
experts. This is also the case if root cause nodes (CPCs) are symmetrically affected by 
multiple parent nodes. Therefore, a combination of ER synthesising technique and BN 
probabilistic theory will be investigated in this technical work. The combination of ER 
and BN allows both algorithms to capture the incompleteness and randomness of 
uncertainties in marine engineering operations. Therefore, it is very important to 
understand the operational context and ramifications of applying both modelling 
techniques. These will be elaborated in the methodological framework proposed in 
Section 5.3, in that the ER algorithm's synthesising and aggregation capability in 
handling a 'number of experts' complete and incomplete degrees of belief elicitation will 
also be examined. A case study will be explored in Section 5.4, in order to validate the 
BN model and ER algorithm. Section 5.5 will conclude with the achieved results. 
5.3. Methodology 
The new methodological framework (see Figure 5.1) can be implemented in the 
following steps. Firstly, it is to develop the possible rule base of modelling probabilistic 
causal relation between parent-child nodes in the COCOM BN developed in Chapter 4. 
Secondly, degrees of belief in COCOM-CMs conditional probabilities could be elicited 
in a complete or incomplete format by experts. Thirdly, the developed ER approach 
proposed in Yang and Xu (2002a, b) could be used to synthesise the degrees of belief, 
and aggregate the root cause factors' probability that are symmetrically affecting 
CREAM CPCs. This includes a review and examination of the ER algorithm, and the 
ER-based software. Fourthly, the unknown masses (the unassigned probabilities to 
grades of the child node) could be distributed back to the "Best" and "Worst" 
evaluations in BNs. Fifthly, two BN models with the "Best" and "Worst" conditional 
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subjective probability estimations are constructed. Sixthly, COCOM-CMs posterior 
probabilities could be aggregated by the two BN model inference mechanisms. 
Seventhly, COCOM-CMs' posterior probabilities could be transformed and presented 
into HFP intervals. These intervals could be averaged into a crisp HFP value for a 
ranking purpose. Finally, the newly developed methodology could be validated by the 
reliability assessment of a specific case study scenario. 
To develop the possible rule base of modelling probabilistic causal relation between parent- 
child nodes in the COCOM BN. 
To elicit the complete or incomplete degrees of belief of COCOM-CMs by a nubmer of 
experts. 
To synthesise the complete and incomplete expert judgements' degrees of belief, and aggregate 
the root cause factors' probability that are symmetrically affecting CREAM CPCs. 
To distribute the unassigned probabilities caused by the incompleteness of judgements back to 
the "Best" and "Worst" evaluation grades of the child node in the COCOM BN. 
To construct two BNs with the "Best" and the "Worst" conditional subjective probability 
estimations 
To aggregate COCOM-CMs posterior probabilities by using the constucted BNs inference 
mechanisms. 
To transform COCOM-CMs' posterior probabilities into HEP inveravls that could be averaged 
into a crisp HFP value for a ranking purpose. 
Figure 5.1: The methodology of combining ER and BNs 
5.3.1. Developing the rules base of modelling parent-child nodes and eliciting the 
complete or incomplete degrees of belief of COCOM-CMs 
In Section 4.3.2, it was found difficult to assign CPT of COCOM-CMs under new 
attributes, 0, A and W. 0, A and W are defined through the distinctive evaluation 
grades "Inappropriate", "Acceptable" and "Appropriate" as stated in Section 4.3.3.1. 
However the problem is the incompleteness knowledge encounters by the experts when 
assigning degrees of belief in the rule base modelling the relation among 0, A, W and 
COCOMs. 
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The constructed rules base such as the one in Table 4.7 can be used by a number of 
experts denoted by EE (i =1... e), to elicit the degrees of belief of the consequent 
human action control modes' evaluation grades denoted by D (n =1... 4). However, 
the problem appears in a situation, where the sum of the elicited degrees of belief is less 
than 1. In order that they can be used to affect COCOM-CMs probability in a 
convergent connection of a BN, ER algorithm synthesising capability will be 
investigated. 
5.3.2. Synthesising the complete and incomplete expert judgements' degrees of 
belief. 
5.3.2.1. Basic evaluation of ER algorithm 
The ER algorithm has been deduced by Yang and Singh (1994) on the basis of the D-S 
theory of evidence for characterising and handling uncertainty in decision analysis. It 
allows the users to develop a framework that aggregates all the evidence available in 
situations pertaining to various intermediate variables and then make inferences about 
the variable of interest. The ER algorithm has been updated and modified further by 
Yang (2001) and Yang and Xu (2002a, b) to model subjective credibility induced by 
partial evidence observations. ER can be used for synthesising incomplete assessments 
in terms of combined probability masses associated with unassigned probability mass or 
unknown mass. 
In order to investigate the capability of the ER algorithm in synthesising incomplete 
assessments, a hierarchy of two levels of attributes is considered, where the top level 
represents the general attribute' synthesised states D (n = 1,2,3,4) of COCOM-CMs, 
and the bottom level represents a number of basic attributes that are denoted by Ei 
(i = 1,2,3). In this respect the basic attributes represent the elicitations of states D,, 
provided by experts on a possible assessment for the combinations. 
A granted assessment of Dn by Ei conditional on Lrk mathematically is represented by 
the following distribution: 
S(Ei), Dn I Lrk = (Dn , 
Bn, i), (n = 1... 4) and (i =1... e) ...................................... 
(5.1) 
where, 0 <_ Bn, i<i, Zn=i Bn, i<1 and Bn, i denotes a conditional degree of belief. 
The above distribution reads that the set of basic attributes Ei have subjectively assessed 
the evaluation grade(s) Dn distinctively and conditionally on the new attributes' (0, A 
and W) evaluation grades Lrk combination with a conditional degree(s) of belief Bn, i. 
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An assessment by Ej is complete if En=1 Bn, i=1 and incomplete if E4=1 Bn, i<1. 
A special case is Z4 n=1 Bn, i=0 or Bn, i=0 for all Dn , which denote a complete lack 
of information on L, k. Such partial or complete ignorance is not rare in many distinctive 
evaluation problems. 
Suppose the importance or the relative weight of a basic attribute Ei is given by the 
weight wi, (i = 1,2,3) with the condition that 05 wt <_ 1. In this regard, the relative 
importance of Et plays an important role in a multi attributes' assessment (they may be 
estimated by using a simple rating method or assessed by using more elaborated 
methods such as the AHP-Based pair-wise comparisons of distinctive evaluation 
grades) (Yang et al., 2001; Yang et al., 2010). Collectively, the basic attributes' Ei 
weights have to be normalised for the consistency of the assessment. 
5.3.2.2. ER algorithm for synthesising elicitations of basic attributes 
Let mn, t be a given basic conditional probability mass representing a conditional 
defined degree of belief Bn, i and the relative importance cot of the ith basic attribute 
Et (in the assessment of nth general attribute conditional degree of belief). Let m. i be a 
remaining probability mass unassigned to any individual grade Bn, i after all the nth 
grades have been elicited as far as Et is concerned. Thus, mn, t and fi could be 
calculated as follows: 
mn, t = co1Bn, i .......................................................................................................... 
(5.2) 
and the mt is given by: 
mt =1-1: 
n=1 
mn. i = 1- 0)1 En=1 Bn, i ............................................................... 
(5.3) 
where, n=1,2,3,4 and i=1,2,3. 
Given the above definitions and discussions the ER algorithm can be used for 
synthesising the basic conditional probability masses mn, l and mn, 2 (developed by 
Equation 5.2) into a combined probability mass mnc. The combined mass can be 
synthesised further with a third basic conditional probability mass mn, 3 to develop the 
combined probability mass mnc+i" Changing the order of synthesising the three basic 
conditional probability masses does not change the final result at all. 
The basic conditional probability masses mn, l and mn, 2 (n = 1,2,3,4) are synthesised 
by using the following ER algorithm. 
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mi =1- coi > 0, for all i= (1,2,3) ........................................................................ (5.4) 
mt = ml + mi . .......................................................................................................... (5.5) 
K(i+1) = [1 - Er 1 E7=i mt, i mi, i+il -1 n= (1,2,... 4) ............................................ (5.6) j*t 
K(i+1) = [1 -(m1,1 x m2,2 + ml, i x m3,2 + m1,1 x m4,2) +(m2,1 x m1,2+m2,1 x 
m3,2 + m2,1 x 1114,2) +(m3,1 x m1,2 + m3,1 x m2,2 + m3,1 x 1n4,2) +(m4,1 x m1,2 + 
rºt4,1 X m2,2 + m4,1 x 
M3,2)1-1 ....................................................................................................................... (5.7) 
{Dn}: m. ic = K(i+1)[mi x m, i+1] . ................................................................................ (5.8) 
{Dn}: mc = K(i+z)[mi x mi+i + mn, i x mi+i + mi x mn. i+i] ................................. (5.9) 
{D}: mnc = K(i+l) [mn, i x mn, i+i + mn ix mi+i + mi x mn , i+l] ...................... 
(5.10) 
B- Mn 1-? xt.................................................................................................................. (5.11) 
B -_ 
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... (5.12) mt............................................................................................................... 
where, mi, mi, K(i+i)(n = 1,2,3,4 and i=1,2,3), respectively, denote the remaining 
relative importance of basic attribute Ei, the unassigned probability mass (remaining 
probability mass and relative importance) of any individual grade, and the normalizing 
factor. In addition,, m. ic, m. c, and m, ,, (n = 1,2,3,4 and i=1,2,3) respectively, denote 
the remaining combined relative importance of the two assessments El and E2, the 
combined probability mass initially unassigned to any individual grade degree of belief 
Bn, i, the remaining combined probability mass due to the possible incomplete 
assessment of Bn, i by El and E2, and the combined probability mass generated by 
synthesising the two assessments El and E2. Bn, is the combined degrees of belief of 
the two assessment E1, and E2, and B. is the unassigned probability mass to the two 
assessments E1, and E2. In a similar way the above ER algorithm is used to synthesis 
the combined probability mass mnc (generated by synthesising the two assessments El 
and E2 (as one set)) with the basic conditional probability masses m,,, 3 of the third 
assessment E3 (as the other) to obtain the synthesised degrees of belief Bn and the 
unassigned probability mass Bu of the three assessments El, E2 and E3. 
154 
5.3.3. Distributing the unassigned probability masses in the COCOM-CMs BN to 
obtain HFPs interval 
The unassigned probability mass Bu caused by the incompleteness of judgements goes 
back respectively to the "Best" B1 and "Worst" B4 evaluation grades of the child node 
in the COCOM-CMs BN. Similarly for all the other unassigned probability masses go 
back to the best and worst scenarios CPT that will be used individually in the 
constructed generic CREAM BN model in Chapter 4, in order to aggregate COCOM- 
CMs posterior probabilities for the best and worst scenarios separately. The best 
scenario will also be used to obtain the lowest HEP value using Bayesian inference and 
the defuzzifecation method in Chapter 4 (Equation 4.5), while the CPTs associated with 
the worst case will be used to calculate the highest HEP values. Consequently, the 
highest and lowest values can be used as the two limits of an interval. It reflects the fact 
that the HEP analysis with incomplete input deliveries its values in an interval, in which 
the actual HEP exists. For a ranking purpose, the HEP average value is calculated and 
presented. However it is noteworthy that a human action is more reliable than the other 
if and only if its highest value is smaller than the lowest one of the other. 
5.4. An illustrative example 
To demonstrate the above methodology, this part describes the calculation of obtaining 
incomplete CPT of COCOM-CMs node in the network in Chapter 4 through 
interviewing 3 experts. 
Step 1: Three domain experts Ei (i = 1,2,3) are asked to provide their elicitations on 
the evaluation grades of the COCOM-CMs in terms of conditional degrees of belief as 
defined by equation 5.1 and the rule base constructed in Table 4.7. Their input is listed 
in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Basic attributes elicitation of evaluation grades conditional degrees of belief 
E E E 
L D11 D2,1 D31 D41 D72 D22 D3.2 D42 D D2.3 D3.3 D4.3 
Bi 1 B2 1 B3 1 
B41 B2 82.2 B2 B4 2 
B1 82.3 83.3 64 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.9 0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0.1 0.9 0 0 0.1 0.8 0 0 0.2 0.8 
3 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 0.2 0.7 0 0 0.3 0.7 
4 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 0.2 0.7 0 0 0.4 0.6 
5 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0 0 0.3 0.6 0 0 0.7 0.3 
6 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0 0 0.4 0.5 0 0,2 0.8 0 
7 0 0. 07 
8 0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0 0 0.7 0.3 
9 0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 0 0 
10 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 0.1 0.8 0 0 0 0.4 0.6 
11 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 0.7 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 
12 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0 0.2 0.7 0 0 0,7 0.3 0 
13 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0 0.3 0.6 0 0 0,6 0.4 0 
14 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0 0.5 0.4 0 0.3 0,7 0 0 
15 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0 0.5 0.4 0 0.2 0.8 0.4 0 
16 0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 0.6 0.3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 
17 0.2 0.4 0.4 0 0 0.7 0.2 0 0.5 0,5 0 0 
18 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 0 0.8 0.1 0 0.6 0.4 0 0 
18 0 0 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.2 0 0 0 0.3 0.7 
20 0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0 0 0.6 0.4 0 
21 0 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0 0 0.4 0.6 0 
22 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 
23 0.2 0.4 0.4 0 0.6 0.3 0 0 0.7 0.3 0 0 
24 0.3 0.5 0.2 0 0.7 0.20 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 
25 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.2 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
26 0.3 0.5 0.2 0 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 
27 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.9 0 0 0 0,9 0.1 0 0 
Next three experts' judgements are synthesised using the ER algorithm. Rule 7 in Table 
5.1 is used as an example. The relative importance of the three experts is equal. The 
synthesising of the three assessments E1, E2 and E3 is approached through. Firstly, 
synthesising the two assessments E1, and E2 (as one set), as follows. 
To calculate the basic conditional probability masses mn, l as defined by Equation 5.2. 
m1,1 =0.333x0=0; m2,1 =0.333x0=0; m3,1 =0.333x0.3=0.0999; 
m4,1 = 0.333 x 0.7 = 0.2331. 
m1,2 =0x0.333 = 0; m2,2 = 0.1 x 0.333 = 0.0333; m3,2 = 0.3 x 0.333 = 
0.0999; m4,2 = 0.3 x 0.333 = 0.0999. 
m1,3 =0x0.333=0; m2,3 =0x0.333=0; m3,3 = 0.4 x 0.333 = 0.1332; 
m4,3 = 0.6 x 0.333 = 0.1998. 
Next it is to calculate the remaining probability mass r'i due to the possible 
incompleteness of any individual grade Bn, i as defined by Equation 5.3. 
rll = 0.333[1 - (0 +0+0.3 + 0.7)] = 0; 
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fn-2 = 0.333[1 - (0 + 0.1 + 0.3 + 0.3)] = 0.0999; 
m3 = 0.333[1 - (0 +0+0.4 + 0.6)] = 0. 
The remaining relative importance nti for all i= (1,2,3) is obtained as follows using 
Equation 5.4. 
mi =1-0.333 = 0.667; 
m, 2 =1-0.333 = 0.667; 
m. 3=1-0.333=0.667. 
The unassigned probability mass mi (remaining probability mass and relative 
importance) to any individual grade can be computed using Equation 5.5. 
mi =0+0.667 = 0.667; 
rn2 = 0.0999 + 0.667 = 0.7669; 
m. 3=0+0.667=0.667. 
The normalizing factor K(i+l) for combining the two assessments E1 and E2 is 
calculated using Equations 5.6 and 5.7. 
K(i+l) = [1 - (0 x 0.0333 +0x0.0999 +0x0.0999) + (0 x0+0x0.0999 + 
0x0.0999)+(0.0999 x0+0.0999 x 0.0333 + 0.0999 x 0.0999) + (0.2331 x0+ 
0.2331 x 0.0333 + 0.2331 x 0.0999)1.1 = 1.0464. 
The combined remaining relative importance fn-i, from the two assessments El and E2 
are obtained using Equation 5.8. 
fn-i, = 1.0464(0.667 x 0.667) = 0.4655. 
The remaining combined probability mass fn, due to the possible incomplete 
assessment of Bn, i by Ei and E2 is defined by Equation 5.9. 
m, = 1.0464[(0 x 0.0999) + (0.667 x 0.0999) + (0 x 0.667)] = 0.0697. 
To calculate the combined probability mass mnc of the basic conditional probability 
masses mn, 1 and mn, 2, Equation 5.10 is employed as follows. 
mic 
m2C 
m3c 
= 1.0464[(0 x 0) + (0 x 0.7669) + (0.667 x 0)] = 0; 
= 1.0464[(0 x 0.0333) + (0 x 0.7669) + (0.667 x 0.0333)] = 0.0232; 
= 1.0464[(0.0999 x 0.0999) + (0.0999 x 0.7669) + (0.667 x 0.0999)] = 
0.1537; 
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m4C = 1.0464[(0.2331 x 0.0999) + (0.2331 x 0.7669) + (0.667 x 0.0999)] _ 
0.2698. 
Finally, the remaining combined probability mass ffi due to the possible incomplete 
assessment of Bn, i by El and E2 is calculated by Equation 5.5. 
Mc = 0.0697 + 0.4655 = 0.5842. 
Secondly, in a similar way, the result of combining three experts' judgements can be 
obtained by synthesising the combination of the first two assessments El, and E2 (as one 
set) with the third assessment E3 (as the other). Consequently, the synthesised human 
action control modes' degrees of belief B for the 7t' rule are Strategic (Bl) = 0, 
Tactical (B2) = 0.0252, Opportunistic (B3) = 0.3271 and Scrambled (B4) = 0.5713. 
The use of the ER algorithm has also resulted in a combined unknown mass (B,, ) _ 
0.0744. 
Windows based IDS software was developed by Yang (2001). It is used in synthesising 
the basic attributes Et of Rule 7 with the same result obtained in Figure 5.2. The 
intelligent decision system (IDS) is also used in synthesising the other combined 
degrees of belief (or probabilities) listed in Table 5.1. 
Although the ER algorithm is used to synthesise experts' combined degrees of belief 
mass B, ,a remaining unknown mass Bu, which 
is not assigned to any evaluation 
grades, is also developed. Consequently, the remaining unassigned degrees of belief are 
assigned back to the best evaluation grade "Strategic" and the worst evaluation grade 
"Scrambled" on all rules. Accordingly, two sets of evaluation grades are generated in 
Table 5.2 and used as prior probabilities in generic COCOM BN model to calculate 
HEP values. 
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Table 5.2: Synthesised and combined degrees of beliefs of COCOM-CMs evaluation grades 
Alts. Strategic 
1D, 1 
Strategic 
(DI)C 
Unknown 
Tactical 
(D2) 
Opportunistic 
(D3) 
Scrambled 
ID4) 
Scrambled 
(D4) C 
Unknown 
Unknown 
1 0 0.0211 0 0 0.9789 1 0.0211 
2 0 0.0231 0 0.1019 0.8750 0.8981 0.0231 
3 0 0.0244 0 0.1973 0.7783 0.8027 0.0244 
4 0 0.0248 0 0.2321 0.7431 0.7679 0.0248 
5 0 0.0265 0.0279 0.4316 0.5140 0.5405 0.0265 
6 0 0.0277 0.1220 0.5323 0.3180 0.3457 0.0277 
7 0 0.0759 0.0253 0.3260 0.5728 0.6487 0.0759 
8 0 0.0271 0.1164 0.5282 0.3283 0.3554 0.0271 
9 0.1227 0.1519 0.3910 0.2979 0.1592 0.1884 0.0292 
10 0 0.0274 0.0274 0.4734 0.4718 0.4992 0.0274 
11 0.0295 0.0576 0.4495 0.4045 0.0884 0.1165 0.0281 
12 0.0284 0.0554 0.4394 0.4768 0.0284 0.0554 0.0270 
13 0.0284 0.0555 0.4031 0.4845 0.0569 0.0840 0.0271 
14 0.1525 0.1797 0.5789 0.2126 0.0288 0.0562 0.0274 
15 0.1512 0.1784 0.6164 0.1767 0.0285 0.0557 0.0272 
16 0 0.0271 0.4819 0.4058 0.0852 0.1123 0.0271 
17 0.2159 0.2433 0.5757 0.1809 0 0.0274 0.0274 
18 0.2851 0.3125 0.5695 0.1180 0 0.0274 0.0274 
19 0.0865 0.1153 0.1153 0.2715 0.4979 0.5267 0.0288 
20 0.0855 0.114 0.4205 0.3457 0.1198 0.1483 0.0285 
21 0.1125 0.1406 0.3815 0.4188 0.0591 0.0872 0.0281 
22 0.1758 0.2343 0.3223 0.2822 0.1612 0.2198 0.0586 
23 0.5278 0.5817 0.2997 0.1186 0 0.0539 0.0539 
24 0.6370 0.6635 0.2810 0.0555 0 0.0265 0.0265 
25 0.4437 0.4719 0.3803 0.1182 0.0296 0.0578 0.0282 
26 0.6753 0.7016 0.2432 0.0552 0 0.0263 0.0263 
27 0.8153 0.8397 0.1603 0 0 0.0244 0.0244 
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Figure 5.2: Assessment alternative 7 evaluation grads synthesised degrees of belief 
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5.4.1. Aggregating multi attribute effect on root cause CPCs 
The main reasons behind the selection of the Deepwater Horizon accident as a case 
study to validate the correlation of ER sensitizing and aggregation technique with the 
developed COCOM-CMs BN model and are: there were several main governing factors 
had symmetrically affected the context' CPCs effect level over the whole period of the 
drilling operations; the uncertainty associated with the available information during the 
final stages of drilling operation, inevitably stimulated the possibility of utilising the 
incomplete degrees of belief in the assessment of COCOM-CMs. 
5.4.1.1. Case study background 
On the evening of April 20,2010, a well control event allowed hydrocarbons to escape 
from Macondo well onto Transocean's Deepwater Horizon, resulting in explosions and 
fire on the rig. Eleven people lost their lives, and 17 others were injured. The fire, 
which was fed by the hydrocarbons from the well, continued for 36 hours until the rig 
sank. Hydrocarbons continued to flow from the reservoir through the wellbore and the 
Blow Out Preventer (BOP) for 87days, causing a spill of a national significance. 
Deepwater Horizon was located approximately 50 miles south of Venice, LA at 
Mississippi Canyon 252. 
The accident on April 20,2010, involved a well integrity failure, followed by a loss of 
hydrostatic control of the well. This followed a failure to control the flow from the well 
with the BOP equipment, which allowed the release and the subsequent ignition of 
hydrocarbons. Ultimately, the BOP emergency functions failed to seal the well after the 
initial explosions (BP, 2010). 
The evaluation of CPCs in this case study is based on the investigation team's review 
results specifically presented in Appendix T of the Deepwater Horizon Accident 
Investigation Report (BP, 2010). The review was to identify the relevant practices, 
procedures, and expectations, comparing them with the rig crew's actions in monitoring 
the Macondo well and managing the well control event on 20 April 2010. The review 
included the documents that governed the drilling operation on board the Deepwater 
Horizon at the time of the accident; the available real time data; the witness account 
interviews; and the MBI testimony. In this respect, Table 5.3 summarizes the specified 
functional assessment attributes, the identified evidence, and their evaluation. The 
inherent variability effects that shaped operators' actions and observations in the context 
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of events are used in CPCs' effect level evaluations. The evaluations listed in Table 5.4 
have been subjected to experts' review and assessment. CPCs' effect levels are assigned 
in complete degrees of belief with equal relative importance. IDS software is used to 
aggregate the assigned complete degrees of belief of CPCs' effect levels probability 
mass, as shown in Table 5.5. 
CPCs' effect level evaluations are used as input observations of root cause nodes in the 
two established CREAM BN generic models. Their synthesised COCOM-CMs' 
conditional degrees of belief masses and unknown masses dealt with in Section 5.4.1 
are listed in Table 5.2. Two possible assessment scenarios are generated: the first 
scenario utilises root cause nodes observation and the worst possible set of evaluation 
grades, which includes the combined probability masses of scrambled evaluation grades 
(see Figure 5.3). The second scenario utilises root cause nodes observation and the best 
possible set of evaluation grades, which includes the combined probability masses of 
strategic evaluation grades (see Figure 5.4). The posterior probabilities of the two 
assessment models' evaluation grades and their transformed respective HFP results are 
shown in Table 5.6. HFPs are derived by utilising the nominal HFP values stated in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3.2. Finally, HFPs are presented in an utility interval rather than 
a crisp value. Such an interval could be used effectively to specify the uncertainty 
involved in the assessment, and can also be averaged into a crisp value for ranking. 
Accordingly, corrective actions and reassessments could be structured. 
Table 5.3: Identified relevant practices, procedures, and expectations of rig crew's actions in monitoring 
the Macondo well and managing the well control event on 20 April 2010 
Investigation tea m review results Functional 
assessment attributes Identified evidence Evaluation 
The investigation team could not 
verify whether anyone fitted the 
description of manager or had task 
responsibilities, and who should have 
The manager was not clearly defined made enquiries regarding 
the results 
of the negative pressure test that had 
Task been conducted to prove that the well 1 
responsibilities structure 
integrity was intact at the 
time the negative pressure test results 
were concluded. 
The well driller's responsibility is to 
detect a well control situation and Neither the driller nor the tool-pusher shut in the well quickly, and to realized that there were impending minimize the kick size used to well control events enhance the safety of a well control . 
operation. 
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The review of well control 
preparation 
procedures has not occurred 
On 20 April, 2010 between 13: 28 and 
17: 17 hours drilling mud fluid 
volume monitoring equipment was 
not properly used; in addition, it is 
not known what equipment they were 
using. 
On 20, April, 2010 from 13: 28 hours 
to 17: 17 hours, mud was transferred 
to the supply vessel. Transferring 
mud from the pits to the supply 
vessel impaired the ability of mud- 
loggers to reliably monitor the pit 
levels. Mud-logger stated this 
concern was raised with the assistant 
driller. The response was that the 
assistant driller would notify him 
when the mud transfer was completed 
and monitoring could resume. Mud- 
logger indicated that this notification 
did not occur after mud transfer to the 
supply vessel stopped at 17: 17 hours. 
There is no evidence to suggest that 
either the driller or assistant driller 
was monitoring the well mud fluid 
volumes and flow. Although mud- 
loggers' well monitoring equipment 
was installed and working, it was 
apparently not being used due to mud 
transfer to the supply vessel and mud 
pit cleaning activities. 
Mud pumps were stopped at 21: 31 on 
April 20,2010, but the driller and the 
tool-pusher both apparently were 
trying to understand the deferential 
pressure just prior to the accident. 
An increase in return flow from the 
well at 20: 58 hours on April 20, 
2010, approximately 51 minutes 
before the first explosion. However, 
drill pipe pressure also increased and 
went unnoticed. The real time data 
indicts that a 39 bbl gain was taken in 
the mud pits at that time. 
At 21: 08 hours on April 20,2010, 
pumping was stopped, and the sheen 
test intended to indicate the presence 
of free oil was performed on the 
spacer returning from the well. From 
this time forward, the fluid returning 
from the well was discharged 
overboard. 
There is no evidence. 
Pressure and flow variations should 
have been available that would have 
indicated an abnormality with the oil 
well. In this regard "extreme caution" 
could include factors such as pressure 
changes and flow increases. It would 
also include isolated individual 
volume monitoring to enhance well 
structure intact integrity. 
Mud-logger did not effectively 
monitor pit volumes for the 
remainder of that day. 
A more timely response to well 
conditions may have occurred if 
"constant, accurate observation and 
recording of mud volume" was 
implemented as defined in high 
pressure high temperature drilling 
guide lines stated in the documents 
governing the drilling operation. 
Neither the driller nor the tool-pusher 
realized that there was an impending 
well control event. 
Interim reports and the real time data 
indicate that the trip tank was being 
emptied at that time. This may have 
masked the volume change caused by 
flow from the well. 
If the driller's flow metre had been 
operating properly, increasing return 
flow would have been detected at this 
time. 
162 
aý ýM 
"ý ý 
Cd G 'O 
aý 
y 
Vl 
3 
ý 
N 
.E 
co 
9; "a 
ý E v, 
ýb 
ý 
5 
6 
Blowout 
emergency 
response 
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While fluids were being discharged 
overboard, the mud loggers' flow 
meter bypassed. 
Mud-logger indicated that mud flow 
would not be seen if the flow diverter 
was activated or going through the 
dump line. The mud logging system 
is far more accurate. 
Real-time data indicates that 
circulation continued after flow 
increased and pump pressure 
fluctuated between 20: 58 hours and 
21: 31 hours. 
Well flow modelling indicates that 
between 21: 36 hours and 21: 38 hours 
a valve was opened and closed on the 
rig floor, presumably to bleed off 
pressure from the drill pipe. 
Mud was seen shooting all the way 
up to the derrick for several seconds, 
and then it just quit and went down 
for several seconds after that, and 
then all of a sudden the degasser mud 
started to come out of the degasser 
very strongly onto the deck. Mud 
flow volume through the rotary table 
at the surface was significant. 
The emergency response procedure 
that should be developed jointly by 
the management and the operator to 
be used in case of well blowout was 
requested. 
Events stated do not support a 
conclusion that action was taken to 
shut the well in the shortest possible 
time, as required by the documents 
governing the drilling operation, 
following the sequence for shutting 
down a well when either tripping or 
drilling. 
The mud loggers were unable to 
monitor flow. 
By the time the mud pumps were shut 
down at 21: 31 hours, an estimated 
300bbl gain had been taken into the 
wellbore and the well was flowing. 
Based on wetness accounts, the 
investigation team concluded that this 
occurred approximately 4 minutes 
before mud start flowing onto the rig 
floor. 
Based on the procedure defined for 
equipment handling gas in the riser, 
the mud flow should have been 
routed overboard. Instead, the mud 
flow was routed through the mud gas 
separator. Based on gas dispersion 
and explosion analyses, the 
investigation team concluded that, if 
the rig crew had diverted mud flow to 
the overboard discharge line rather 
than to the mud gas separator, the 
consequences of the event would 
have been reduced. 
Such document was not received at 
the time of investigation. 
In the opinion of the investigating 
team, despite the guidance provided 
in the documents governing the 
drilling operation, welibore 
monitoring did not identify the influx 
until after hydrocarbons were in the 
riser, and the subsequent action taken 
prior to the explosion suggests the rig 
crew was not sufficiently prepared to 
mange an escalating well control 
situation. 
The investigation team review and assessment results summarised in Table 5.3 have 
been used in interviews with three experts to provide their discrete subjective 
probabilities elicitations on the symmetrical affect of functional assessment attributes' 
identified evidence and evaluation on each CPC effect levels/ descriptors. CPCs' effect 
levels are assigned complete degrees of belief with equal relative importance. Final 
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assessment results are listed in Table 5.4, where (x) denotes the irrelevance of effect and 
the equally distributed probability on all effect levels of a CPC means the effect levels 
could not be verified. 
Table 5.4: Evaluation of functional assessment attributes affect on CPCs effect level/descriptor 
Function al assessment attributes 
CPCs Level/descriptors Fc 
3 
y 
X g. 
C 
0 y C 0. W U 
Very Efficient 0 0 0 0 25 0 Adequacy of 25 0 i i Efficient 0 0 0 0 organ sat on 
CPC 1 Inefficient 0 0 100 100 25 0 
Deficient 100 100 0 0 25 100 
Advantageous x 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 Working conditions 33 3 
CPC 2 Compatible x 33.3 33.3 
33.3 .3 33. Incompatible x 33.4 33.4 33.4 33.4 33.4 
d Supportive x x 0 0 
23 0 
A equacy of MMI and 0 0 25 0 Adequate x x operational support 25 0 
CPC 3 Tolerable x x 50 50 Inappropriate x x 50 50 25 100 
Appropriate 0 0 0 0 33.3 100 Availability of 
ro d l / CPC 4 Acce table 
100 0 100 100 33.3 0 
p ce ures p ans 4 0 Inappropriate 0 100 0 0 33. 
Number of Fewer than capacity x 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 
simultaneous goals CPC Matching current capacity x 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 
5 More than capacity x 33.4 33.4 33.4 33.4 33.4 
Adequate x 100 100 100 33.3 33.3 
Available time CPC 6 Temporarily inadequate x 0 0 0 33.3 33.3 
Continuously inadequate x 0 0 0 33.4 33.4 
Day-tim e 6: 00-1S: 00hr (adjusted) x 33.3 50 50 33.3 50 Time of day (circadian 
h th CPC 
Night(17: 00-24: 00hr) (unadjusted) x 33.3 50 50 33.3 50 r y m) 7 Night-time(0: 00-7: 00hr) (unadjusted) X. 33.3 0 0 33.4 0 
A Adequate, high experience 33.3 33.3 0 0 
33.3 0 
dequacy of training 0 33 3 0 d i CP Adequate, limited experience 33.3 33.3 0 . an expert se C8 3 100 Inadequate 33.4 33.4 100 100 3 .4 
C Very efficient 25 25 0 0 25 
0 
rew collaboration 
li Efficient 25 25 0 0 25 
0 
qua ty 25 0 CPC 9 Inefficient 25 25 0 0 Deficient 25 25 100 100 25 100 
The final assessment results listed in Table 5.4 are used to aggregate the complete 
degrees of belief of CPCs' effect levels listed in Table 5.4 with use of ER software. 
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Table 5.5: CPCs effect levels/descriptors assigned degrees of belief aggregation with IDS 
CPCs Level/descriptors 
Functional assessment attributes 
aggregated degrees of belief 
Verv Efficient 3.51 
Adequacy oforganisation Efficient 3.51 
CPC I Inefficient 57.09 
Deficient 35.89 
Advantageous 33.33 
Working conditions Compatible 33.33 
CPC 2 Incompatible 33.34 
Supportive 5.18 
Adequacy of MMI and operational support Adequate 5.18 
CPC 3 Tolerable 29.52 
Inappropriate 60.12 
Appropriate 19.95 
Availability of procedures/plansCPC4 Acceptable 60.10 
Inappropriate 19.95 
Fewer than capacity 33.33 Number of simultaneous goals Matching current caaci 33.33 CPC 5 
More than capacity 33.34 
Adequate 78.82 
Available time 
P Temporarily inadequate 
10.59 
C C6 
Continuously inadequate 10.59 
Dav-time (6: 00-18.00hr) (adjusted) 36.25 
Time of day (circadian rhythm) Ni ht(I7: 00-24: 00hr) (unadjusted) 49.13 
CPrc 7 Night-time(0: 00-7.00hr) (unadjusted) 14.62 
Adequate, high experience 14.01 
Adequacy of training and expertise CPC 8 Adequate, limited experience 14.01 
Inadequate 71.98 
Very efficient 6.43 
Crew collaboration quality Efficient 6.43 
CPC 9 Inefficient 6.43 
Deficient 80.70 
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Figure 5.3: BN model displays human COCOM-CMs' posterior probabilities based on the worst possible 
set of evaluation grades (scrambled evaluation grades' conditional degrees of belief masses are combined 
with the unknown masses) and CPCs' input observations are complete (condition 1). 
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Figure 5.4: BN model displays human COCOM-CMs' posterior probabilities based on the best possible 
set of evaluation grades (strategic evaluation grades' conditional degrees of belief masses are combined 
with the unknown masses) and CPCs' input observations are complete (condition 2). 
Table 5.6: Final HFPs of both assessed scenarios 
Conditions HFP/time 
0.0838x0.000224 + 0.20l x 0.01+ 0.281, 
I. The worst scenario BN aggregated COCOM-CMs 
0.0708+0.435x0.3 16 
probability and their transformed highest HFP 0.1594 
0.119x0.000224 + 0.201 x 0.01+ 0.281 x 2. The best scenario BN aggregated COCOM-CMs 
0.0708+0.40x0.3 16 
probability and their transformed lowest HFP 
= 0.1483 
The highest and lowest values of HFPs interval 0.1483 SHFP 50.1594 
The HEP average value 0.1483+0.1594 = 0.1539 failure/time 
5.4.1.2. Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis is carried out in order to partially validate the developed CREAM 
BN models. The models should at least satisfy the two axioms described in Section 
4.3.3.4. Firstly, three examination scenarios including CPC "Adequacy of training and 
expertise" evaluation grades "Adequate with high experience", "Adequate with limited 
experience" and "Inadequate" are used individually as input observations of the worst 
and the best scenarios' models shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. The revised 
COCOM-CM probabilities and their transformed HFPs findings stated in Table 5.7 
blusb -11. b. TO" I ýaluma worhini -dl-, 
Ceudal/kWeiat 1"3 
TangaramMeayue 9a8 
NeeSNte 788 
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satisfy the requirement of axiom I described in Section 4.3.3.4. 
Table 5.8 illustrates three scenarios' revised COCOM-CMs' probabilities (for the worst 
and the best scenarios) and their transformed HFPs due to the combined effect of seven 
CPC states' being simultaneously set at levels of "Improved", "Not significant", and 
"Reduced". The results of the three scenarios shown in Table 5.8 show that the models 
inference and the final probabilities change are in agreement with logicality of input 
observations that satisfy the requirement of axiom 2. 
The above developed scenarios give a partial validation to the models. In order to carry 
out a full validation, models CPTs would need to be assessed for a period of time based 
on experts' knowledge in the applicable domain. Therefore, the combination of the ER 
algorithm with the established CREAM BN generic model enables to quantifying 
human action failure probability in a context of incomplete assessment, which can be 
assessed further for utility analysis and decision making. 
Table 5.7: Human action failure probability changes results due to adequacy of training and expertise 
(CPC8) states effect level. 
Axiom I 
Mo dels Inference output beliefs 
CPC 8 states assigned input Strategic Tactical Opportunistic Scrambled Final 
observations (D, ) (Di) (D3) (D, ) HFP/time 
Adequate with high 29 8 20 30 23.10 16.90 0.0728 
A 
experience 100% (best) . . 
C 
8 Adequate with high 26.60 30.20 23.10 20.20 0.0833 
experience 100% (worst) 
Adequate with limited 12.20 29.50 31.70 26.60 0.1095 
experience 100% (best) 
Adequate with limited 9 03 50 29 31.70 29.70 1193 
experience 100% (worst) . . 
Inadequate 100% (best) 8.33 16.30 28.3 47.10 0.1705 
Inadequate 100% (worst) 4.70 16.30 28.30 50.70 0.1819 
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Table 5.8: Human action failure probability changes results due to the combined effect levels of seven 
CPCs involved in case study scenarios 
Axiom 2 
Model Inference ou ut beliefs 
Seven CPCs' states assigned input Strategic Tactical Opportunistic Scrambled Final 
observations (Dr) (D2) (D 3) (D4) probability 
(CPCs 1,6) Improved 100% 
(best) 
(CPC 4) Not significant 8.29 22.10 31.70 37.90 0.1444 100% (best) 
c (CPC 3,7,8,9) Reduced 
100% (best) 
(CPCs 1,6) Improved 100% 
(worst) 
(CPC 4) Not significant 4.88 22.10 31.70 41.4 0.1555 100% (worst) 
(CPC 3,7,8,9) Reduced 
100% worst 
(CPC 1,4,6) Not significant 
(best) 100% 4.48 12,80 28.00 54.00 0.1770 
c (CPC 3,7,8,9) Reduced 
100% (best) 
(CPC 1,4,6) Not significant 
`" 100% (worst) 1.58 12.8 28.00 57.7 0.2034 
(CPC 3,7,8,9) Reduced 
100% (worst) 
(CPC 3,8,9) Improved 
100% (best) 
CPC 4,7) Not significant 20,90 34.20 31.70 13.20 0.0676 100% (best) 
(CPC 1,6) Reduced 100% 
best 
(CPC 3,8,9) Improved 
rn 100% (worst) 
CPC 4,7) Not significant 17 90 34.20 31.70 16.20 0.0770 100% (worst) . 
(CPC 1,6) Reduced 100% 
worst 
5.5. Conclusion 
ER's synthesising and aggregation capability has enlarged the scope of a BN 
mechanism inference viability in describing and handling uncertain information in an 
engineering operation context. By using the concept of degrees of belief, the ER-BN 
combination can well model context knowledge incompleteness and ignorance 
explicitly at any BN assessment level. Combining degrees of ignorance with the best 
and worst evaluation grades explicitly have helped to develop two BNs to aggregate the 
best and worst scenarios of COCOM-CMs' probabilities. Subsequently, their results are 
transformed and presented in HFP intervals, where each could be averaged into a crisp 
HFP value. Consequently, a sound method for dealing with a high level of uncertainties 
in marine engineering operations is rationally developed to handle the problems to 
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which the traditional methods lack the capability of providing appropriate solutions. 
Therefore, the established CREAM BN generic model for proactive assessment of 
human action failure probability will be used with more confidence in CREAM human 
performance analysis and decision making in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Decision making methodology for improving human performance 
reliability based on operational context analysis 
Summary 
A decision making process can be a feed forward action, needed to integrate the 
bidirectional approaches of HRA (i. e. CREAM) in reducing HFP. This process is based 
on the previously developed CREAM models of human performance assessment and 
analysis in the context of marine engineering operations. The aim of human 
performance analysis is to identify initiating events or root causes of assessed HFP. To 
reduce a HFP, the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is first used to subjectively 
assign the weights of the chosen decision criteria. Secondly, entropy information with 
respect to each criterion is calculated to analyse internal relative importance of the 
chosen criterion. Thirdly, a TOPSIS method is used to model the evaluation of the 
identified risk control options (RCO) with respect to each criterion and the combined 
weights of the criteria. This will provide the preference order of the developed RCOs, 
where decision makers would be able to choose the relevant alternative of RCOs based 
on their plans and expectation in respect of the reduction of HFP. Finally, the 
developed technical work achievements are concluded. 
6.1. Introduction 
A BN model has been developed in Chapter 4 to quantify human action control mode 
probabilities. The BN model's capability is further enhanced in Chapter 5 by the use of 
ER belief theory, enabling the capture of incomplete information associated with CPCs 
and other attributes in a CREAM context. The developed BN is constructed to model 
CREAM for human performance reliability assessments, which concede that 
information process and human actions are coupled and mutually dependent (Hollnagel, 
1998a). 
CREAM shows that human actions depend on the conditions under which an action 
takes place in both human performance analysis and assessment. The cause and effect 
relationship specified in the CREAM human performance analysis method can be used 
to describe a large number of potential pathways, through the use of classification 
groups, to identify the attribute(s) of an initiating event or "root" cause. Hence, the 
170 
classification groups' generic framework provided in CREAM can be specified to suit 
marine engineering operations. 
Consequently, a described context in the framework of human performance assessment 
can be used to identify the possible error modes/phenotypes and the main related groups 
of people, technological and organisation possible or probable and the likely genotype 
causes, following the retrospective analysis of CREAM. 
Such identification can be detailed to a further analysis level(s) to establish the potential 
pathways that could be used to identify the well thought-out specific consequent(s) 
(effects) general consequent(s) (causes/effects), the general antecedent(s) (causes) and 
the likely specific antecedent(s) attribute(s) of initiating event(s) or (root) cause(s). Such 
identification will make possible the development of RCOs that will impact the likely 
causes effecting human performance reliability. A MCDM model will be formed, 
containing four main parts, namely RCOs developed to mitigate assessed HFP, criteria 
to be used to evaluate the estimated impact of each RCO on human performance 
reliability, relative importance of criteria (or weights) and a decision matrix. The 
decision matrix will be normalized so that RCO comparison becomes relevant. Of the 
many solution methods available, TOPSIS (Hwang and Yoon, 1981) is selected to rank 
the developed alternatives of RCO in descending order, enabling DMs to choose the 
best alternative. The TOPSIS method is selected because of its full utilization of 
information and the systematic computational procedure, which provides an 
indisputable ranking order for the developed alternatives. TOPSIS is suitable for cases 
with a large number of attributes and alternatives, and especially useful for objective or 
quantitative data for analysis (Tavana and Hatami-Marbini, 2011). 
To achieve the aim of this work, this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 
provides the description of CREAM retrospective analysis, followed by the review of 
MCDM methods in general and TOPSIS in particular. Section 6.3 examines the 
proposed decision making methodology in two parts. The first part specifies CREAM 
classification groups' generic framework in marine engineering systems operation 
ergonomics, which would enable users to identify the initiating event or root causes of 
an incident or accident that are needed to develop a set of RCOs in a decision making 
model. The second part presents the three phases of the MCDM method combining 
AHP entropy calculation and the TOPSIS decision making model. Section 6.4 
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demonstrates the application of the proposed decision making methodology in a case 
study and its validating sensitivity analysis. Section 6.5 concludes the achieved results 
with summary and remarks. 
6.2. Literature review 
6.2.1. Review of the CREAM retrospective approach 
This review will be focused on the CREAM performance analysis model. It includes a 
method, a classification scheme and model of cognition. The classification scheme's 
groups and the method are intrinsically linked. The classification scheme serves to 
define the links between possible causes and effects. In this context, the model of 
cognition is used as an underlying convenient way to inevitably organise some group 
categories of a human model of cognition in observation, interpretation and planning, 
which describe the possible causes and effects of human action. This will implicitly 
map the ways in which actions are typically shaped and the ways in which erroneous 
actions might happen. The classification scheme and the model of cognition 
characteristics make the analysis method recursive rather than strictly sequential. The 
method contains well defined usage conditions that determine when an analysis has 
come to the end. This is important to ensure that the method usage is consistent and 
uniform across applications (Holinagel, 1998a). 
6.2.1.1. Basic principles of the classification scheme 
The CREAM classification scheme practically describes most possible manifestations 
of erroneous actions as well as the majority of possible causes, and covers all possible 
types of erroneous actions. The classification scheme makes a distinction between 
effects (phenotypes or manifestations) and causes (genotypes) on the high level of 
analysis. The effects refer to what is observable in the given system. This includes overt 
human actions as well as system events. The causes are the categories that can be used 
to describe the concept(s) which has brought about or can bring about the effect(s). 
The main phenotypes and genotypes are application dependent, i. e., the details of the 
classification scheme may vary according to the application. Therefore, the categories 
must always be specific either to a particular application or to the type of application, 
for instance, marine ergonomics (Hollnagel, 1998a; Serwy and Rantanen, 2007). 
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For convenience of analysis the terms antecedent and consequence are used to separate 
aspects of the classification groups in developing the pathways between the categories. 
In reality, the antecedent is that which gives rise to a specific consequent, given the 
premises of the classification scheme. The terms cause and effect are specifically used 
to denote the end points of the event being considered. The cause can thus be either the 
"root" cause or the initiating event, while the effect corresponds to the error mode or 
phenotype resulting from erroneous action (Hollnagel, 1998a; Serwy and Rantanen, 
2007; Lee and et al., 2011). 
6.2.1.2. The classification scheme 
The classification scheme is generally composed of phenotypes and genotypes. Both 
phenotypes and genotypes are further divided into more detailed classification groups, 
each of which has been described in terms of general consequents (or effects) and 
specific consequents (or effects). The phenotypes group is described in ten error modes, 
which for practical reasons are divided into four classification sub-groups called: (1) 
action at wrong time, (2) action of wrong type, (3) action at wrong object, and (4) action 
in wrong place/sequence. 
The genotypes describe the categories that in the classification scheme serve as 
antecedents, hence ultimately as attributed causes. These are divided into ten different 
classification groups, which in turn are assigned to three main categories. One main 
category is the person related genotypes (group), which is further divided into 
categories of: (1) observation, (2) planning, (3) interpretation, (4) temporary person 
related causes, and (5) permanent person related causes. The first three categories of 
person related genotypes (group) refer to the underlying model of cognition, where the 
function of execution is covered by the error modes. The second main category is the 
technology related genotypes, which is further divided into four groups of. (1) 
components, (2) procedures, (3) temporary interface problems, and (4) permanent 
interface problems. Finally, the third main category is the organisation related 
genotypes, which is divided into five more detailed groups of. (1) communication, (2) 
organisation, (3) training, (4) ambient conditions, and (5) working conditions 
(Hollnagel, 1998a; Serwy and Rantanen, 2007). The overall structure of the 
classification scheme is shown in Figure 6.1. Further details can be found in Appendix 
3.1. 
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The main principle by which the groups can be related to each other can be achieved in 
that each consequent described by a classification group must correspond to one or 
more antecedents and these antecedents must occur in the other classification groups. 
This is shown in a simple way in Figure 6.1: the genotypes are the antecedents of the 
phenotypes and the phenotypes (error modes) in turn are the antecedents of the general 
error consequences. 
The relation between the classification groups can be established by providing for each 
group a list of the antecedents that are likely candidates as explanations for the general 
consequents of that group, where each of these antecedents in turn either appears as a 
consequent of another classification group or is a "root" cause. It is, of course, 
necessary to have a well-defined stop rule (Hollnagel, 1998a; Serwy and Rantanen, 
2007; Warner and Sandin, 2010; Lee and et al., 2011). 
Consequent-antecedent relations in CREAM can be described by going through the 
classification groups in the following order: error modes (phenotypes), person related 
genotypes, technology related genotypes, and organisation related genotypes - as shown 
in Figure 6.1. 
" Error modes (Phenotypes) 
The error modes are the observable features of actions and they are the starting point of 
an analysis. Table A3.1.1 shows that each error mode can be related to a considerable 
number of general antecedents. Many of these general antecedents are furthermore 
common for all error modes. The general antecedents describe the likely first-order 
explanations for an erroneous action. The purpose of a systematic analysis method is to 
go beyond the immediate explanations and look for what further details can be found 
given the available information about the event (Hollnagel, 1998a; Warner and Sandin, 
2010; Serwy and Rantanen, 2007; Subramaniam, 2010). 
A careful reading of the general antecedents for the error modes will reveal that they all 
occur as general consequents in the classification groups (see Appendix 3.1). In this 
context, the possible specific antecedents are used to describe particular conditions that 
could have contributed to a general consequent. Conditionally, the specific antecedents 
should only be used as part of the explanation if sufficient information about the event 
is available. In such cases the specific antecedent is the final or terminal cause, i. e., the 
analysis cannot go any further (Hollnagel 1998a; Warner and Sandin, 2010). 
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Figure 6.1: High level differentiation and overall grouping of genotype, adopted from (HoIInagel, 1998a) 
" The category of person related genotypes groups 
The category of person related genotype groups is described for the error modes. The 
categories listed under general antecedents all occur in other classification groups as 
general consequents. That is actually a defining characteristic of the whole classification 
scheme. For consistency of the method, in no case can a general antecedent in a group 
be a general consequent of the same group (Serwy and Rantanen, 2007). 
" The category of technology related genotypes groups 
The category of technology related genotype groups can be proposed in a relatively 
large number of specific antecedents. In these cases the specific antecedents can be 
understood either as a specific antecedent of the general antecedent or as an additional 
antecedent (Warner and Sandin, 2010). 
" The category of organisation related genotypes groups 
The category of organisation related genotype groups describes both general and 
specific antecedents referring to both technological and psychological factors. To deal 
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with CREAM limitation in organisational factors, further antecedents will be proposed 
for organisation groups while specifying classification groups in marine ergonomics. 
Generally, in all cases where the general antecedent is given as none, this does not mean 
that none of the general consequents has antecedents. Instead the condition described by 
the general consequent is considered permanent, and specifying this further may not 
improve the analysis that much. Obviously, if the general antecedent is none, then there 
cannot be a specific antecedent either (Holinagel, 1998a). 
6.2.1.3. The overall method description 
The principal stages of this method are illustrated in Figure 6.2 and are composed of the 
following steps: 
The first step is to describe the context that existed at the time when the event occurred. 
This is done by using the CREAM notion of the CPCs. For the sake of the retrospective 
analysis the CPCs are needed to help determine the possible error modes/phenotypes 
and the probable causes /genotypes. This may require a detailed analysis of aspects of 
the application which are not contained in the event report. 
The second step is to describe the possible error modes for all possible human actions, 
without considering a specific one. The description should use the knowledge of the 
application and the context description to produce a limited set of error modes, and also 
to define their effect criteria. 
The effect of each error mode is determined - whether it is impossible, possible, or very 
likely. The analysis is to investigate the error modes that are very likely before looking 
at the ones that are just possible. The possibility of each error mode is determined by 
checking some essential aspects based on experience and the knowledge of the 
application, as well as some of human factors. 
The third step is to describe the probable genotypes or categories of possible causes, 
with the use of the given knowledge about the CPCs. This serves to identify in advance 
the genotype categories' groups that are more likely than others to be relevant as part of 
an explanation. The purpose of this is to limit and simplify the analysis, and to focus or 
concentrate on the causes that are likely to be part of the explanation. Generally, the 
third stage of the analysis addresses the differences in possibilities or the likelihoods of 
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genotypes with the condition that none of cognitive functions' category is completely 
ruled out (Hollnagel, 1998a; Warner and Sandin, 2010). 
The fourth step is to perform a more detailed analysis of the main task steps. This stage 
will try to trace the possible consequent-antecedent links for the selected error modes. 
For each error mode it is expected that the analysis will produce a set of candidate 
causes rather than a single (root) cause. The approach principles and conditions are 
elaborated in the following sections (Hollnagel, 1998a). 
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Figure 6.2: Overall method for retrospective analysis, adopted from Hollnagel (1998a) 
" Detailed analysis 
Detailed analysis begins by looking for the most likely error modes associated with the 
event in question. Once the general consequent/specific consequent error modes for an 
initiating event are described the analysis can proceed to find the likely causes. This is 
achieved by a recursive search through the classification scheme that begins by 
selecting one of the antecedents directly linked to an error mode - either a general 
antecedent or a specific. If the outcome of this step identifies a specific antecedent then 
the analysis is completed (Hollnagel, 1998a; Serwy and Rantanen. 2007; Warner and 
Sandin, 2010). If the outcome identifies a general antecedent then the analysis must 
continue. Therefore, the next step is to check the classification groups to find the 
possible indirect link between the general consequent of the first level of analysis and 
the other matching general antecedent in the next level of analysis. When the relevant 
general consequent in the next level of analysis is found the analysis continues from 
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there until the end point probable general or specific antecedent (s) is found. In this 
specific condition a specific consequent cannot replace the general consequent. 
Therefore, when the general and/or specific consequents are selected their 
corresponding general antecedent(s) or specific antecedent(s) is identified. On this level 
of analysis, if the outcome identifies a specific antecedent then the analysis has come to 
an end. Similarly, if there are no general antecedents, there are most probably no 
specific antecedents either, and then the analysis must stop. In this way the analysis 
continues by applying the same principle recursively for all other possible cases until a 
stop criterion is reached. For further clarification the principles of the detailed analysis 
are shown in Figure 6.3 (Hollnagel, 1998a; Serwy and Rantanen, 2007; Warner and 
Sandin, 2010). 
The above description provides a simple account of the analysis, but it is necessary to 
extend it in several ways to make the method practical. The first extension refers to the 
notion of direct and indirect links. The search for an antecedent within a classification 
group looks first at the direct links between consequents and antecedents. If, however, 
there are no satisfactory relations between consequents and antecedents along the direct 
links, the indirect links should be investigated. Similarly, if the indirect links suggest a 
consequent-antecedent relation that is as reasonable as the one(s) suggested by the direct 
links, then the indirect link should also be explored (Holinagel, 1998a; Warner and 
Sandin, 2010). 
The second revision has to do with tracing the path from consequents to antecedents. 
Any step in the analysis may show that there is more than one possible general 
antecedent for the general consequent of that group. This means that the analysis must 
explore all relevant paths and that it is necessary to keep track of the branching points. 
Finally, it is helpful to note that the use of the CPCs and the initial selection of possible 
error modes and probable causes serve to limit the analysis so that it does not have to go 
through every path as well (Hollnagel, 1998a). 
The following stop rules could be applied in the context of the analysis in Figure 6.3: 
1. If a general consequent points to a specific antecedent as the most likely candidate 
cause, then the analysis is stopped. 
2. If a general consequent does not have a general antecedent, then the analysis ends 
(Hollnagel, 1998a). 
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Figure 6.3: Detailed method for retrospective analysis adopted from (Hollnagel, 1998a) 
" Going beyond the stop rule 
The purpose of a stop rule is to ensure that all probable consequent-antecedent links are 
explored and that the search for consequent-antecedent links is made in a uniform and 
consistent way. However, it is entirely possible to continue the analysis and, in a sense, 
go beyond the stop rule, if the classification scheme is suitably extended and the method 
remains unchanged. 
The extension of the classification scheme can be achieved in two different ways. One 
possibility is that a specific antecedent is changed so that it becomes a general 
antecedent. Generally, a specific antecedent cannot be changed into a general 
antecedent without considering the possible consequences for other classification 
groups. Therefore, such a change cannot be accomplished without revising the whole 
classification system. 
The other extension is to provide a new general antecedent, either as an addition to the 
existing general antecedents or as new in the cases where no general antecedents are 
given. The explicit principle according to which the classification groups of CREAM 
have been defined makes such an extension relatively easy to do. The only thing that 
must be observed is that the links between general consequents and general antecedents 
are properly maintained, so that the classification scheme as a whole remains consistent, 
with no conflicts in the use of specific terms and no loose ends. The basic recursive 
analysis principle can be retained and the stop rules remain valid. This is necessary not 
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only to be able to use the same analysis method but also to maintain the common basis 
for analysis and prediction (Hollnagel, 1998a). 
6.2.2. Review of MCDM-TOPSIS method and the related models 
MCDM refers to making decisions in the presence of multiple, usually conflicting 
criteria. MCDM problems are commonly categorized as continuous or discrete, 
depending on the domain of alternatives. Hwang and Yoon (1981) classify them as 
MCDM and Multiple Objective Decision Making (MODM). MCDM has a discrete, 
usually finite, number of pre-specified alternatives, requiring inter and intra-attribute 
comparisons and involving implicit or explicit trade-offs. MODM presents decision 
variable values to be determined in a continuous or integer domain, of infinite or large 
number of choices, to best satisfy the DMs' constraints, preferences or priorities. 
MCDM methods have also been used for combining good MODM solutions based on 
DMs' preferences (Kok, 1986; Kok and Lootsma, 1985; Zanakis et al., 1998). 
The primary aim in MCDM is to provide a set of attribute aggregation methodologies 
that facilitate the development of models considering the DMs' preferential system and 
judgment policy (Doumpos and Zopounidis, 2002). Achieving this goal requires the 
implementation of complex procedures. Several methods have been proposed for 
solving MCDM problems. A major criticism of MCDM is that different techniques may 
yield different results when applied to the same problem (Zanakis et at., 1998). The 
development of MCDM models has often been dictated by real-life problems. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that methods have appeared in a rather diffuse way, 
without any clear general methodology or basic theory (Vincke, 1992). The selection of 
a MCDM framework or method should be done carefully according to the nature of the 
problem, types of choices, measurement scales, dependency among the attributes, type 
of uncertainty, expectations of the DMs, and quantity and quality of the available data 
and judgments (Vincke, 1992). Finding the "best" MCDM framework is an elusive 
goal that may never be reached (Triantaphyllou, 2000; Tavana and Hatami-Marbini, 
2011). 
Several discrete methods use a finite number of alternatives, set of objectives, criteria 
for evaluating alternatives, and methods for ranking alternatives (Ananda and Herath, 
2009). Discrete methods are divided into: weighting techniques such as the SAW 
(Hwang and Yoon, 1981); ranking techniques, such as the Preference Ranking 
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Organization Method for Enrichment Evaluations (PROMETHEE) (Brans and Vincke, 
1985), the TOPSIS (Hwang and Yoon, 1981), and the Ordered Weighted Averaging 
(OWA) (Yager, 1988); and mixed techniques, such as the ELECTRE (Roux and Elloy, 
1985), the AHP (Saaty, 1980), the Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT) (Von- 
Winterfeldt, 1986), and the Value Focused Thinking (VFT) (Keeney, 1993; Emeka 
Uzokaa et al., 2011). A detailed analysis of the theoretical foundations of different 
MCDM methods and their comparative strengths and weaknesses is presented in 
Larichev and Olson (2001), Belton and Stewart (2002) and Figueira et al. (2005). 
In MCDM the accuracy and effectiveness of evaluation results have been directly 
affected by the determination of weight among the evaluation criteria or attributes. 
Therefore, the weight determination for each evaluation criterion is a key point and a 
difficult point in MCDM models. The usually used weight evaluation methods can be 
divided into three categories: subjective weighting method, represented by the Delphi, 
AHP, and Expert Method (Samir and Jacques, 2006; Tung and Tang, 1998); objective 
weighting method, represented by principal component analysis, factor analysis, 
entropy method, and rough set method (Dongye et al., 2005; Carrara, 1983); and the 
combination weighting method (Zhao et al., 2004). The third represents a weight 
calculation method that combines the subjective judgments and the objective analysis. 
All these methods cannot avoid subjectivity in some degrees when being used to 
confirm the weight of evaluated criteria (Zhang et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the 
combination weighting method takes the subjective and objective components into 
account, and combines expert judgment with objective analysis, thus getting a more 
ideal and realistic value of weight (Qin et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2009). 
AHP has proven to be a popular technique for determining subjective weights in multi 
attributes problems (Zahedi, 1986; Shim, 1989). The importance of AHP and the use of 
pair-wise comparisons in decision making are best illustrated in the more than 1,000 
references cited in Saaty (2000). AHP calculations are not complex, and if the 
judgments made about the relative importance of the attributes have been made in good 
faith, then AHP calculations lead intrinsically to the logical consequence of those 
judgments. Harker and Vargas (1990) show that AHP does have a clear foundation; the 
prime measurement of preferences is fully represented by the eigenvector method, and 
the principles of hierarchical composition and rank reversal are valid. In response, Saaty 
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(1981 and 1990a) contends that rank reversal is a positive feature, when new reference 
points are introduced. 
Entropy could be used as an objective measurement of disorder in order to evaluate the 
implicit uncertainty of each attribute based on probability theory. Therefore, the implicit 
information disorder of each attribute can be indicated by its entropy value (Zhang et 
at., 2007; Han and Xiao, 2009). 
TOPSIS has been an important branch of decision making. To clarify its features, the 
characteristics of TOPSIS and AHP have been compared by Saaty (I 990b). The major 
weaknesses of TOPSIS are in not providing weight elicitation and consistency checking 
for judgments. However, AHP's employment has been significantly restrained by the 
human capacity for information processing (Saaty and Ozdemir, 2003). From this point 
of view, TOPSIS alleviates the requirement of paired comparisons, and the capacity 
limitation might not significantly dominate the process. Hence, it would be suitable for 
cases with a large number of attributes and alternatives, and especially useful for 
objective or quantitative assessed data (Tavana and Hatami-Marbini, 2011). 
TOPSIS helps DMs to organize the problems to be solved, and carry out analysis, 
comparisons and rankings of the alternatives. Accordingly, the selection of a suitable 
alternative(s) can be made. Section 2.5 provides further information regarding the basic 
theory of TOPSIS. 
In applications, basically raw data measurements in the TOPSIS model are normalized 
to a compatible unit or measure. In this regard, sensitivity analysis experiments have 
been carried out by Chakraborty and Yeh (2009) to find the sensitivity levels of 
different normalization procedures, such as "Vector Normalization", "Linear Scale 
Transformation (Max-Min)", "Linear Scale Transformation (Max)" and "Linear Scale 
Transformation (Sum)", under different problem settings. The experimental results have 
justified the use of vector normalization in the TOPSIS method. It is the most consistent 
in ranking and is able to handle weight sensitivity quite well. Their study has identified 
the possible alternatives to the vector normalization procedure under different problem 
settings. The method also helps researchers to choose the best normalization procedure 
if the weight is a very important factor in certain decision settings (Chakraborty and 
Yeh, 2009). 
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However, in traditional TOPSIS, the evaluation values and the weights of the criteria 
are given as crisp values. The crisp data might be inadequate to model many real life 
situations. Therefore, the TOPSIS method was extended to integrate some uncertain 
information. For example, Jhanshahloo et al. (2006) have extended the TOPSIS method 
to accommodate fuzzy data. The main advantage of fuzzy formulation - compared to 
crisp formulation - is that the DM is not forced to give a precise formulation, for the 
sake of mathematical reasons (Zimmermann, 2001; Ziya Ulukan and Kop, 2009). Chen 
(2000) has extended the TOPSIS method to fuzzy group MCDM problems by 
considering triangular fuzzy numbers and defining crisp Euclidean distance between 
two fuzzy numbers. Ashtiani et al. (2009) have developed an interval valued fuzzy 
TOPSIS to solve MCDM problems in which the performance rating values as well as 
the weights of criteria are linguistics terms that can be expressed in interval-valued 
fuzzy numbers. Wei (2009) has extended TOPSIS to deal with group decision making 
problems with assessments of information in which the attribute values take the form of 
linguistic information and attribute weights are incompletely known. Torfi et al. (2010) 
have proposed AHP and TOPSIS methods' frameworks to deal with the evaluations' 
uncertainty and imprecision in which the experts' comparisons are represented as fuzzy 
numbers. The final weights of alternatives are determined by using fuzzy AHP method 
and a group of experts' comparisons. Wentao and Huan, (2010) have presented an 
extended TOPSIS method for stochastic multi-criteria decision making problems 
through interval estimation as a new method. 
TOPSIS has been deemed one of the major decision making techniques in recent years 
(Shih et al., 2007). It has been successfully applied to the areas of human resources 
management (Chen and Tzeng, 2004), transportation (Janic, 2003), product design 
(Kwong and Tam, 2002), manufacturing (Milani et at., 2005), water management 
(Srdjevic et al., 2004), quality control (Yang and Chou, 2005), company financial 
ratios' comparison (Deng et al., 2000), location analysis (Yoon and Hwang, 1985), 
human spaceflight mission planning at NASA (Tavana and Hatami-Marbini, 2011), and 
approximate vessel selection under uncertain environments (Yang et at., 2011). In 
addition, the concept of TOPSIS has also been connected to multi-objective decision 
making (Lai, 1994) and group decision making (Shih et at., 2001; Tavana and Hatami- 
Marbini, 2011). 
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TOPSIS is attractive in a way that limited subjective input is needed from DMs. The 
only subjective input needed is weights. According to the observations of Kim et al. 
(1997) and Shih et at. (2007), four advantages are addressed in TOPSIS, including a 
sound logic that represents the rationale of human choice; a scalar value that accounts 
for both the best and worst alternatives simultaneously; a simple computation process 
that can be easily programmed into a spreadsheet; and the performance measures of all 
alternatives on criteria can be visualized on a polyhedron, at least for any two 
dimensions (Tavana and Hatami-Marbini, 2011). In fact, TOPSIS is a utility based 
method that compares each alternative directly, depending on data in the evaluation 
matrices and weights (Cheng et at., 2002; Shih et al., 2007). Besides the above, TOPSIS 
has been shown to be one of the best MCDM methods among the Simple Additive 
Weighting (SAW), Multiplicative Exponent Weighting (MEW), AHP, and ELECTRE 
MCDM methods, in addressing the rank reversal issue, which practically featured in 
alteration of the ranking of alternatives in a TOPSIS model by the addition or deletion 
of irrelevant alternative(s) (Zanakis et at., 1998; Wang and Luo, 2009). This consistency 
feature is largely appreciated in practical applications. Moreover, the rank reversal in 
TOPSIS is insensitive to the number of alternatives and has its worst performance only 
in the case of a very limited number of criteria (Triantaphyllou and Lin, 1996; Zanakis 
et al., 1998). However, Ren et al., (2007) has suggested that Modified Technique for 
Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (M-TOPSIS) prevents rank-reversal 
and it should be used in lieu of the conventional TOPSIS. In this regard, Tavana and 
Hatami-Marbini, (2011) illustrated that the M-TOPSIS method proposed by Ren et al. 
(2007) is also subject to the rank reversal. The rank reversal phenomenon is not unique 
in M-TOPSIS, and changing the decision environment in some MCDM methods may 
also lead to a rank reversal (Wang and Luo, 2009). 
Based on the preceding review the proposed MCDM framework in this technical work 
integrates the weighting method in the TOPSIS model. The former model combines the 
aggregation of the AHP model and entropy method, to obtain a realistic value of criteria 
weights. The latter integrates weighted criteria in a number of pre-specified alternatives, 
requiring inter and intra-attribute comparisons involving implicit or explicit trade-offs, 
to rank alternatives of RCO in descending order. The proposed framework structure has 
some obvious attractive features: the generic nature of the framework allows for the 
subjective evaluation of a number of decision alternatives on a number of performance 
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attributes by individual or a group of DMs; the mathematical and computational 
properties of the models are applicable to a wide range of real-world decision making 
problems in MCDM; and the information requirements of the proposed framework can 
be differentiated into a hierarchy to simplify information input and allow the DMs to 
focus on a small area of the large problem. This process is also useful for seeking input 
from multiple DMs as inconsistencies are inevitable when dealing with subjective 
information from different DMs. The built-in inconsistency checking mechanism of the 
proposed framework helps to identify inconsistencies in judgments at very early stages 
of the computation process. Finally, there are several variations of TOPSIS models in 
MCDM literature (Olson, 2004; Tavana and Hatami-Marbini, 2011). Examples include 
conventional TOPSIS (Hwang and Yoon, 1981); A-TOPSIS (Deng et at., 2000) and M- 
TOPSIS (Ren et al., 2007). This work will include the conventional TOPSIS model. 
6.3. Methodology 
The framework of the proposed methodology in this technical work is approached in 
two parts. The first part specifies CREAM generic classification groups in marine 
engineering operations ergonomics, which would enable users to identify the initiating 
events or root causes of HFP. As a result, RCOs needed to mitigate HFP are developed 
for the decision making model. The second part presents the three phases of the MCDM 
method. The first-phase presents the AHP model to be used for subjective weighing of 
selected criteria in the decision making model. The second phase presents the entropy 
analysis method to be used for measuring the intrinsic weight of each selected criterion 
in the decision making model. Both weights would be combined and normalised to 
standardise their use in TOPSIS models. Finally, the third phase presents the proposed 
TOPSIS models to be used for ranking the developed alternatives of RCO in descending 
order. The alternatives of RCO are to be developed based on the finding of human 
performance analysis through the classification groups specified in the first part of this 
methodology. Finally, the three phase processes are depicted in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4: The proposed methodological framework 
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6.3.1. Specifying CREAM generic classification groups in marine engineering 
operations ergonomics 
Based on Hollnagel's (1998a) observation stating that the CREAM classification groups 
were developed in the context of nuclear ergonomics, they can be used generically, but 
they have to be specified in different applications. Hollnagel (I 998a) and Serwy and 
Rantanen (2007) also observed that CREAM original classification groups reveal some 
critical shortcomings in identifying the specific/general root causes related directly to 
organisational issues in the performance analysis model. In this regard, a new change of 
factors and addition of some PIF and sub PIFs defined for the adequacy of organisation 
reliability assessment in Chapter 3 are used to alleviate those critical shortcomings with 
respect to classification scheme extension principles (stated in Section 6.2.1.3 under the 
heading going beyond the stop rules), especially in the maritime engineering context. 
Newly developed classification group tables are attached in Appendix 3.1 with their 
numbers A3.1.1 to A3.1.15. The following is the description of each newly specified 
factor introduced in the tables. 
" Add new supplement factors "Inadequate workload" and "Lack of competence" as 
specific antecedents of the delayed interpretation general consequent in the 
interpretation category for the person related genotypes causes group (see Table 
A3.1.3). 
" Add a new supplement factor "Lost situational awareness" as a specific antecedent of 
the incorrect prediction general consequent in the interpretation category for the 
person related genotypes causes group (see Table A3.1.3). 
" Add a new factor "Heuristic thoughts" as a general antecedent of the fear general 
consequent in the temporary person related category for the person related genotypes 
causes group (see Table A3.1.5). 
" Add a new supplement factor "Lack of motivation" as a specific antecedent of the 
psychological stress general consequent in the person temporary category for the 
person related genotypes causes group (see Table A3.1.5). 
" Add a new insertion "They are defined in the safety management system" in 
descriptions of the functional impairment and the cognitive style general consequent 
in the permanent person related functions categories for the person related genotypes 
causes group (see Table A3.1.6). 
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" Add new factors "Bias physical fitness tests" as a general antecedent of the 
functional impairment general consequent in the permanent person related functions 
for the person related genotypes causes group (see Table A3.1.6). 
" Add new factors "Inattention" and "Distraction" as general antecedents and a new 
factor "Lack of skill" as a specific antecedent of the cognitive style general 
consequent in the permanent person related functions categories for the person 
related genotypes causes group (see Table A3.1.6). 
" Add a new factor "Wrong reasoning" as a general antecedent and a new factor "Lack 
of competence" as a specific antecedent of the cognitive bias general consequent in 
the permanent person related functions categories for the person related genotypes 
causes group (see Table A3.1.6). 
" Add new supplement factors "Running in failure", "Random failure "and "Age 
dependent failure" as general antecedents of the equipment failure general 
consequent in the equipment category for the technologically related genotypes 
group (see Table A3.1.7). 
" Add a new supplement factor "Halted processors" as a general antecedent and a new 
factor "Incompatible programmes" as a specific antecedent of the software fault 
general consequent in the permanent equipment category for the technologically 
related genotypes group (see Table A3.1.7). 
" Add a new supplement factor "Inadequate standards" as a general antecedent of the 
inadequate general consequent in the procedure category for the technologically 
related genotypes group (see Table A3.1.8). 
" Add a new supplement factor "Fetching problems" as a specific antecedent of the 
incomplete information general consequent in the temporary interface problems 
category for the technologically related genotypes group (see Table A3.1.9). 
" Add the new factors "Poor accessibility" and "Low availability" as specific 
antecedents of the access problems general consequent in the permanent interface 
problems category for the technological related genotypes group (see Table A3.1.10). 
" Add a new factor "Inadequate control "as a specific antecedent of the mislabelling 
general consequent in the permanent interface problems category for the 
technologically related genotypes group (see Table A3.1.10). 
" Add the new factors "Ineffective safety management system" and "Low management 
quality" as general antecedents and "Not performed maintenance procedures" and 
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"Ineffective control" as specific antecedents of the maintenance failure general 
consequent in the organisation category for the organisation related genotypes group 
(see Table A3.1.12). 
" Add the new factors "Unclear policies" as a general antecedent and "Not adopted 
standards" as a specific antecedent of the inadequate quality control general 
consequent in the organisation category for the organisation related genotypes group 
(see Table A3.1.12). 
" Add the new factors "Ineffective organisational structure", "Not acquired 
organisational culture" and "Ineffective safety management system" as general 
antecedents and "Not clear strategy and objectives" and "Ineffective control" as 
specific antecedents of the management problem general consequent in the 
organisation category for the organisation related genotypes group (see Table 
A3.1.12). 
" Add the new factors "Ineffective resources" as a general antecedent and "Low 
availability" and "Unreliable" as specific antecedents of the design failure general 
consequent in the organisation category for the organisation related genotypes group 
(see Table A3.1.12). 
" Add the new factors "Ineffective organisational structure", "Not acquired 
organisational culture" and "Ineffective safety management system" as general 
antecedents and "Ineffective control" as a specific antecedent of the inadequate task 
allocation general consequent in the organisation category for the organisation 
related genotypes group (see Table A3.1.12). 
" Add the new factors "Classical organisational structure" and "Not acquired 
organisational culture" as general antecedents and "Uncommitted to norm" and 
"Uncommitted to safety culture" as specific antecedents of the social pressure 
general consequent in the organisation category for the organisation related 
genotypes group (see Table A3.1.12). 
" Add the new factors "Ineffective manning policy" and "Insufficient human 
resources" as general antecedents and "Recruitment failure" and "Promotion failure" 
as specific antecedents of the social pressure general consequent in the training 
category for the organisation related genotypes group (see Table A3.1.13). 
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" Add the new factors "Incomprehension" as a general antecedent and "Lack of 
training" as a specific antecedent of the insufficient knowledge general consequent in 
training category for the organisation related genotypes group (see Table A3.1.13). 
" Add the new factors "Ineffective control" and "Out of control" as general 
antecedents and "Defected control systems" and "Environmental effect" as specific 
antecedents of the temperature general consequent in ambient conditions category for 
the organisation related genotypes group (see Table A3.1.14). 
" Add the new factors "Poor functionality" as a general antecedent and "Poor design" 
and "Inappropriate adjustment" as specific antecedents of the sound general 
consequent in ambient conditions category for the organisation related genotypes 
group (see Table A3.1.14). 
" Add the new factors "Ineffective control" and "Out of control" as general 
antecedents and "Defected control systems" and "Environmental effect" as specific 
antecedents of the humidity general consequent in ambient conditions category for 
the organisation related genotypes group (see Table A3.1.14). 
" Add the new factors "Poor design" as general antecedent and "Inappropriate 
adjustment" as specific antecedents of the illumination general consequent in the 
ambient conditions category for the organisation related genotypes group (see Table 
A3.1.14). 
" Add the new factors "Local/dispersed disturbance" and "Temporary/permanent 
disturbance" as general consequents, "Operational defect", "Maintenance failure" 
and "Dynamical characteristics effect" as general antecedents, and "Inappropriate 
instruction" and "Inherited defects" as specific antecedents of the vibration specific 
consequent in the ambient conditions category for the organisation related genotypes 
group (see Table A3.1.14). 
" Add the new factors "Motion" as a general consequent and "Adverse weather 
conditions" as a general antecedent in the ambient conditions category for the 
organisation related genotypes group (see Table A3.1.14). 
6.3.2. Details of the proposed MCDM method 
6.3.2.1. The developments of RCOs 
The development of RCOs is intended to reduce/mitigate high HFPs assessed. 
Basically, RCOs are developed based on HFP initiating events or root cause features. 
Initiating events or root causes are identified through the use of CREAM classification 
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scheme phenotypes groups, and main genotypes categories of person, technological and 
organisation classification groups. In this context, it is vital to understand the inherent 
effect of initiating events or root causes on their related categories. As a result, the 
explicit interrelation of identified categories and their affect on CPCs can be used as a 
guide to develop RCOs. Essentially, they should be based on an organisation's SMS and 
management quality. However, the higher objectivities of the SMS and management 
quality of a shipping organisation would simplify structuring DMs' targeted potential 
RCOs. 
6.3.2.2. Identification of evaluation criteria 
To enable DMs to choose potential RCOs that would effectively reduce/mitigate 
assessed HFP, it is essential to identify the associated evaluation criteria that are used to 
communicate the estimated impact of each criterion on each alternative RCO in decision 
making models. In addition to the "HFP effectiveness" measuring the extent to which 
developed RCOs could fulfil the desired potential objectives (how far the RCO is 
effective in mitigating the HFP), the chosen criteria in this decision model are identified 
and defined as "Technical difficulty of implementing a RCO", "Time required for 
implementation of a RCO", and "Cost of implementing a RCO". However, criteria 
evaluation is model and method reliant. For example, the AHP subjective weighing of a 
criterion is based on the use of the fundamental 1-9 scale or their reciprocals as defined 
by Saaty (1980). Such a scale will be used to assess the priority score of each criterion 
in order to derive its subjective weight. In this context, the assessment of I indicates 
equal importance, 3 moderately more, 5 strongly more, 7 very strongly, and 9 indicates 
extremely higher importance. The values of 2,4,6, and 8 are allocated to indicate 
compromise values of importance. On the other hand, in entropy objective analysis and 
TOPSIS models, "HFP effectiveness" criterion will be aggregated by the use of a BN 
model developed in Chapters 4 and 5, the estimated impact of "Time required for 
implementation of a RCO" and "Cost of implementing a RCO" criteria will be 
evaluated using objective databases, while the impact of the "technical difficulty of 
implementing a RCO" criterion will be evaluated by experts using linguistic variables 
such as "Very-Low" (VL), "Low" (L), "Medium-Low" (ML), Medium (M), "Medium- 
High" (MH), High (H) and Very-High (VH). These linguistic terms can be defined by 
fuzzy triangular membership functions of (0.00,0.00,0.167) for VL, (0.00,0.167, 
0.333) for L, (0.167,0.333,0.50) for ML, (0.333,0.50,0.667) for M, (0.50,0.667, 
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0.833) for MH, (0.667,0.833,1.0) for H and (0.833,1.0,1.0) for VH (Engel and Last, 
2006). Such fuzzy numbers will be defuzzified to crisp numbers by using the centre of 
gravity method (Andrews and Moss, 2002; Yang et at., 2010). 
6.3.2.3. Mathematical details of the AHP method 
This section is intended to cover the underlying methodology framework of steps 3,4, 
5,6, and 7 in Figure 4. The AHP method could be used to develop a set of subjective 
weights (w'1 , w'2 , ... w'4) for the 
four evaluation criteria ( cl , cl, ... c4) (Saaty, 1980). 
Experts could be asked to provide their subjective beliefs based on pair-wise 
comparison of criteria c1, ck, (i _1... 4) and k of ck refers to the whole i rows or j 
columns in a matrix: 
A= (c1) 
nxn ............................................................................................................. 
(6.1) 
However, non uniformity of experts' opinions might occur, so an explicit treatment of 
experts' judgments is in demand, and then the following formula needs to be applied in 
order to obtain an average scale of pair-wise comparison (Klir and Yuan, 1995). 
E e_1 e(x) (6.2) E(X) )=E ........................................................................................................ n 
where E(x) is the synthesised value of n experts' subjective beliefs, e(x) is the value 
given by the eth expert. E(x) can be used as entry cik of a matrix A. Each element of a 
matrix A represents the importance of criterion ci, relative to criterion ck: 
If cik > 1, ci, is more important than ck, 
if cik < 1, ci, is less important than ck, 
if Cik = 1, same importance 
Cik and cki must satisfjr Cik X cki = 1. 
Because the entry Cik is the inverse of the entry cki, and for all i=k, Cik =1, such a 
matrix is said to be a positive and reciprocal matrix. With I's in the main diagonal, 
experts need only to provide value judgment according to the AHP scale in the upper 
triangle of the matrix. 
In a matrix A the weights are consistent if they are transitive, that is; 
Ci k- CLJXCJk............................. ........... ................................................................... 
(6.3) 
for all i, j, and k=1.... n. Such a matrix might exist if the entry c11 is calculated from 
exactly measured data. For matrices involving human judgments, the condition in 
Equation 6.3 does not hold, as human judgments are inconsistent to a certain degree. In 
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such a case, the weight vector w'1 of each criterion can be found by computing the 
normalized eigenvector corresponding to the maximum eigen-value of the matrix A. 
Because the sum of the weights should be equal to I the normalized eigenvector is used. 
The calculation of weight vector w 'I can be deduced by using the following equations. 
Ct 
µij =Z ............................................................................................................. 
(6.4) 
n=i Cif 
where, pi j is the normalized eigenvector value. 
W,. = 
En=i My 
............................................................................................................. 
(6.5) 
n 
A maximum eigen-value of A is defined as Amax, which satisfies the following matrix 
equation: 
Aw' = Amax w' .......................................................................................................... (6.6) 
To calculate Amax the following equation can be used (Kamal et al., 2001). 
Amax = En-1 A W) i }/n ............................................................................................ (6.7) wi 
Saaty (1980) suggests a measure of consistency for the pair-wise comparisons. When 
the judgments are perfectly consistent then, Amax should equal the number of criteria n 
that are compared. Generally, the responses are not perfectly consistent. In addition, 
Amax is greater than n. The larger the Amax, the greater is the degree of inconsistency. 
The consistency index (CI) is defined as: 
Cl = (Amax - n)/(n -1) ........................................................................................ (6.8) 
Saaty (1980) provided the following random index (RI) table for matrices of order 3 to 
10: 
n3456789 10 
RI 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 1.51 
This RI is based on a simulation of a large number of randomly generated weights. The 
consistency ratio (CR) calculation is recommended as: 
CR = CI /RI .............................................................................................................. (6.9) 
The consistency ratio CR is a measure of how a given matrix compares to a purely 
random matrix in terms of their consistency indices. A CR of 0.10 or less is considered 
n 
RI 
3 
0.58 
4 
0.90 
5 
1.12 
6 
1.32 
7 
1.41 
8 
1.45 
9 
1.49 
10 
1.51 
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acceptable. Larger values of CR require the experts to revise their judgments (Kamal et 
al., 2001). 
6.3.2.4. Mathematical details of the entropy measurement method 
This section is intended to cover the underlying methodology framework of steps 8,9 
and 10 in Figure 6.4. The entropy objective analysis method detailed in phase two of 
the proposed methodology consists of the following steps (Yang et at., 2009): 
Step 8: To construct the decision matrix (based on the priority scores assigned to each 
criterion on each alternative RCO) denoted by: 
M= (rij)mxn and i= 1,2 ... m; j = 1,2... n......................................................... (6.10) 
where rUj is a criterion of the decision matrix M, m is the number of decision 
alternatives and n is the number of decision criteria. 
Step 9: To normalize the criteria of the decision matrix: 
P1= rý 
.............................. (6.11) 
ý; j=1,2... n; i=1,2... m ................................... I: -i=, rIi 
where, Pit is a normalized criterion of the decision matrix. 
Step 10: To calculate the entropy of each criterion data: 
The entropy of the set of normalized outcomes of the jth criterion in the decision matrix 
is given by: 
Ej =--K Zm 1[pti x In pij]; j= 1,2... n; i- 1,2... m ......................................... (6. l2) 
where, Ej is the entropy of jth criterion and K is a constant (normalizing) value taken to 
be 1/ln(m). 
Note that if all normalized values for a criterion become identical, Pit = 1/m for all (i, 
J) then E, = 1. 
Next the calculation of the intrinsic weight of each criterion based on its entropy is 
given by: 
W' j= Ei; for all (j) ............................................................................................ (6.13) 
where, d1 is the degree of diversity of the information involved in the outcomes of the 
j" criterion, and is given by the following equation. 
dd = 1-Ej ............................................................................................................... (6.14) 
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6.3.2.5. Combined weights wj calculation 
This section describes the details of step 11 in the proposed methodology. The 
combined weights wj of criteria are derived by the aggregation of criteria subjective 
weights wj calculated with AHP model, and the intrinsic weights Wi calculated as a 
result of criteria entropy analysis. The normalised combined weights wj could be 
derived by using the following equation (Hwang and Yoon, 1981; Milani et al., 2008; 
Yang et at., 2009): 
w jxw" 
W. =n; for all (j) ...................................................................................... (6.15) ýj_lwjxw i 
6.3.4.6. The mathematical details of the conventional TOPSIS model 
Assuming that At (i =1... m) and xx (j =1... n) are a set of m alternatives of RCOs 
and a set of n criteria, respectively, they are representing a real world problem 
demanding DMs' preferences. In this respect, the main procedure for the conventional 
TOPSIS model provided in Phase three of the proposed methodology can be described 
as follows. 
Step 12: To use the constructed decision matrix in Step 8 to obtain the normalized 
decision matrix as required by the TOPSIS model: 
R= (rij)mxn; ........................................................................................................... (6.16) 
ril -xij/E71xij2; i=1... m; j=1... n : ......................................................... 
(6.17) 
Step 13: To combine the combined weights wj with decision matrix vectors r11 to obtain 
the weighted normalized decision matrix V= (vii). 
vtj= wjrjj; i=1... m; j=1... n .......................................................................... 
(6.18) 
Step 14: To determine the PIS and NIS: 
A+ _ (vi , v2 , ... v. ) = {(maxi{vj j))I jE B), (mini{vj j)Ij E C)), 
A- = v; ) = {(mini(vjj))U E B), (maxj(vij)Ij E C)) ......................... (6.19) 
where B and C are associated with the benefit and cost attribute sets, respectively. 
Step 15: To calculate the separation measures denoted by M= S', S. The separation 
measure of each alternative of RCO from the PIS and NIS is calculated by the 
Euclidean distance given by: 
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Si = Ej 1(výj -vf)2; j=1... n; i=1... m. 
Sý = Eý 1(vý1-v1)2; j=1... n; i=1... m ..................................................... (6.20) 
Step 16: To calculate the relative closeness of a particular alternative of RCO to the 
ideal RCO Ci as expressed by: 
Ci=s i=1..., m; 05Ci<1 ...................................................................... (6.21) 
where, Ci is the relative closeness of ith alternative to the ideal solution. The higher Ci 
is, the better the RCO. 
6.4. Case study 
The case study presented in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 will be used in this chapter in order 
to effectively link the derived HEP of the CREAM BN model with the TOPSIS RCO 
decision model. 
6.4.1. The retrospective analysis of M/V Crown Princess accident 
The retrospective analysis will follow the principles stated in Section 6.2.2.3 and its 
related sub section as follows: 
Step 1: To use the incident information that existed at the time of the event occurrence 
to describe CPCs' effect levels in conjugation with CREAM CPCs' description, as 
stated in Chapter 4, Section 4.4. 
Step 2: To include the description of the possible error modes as a result of all possible 
actions of officers in charge of command of the MN Crown Princess at the time of the 
incident. Thus, a limited set of error modes are produced, and the criteria for certain 
error modes (effects) are also defined. 
Table 6.1 Table 6. Ishows the error modes that are determined. The very likely timing, 
sequence and speed error modes are determined based on the thought that the officers in 
charge of command needed to concede the timing, sequence and speed of their actions 
and the related consequences of each action. These had to be controlled competently 
with their cognition functions of observation, interpretation and planning in the context 
of the prevailing conditions. 
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Step 3: To include the descriptions of the possible categories of genotype probable 
causes with the given knowledge about the CPCs in order to identify the genotype 
categories that are most likely relevant. Table 6.2, Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show the 
possible qualitative evaluation of each main genotype category group in relation to each 
CPC. Generally, the third stage of analysis addresses the different possible assessments 
of genotype categories in relation to CPCs' description, with the condition that none of 
the cognitive functions (categories) are completely ruled out. 
Table 6.1: The impossible, possible and very likely error mode, adapted from Hollnagel (1998a) 
Possibility 
Error 
mode 
Controlling questions 
0= impossible, 
i= possible, 
2= very likely 
Does the control of the process require timing of actions? Are there 
clear indicators/signals for the timing of actions? Does the system Timing very likely 
include lead time indications? Does a signal clearly identify the 
corresponding action? 
Is duration a control parameter? Is duration controlled manually or 
Duration automatically? Is the duration clearly shown or indicated? Does the Possible 
indication show elapsed time or remaining time, or both? 
Is level of force/effort a control parameter? Is the required/applied 
Force level of force clearly indicated? Is there a minimum/maximum limit of impossible 
force for a control? Can force be controlled without changing position? 
Is distance or magnitude a control parameter? Is the required/applied Distance / 
distance or magnitude clearly indicated? Can distance or magnitude be impossible 
magnitude 
controlled without changing position? 
Is speed a control parameter? Is speed controlled manually or 
Speed automatically (set-point/rate)? Is the required/applied speed clearly very likely 
indicated? 
Is direction a control parameter? Is there a direct relation between 
Direction (movement) direction of controls and direction of system response? Is Possible 
the required/applied direction clearly indicated? 
Are different objects clearly separated or coded (colour/shape)? Are Wrong 
objects clearly and uniquely identified? Can objects easily be reached Possible 
object 
and seen when use is required? 
Is the sequence of actions/next action clearly indicated? Is the direction 
Sequence of the sequence reversible? Can out-of-sequence actions easily be very likely 
recovered? 
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Table 6.2: Relationship between CPCs and (main) person related genotypes group 
C P f i di Person related genotypes rou s ommon er ormance Con t ons 
Cognitive model 
Permanent 
functions 
Temporary 
functions 
Adequacy of organisation High High Low 
Working conditions Nil Nil Nil 
Adequacy of NM and operational 
support 
High High Nil 
Availability of procedures/ plans High High Hi h 
Number of simultaneous goals Nil Nil Nil 
Available time Nil Nil Nil 
Time of day Nil Nil Nil 
Adequacy of training and preparation High High Hi h 
Crew collaboration quality Medium Medium Medium 
Table 6.3: Relationship between CPCs and (main) technology genotypes groups 
Common Performance Conditions Technology related genotype s groups 
Equipment Procedures Interface 
Adequacy of organisation Nil High Medium 
Working conditions Nil Nil Nil 
Adequacy of MMI and operational 
support 
High High High 
Availability of procedures/ plans High High High 
Number of simultaneous goals Nil Nil Nil 
Available time Nil Nil Nil 
Time of day Nil Nil Nil 
Adequacy of training and preparation High High High 
Crew collaboration quality Medium Medium Medium 
Table 6.4. Relationship between CPCs and (main) organisation related genotypes groups 
C Organisation related genotypes groups ommon Performance 
Conditions Communication Organisation Training 
Ambient 
conditions 
Working 
conditions 
Adequacy of organisation Low High High Nil High 
Working conditions Nil High Nil Nil High 
Adequacy of NM and Nil High High Nil High 
operational support 
Availability of Nil High High Nil High procedures/ plans 
Number of simultaneous Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 
goals 
Available time Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 
Time of day Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 
Adequacy of training and LOW High High Nil Nil 
preparation 
Crew collaboration quality Nil Medium Medium Nil Low 
Step 4: To perform detailed analysis of main task steps. This approached by tracing the 
possible consequent-antecedent direct links for the selected error modes in Table 
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A3.1.1. The following summary provides a set of candidate general antecedent' causes 
to be used as the key factors for the detailed analysis. 
Summary of the candidate general antecedent causes 
Error mode General consequent (effect) General antecedents (causes) 
Inadequate procedures 
Timing Timing 
Faulty diagnosis 
Faulty diagnosis 
Sequence Sequence 
Wrong identification 
Inadequate procedures 
Speed Speed Faulty diagnosis 
Performance variability 
Since the outcome of the analysis at this level could not produce any direct links 
between the candidates of general antecedents and their associated specific antecedents 
(earlier omission and trapping error) (see Table A3.1.1), because they could not be 
considered as the probable initiating events, the analysis therefore is extended to a 
further level. Hence, the recursive search through the classification groups started, to 
find the matching general consequents (effects) of the candidates general antecedents 
(causes) stated in the above summary. In this context, the cognitive model function 
categories of observation, interpretation and planning are inevitably searched first in 
order to justify the competent actions of the officer in command. As a result, the 
following second level set of general antecedent causes is produced: 
" The general consequent "Faulty diagnosis" is effected by the cause of the general 
antecedent "Cognitive bias" (see Table A3.1.3); given that none of the associated 
specific consequents can be justified as the probable root cause, the analysis is 
extended to the next level (see Table A3.1.6). At this level, the indirectly linked 
general consequent "Cognitive bias" effect, directly linked general antecedent 
"Wrong reasoning" cause and the associated specific antecedent's "lack of 
competence", justify the link to likely root cause (see Table A3,1.6). 
" The general consequent "Wrong identification" is effected by the cause of the 
general antecedent "Faulty diagnosis" (see Table A3.1.2); given that none of the 
associated specific consequents can be justified as the probable root cause, the 
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analysis is extended to the next level, where none of the indirectly linked general 
consequent-general antecedents can be justified as the likely causes. Therefore the 
analysis stopped at this level and the general antecedent "Faulty diagnosis" is 
considered as a part of the probable set of causes. 
" The general consequent "Performance variability" is affected by the cause of the 
general antecedent "Insufficient skill" (see Table A3.1.5). At this level, the 
associated specific antecedent "lack of training" justifies the link to the likely root 
cause. Therefore the analysis stopped at this level (see Table A3.1.5). 
" The general consequent "Inadequate procedure" is effected by the cause of the 
general antecedents "Inadequate standards" and "Design failure"; given that the 
associated specific consequent is none, the analysis is extended to a next level, where 
none of the indirectly linked general consequent-general antecedents can be justified 
as the likely causes. Therefore the analysis stopped at this level and the general 
antecedents "Design failure" and "Inadequate standards" are considered as a part 
of the probable set of causes (see Table A3.1.8). 
6.4.2. Selection of the best RCO using the devleoped methodology 
Phase 1: Calculating the subjective weights of identified evaluation criteria 
Step 1: Formulating alternatives of RCOs that are needed to mitigate predicted HFP is 
based on the finding of performance analysis probable set of causes, "lack of 
competence", "lack of training", "Inadequate standards" and "Design failure". 
Considering the underlying conditions stated in Section 6.3.2.3 the following 
alternatives of RCO Ai (i =1... 4) are formulated as follows: 
Alternative A1: A RCO is formulated to provide ship board training to the newly 
signing on officers. The training is to be performed by a qualified officer. It includes 
familiarisation with the use of INS' equipment based on maker instruction and with help 
of training videos. 
Alternative A2: A RCO is developed to provide training to develop crews' competence 
on the use of INS pertaining to the already developed "model course" proposed in 2005 
by the IMO's Subcommittee on Standards on Training and Watch keeping (STW). 
However, the National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) marine accident report 
(NTSB/MAR-08/01,2008) stated that completing INS training does not assure mastery 
of the system because mariners are not required to demonstrate mastery of an INS at the 
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completion of most formal INS training programs. Furthermore, neither the IMO nor 
maritime authorities require licensed mariners who have completed initial INS training 
take courses thereafter. 
Alternative A3: A RCO is formulated to provide dedicated training to develop crews' 
competence on the use of equipment based on adapted and implemented specific 
standards pertaining to the recommendations stated in the National Transport Safety 
Board (NTSB) marine accident report (NTSB/MAR-08/01,2008). These are designed 
to encourage safety improvements for the immediate future as well as for many years to 
come. 
Alternative A4: In this alternative RCO, all the actions in A3 will be used. On top of 
that, INS design characteristics have to be modified by makers in a way that safety alert 
should be provided to the officers while they are manipulating ship speed. Such safety 
alert would help to eliminate the possibility of ship heel due to the effect of increased 
speed in shallow water depth. This alternative is formulated pertaining to the 
recommendations of the NTSB to enhance INS design, procedures, and training. 
In order to quantify each formulated RCO in terms of HFP, to be used as a criterion in 
the TOPSIS decision model, each alternative of RCO will improve different CPCs' 
performance and thus their associated HFP through the CREAM BN model developed 
in Chapter 4. Figure 6.5 displays the aggregation of the BN model, as a result of 
alternative RCO Al. The impact of this RCO could help develop officers' "Adequacy of 
training and experience" to an effect of 100% "Adequate level with limited experience". 
It is rational to evaluate the improvement of the "Adequacy of man machine 
interaction" to an effect level of 100% "Adequate" and the "Crew collaboration" to an 
effect level of 100% "Efficient". 
Figure A 3.2.1 displays the aggregation of the BN model, as a result of alternative 
RCO A2. The impact of this RCO could help develop officers' "Adequacy of training 
and experience" to an effect of 100% "Adequate level with high experience". It is 
rational to evaluate the improvement of the "Adequacy of the man machine interaction" 
to an effect level of 100% "Tolerable", the "Crew collaboration" to an effect level of 
100% "Efficient" and "Adequacy of organisation" to an effect level of 100% 
"Efficient". 
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Figure A 3.2.2 displays the aggregation of the BN model, as a result of alternative 
RCO A3. The impact of this RCO could help develop officers' "Adequacy of training 
and experience" to an effect of 100% "Adequate level with high experience". It is 
rational to evaluate the improvement of the "Adequacy of the man machine interaction" 
to an effect level of 100% "Adequate", the "Crew collaboration" to an effect level of 
100% "Very efficient", the "Adequacy of organisation" to an effect level of 100% 
"Very efficient" and the "Availability of procedures and plans" to an effect level of 
100% "Acceptable". 
Figure A 3.2.3 displays the aggregation of the BN model, as a result of alternative 
RCO A4. The impact of this RCO could help develop officers' "Adequacy of training 
and experience" to an effect of 100% of "Adequate level with a high experience". It is 
rational to evaluate the improvement of "Adequacy of the man machine interaction" to 
an effect level of 100% "Supportive", the "Crew collaboration" to an effect level of 
100% "Very efficient", the "Adequacy of organisation" to an effect level of 100% 
"Very efficient" and the "Availability of procedures and plans" to an effect level of 
100% "Appropriate". Alternative HFPs are derived based on the approach followed in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.4.8. 
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Figure 6.5: M BN model failure probabilities of M/V Crown Princess Officers in charge of command 
actions' (Alternative A1) 
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Step 2: To use the evaluation criteria "HFP effectiveness" denoted by cl, "Technical 
difficulty of implementing RCO" denoted by CZ, "Time required for implementation of 
RCO" denoted by c3 and "Cost for implementation of RCO" denoted by c4 as defined in 
Section 6.3.2.2. 
Step 3: Constructing a pair-wise comparison nxn matrix defined by Equation 6.1 for 
the evaluation criteria. Three experts were asked to provide a pair-wise comparison of 
all criteria. The average scales used for the pair-wise comparison are obtained by using 
Equation 6.2; afterwards they are entered in the comparison matrix (see Table 6.5). An 
example of calculation to obtain judgment matrix for pair-wise compression of criteria 
a1,3 value by row is shown as follow: 
The pair-wise comparison of criterion cl to c3 value, 
C13 3- 
el(x) + e2(x) + e3(x) 
3 
2+3+2.5 
C1,3 =3=2.5 
where, el(x), e2(x) and e3(x) are the values on the pair-wise compression of criteria 
c1 to c3 by row obtained from expert evolutions. 
Table 6.5: Matrix for averaged pair-wise comparison of criteria 
Ci l Ci 2 CO Ci 4 
C1.1 1.00 0.4 2.5 4 
C2. i 2.5 1.00 5 7 
C3J 0.40 0.2 1.00 1.60 
C4-i 0.25 0.14 0.6 1.00 
Step 4: Calculating the priority vector weights w'i involve first normalizing the relative 
importance values in each column of the judgments matrix shown in Table 6.5 by using 
Equation 6.4. The sums of each column of the judgments matrix of criteria cl. l, cl, z, X1.3 
and c1,4 are 4.15,1.74,9.13 and 13.60 respectively. For example the normalized 
eigenvector values of c1,1 is calculated as follow. 
i1,1- 
! 
-'0-0- 4.15 = 0.24 
In a similar way the remaining normalized eigenvector values are obtained and 
presented in Table 6.6. Then the normalized eigenvector values by rows are used in 
203 
Equation 6.5 to obtain the priority vector weights w'1. For example, w'1 is calculated as 
follow. 
0.24+0.23+0.27+0.29 
W'1= 
4 = 0.260 
In a similar way the reaming priority vector weights are obtained and presented in "fable 
6.6. 
Table 6.6: Resulting matrix 
Ei envectorvalues , 
µi1 µi2 µi3 µi4 
w i 
µ1. j 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.29 
0.260 
µ2. i 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.51 
0.560 
93. ) 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.109 
C4,1 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.071 
Step 5: Calculating the maximal Amax value from the judgment matrix as defined by 
Equation 6.7. For example as follows: 
(A w% = (1 x 0.260) + (0.4 x 0.560) + (2.5 x 0.109) + (4 x 0.071) = 1.041 
In a similar way(A w')2, (A w') 3 and (A w')4 are obtained as 2.252,0.439 and 
0.282, 
respectively. 
Amax = (1.041/0.260 + 2.252/0.560 + 0.439/0.109 + 0.282/0.071)/4 =4.006 
Step 6: Computing the CR of the judgments matrix to assure matrix consistency. This 
step involves the calculation of CI as defined by Equation 6.8: 
CI = (4.006 - 4) / (4 - 1) =0.002, 
then, the CR is computed as defined by Equation 6.9: 
0.002 
CR = 0.90 = 0.0022 
Since CR value is less than 0.1, therefore the matrix is consistent. 
Step 7: Developing priority vector weights w'1 as defined in Table 6.6. 
Phase 2: Calculating the intrinsic weights of identified criteria 
Step 8: Constructing the decision matrix as defined by Equation 6.10 (see 'Table 6.7); 
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Table 6.7: Decision matrix 
Al i Evaluation criteria ternat ve 
RCOs Difficulty of 
Time required Cost of 
(Potential HFP 
effectiveness implementing 
for 
implementation implementing 
objectives) RCO 
of RCO (day) 
RCO ($) 
(A) 0.0827 0.315 I 5,000 
(A2) 0.0722 0.555 3 15,000 
(A3) 0.009 0.666 5 25,000 
(A4) 0.0008 0.907 90 70,000 
Step 8.1: Normalising each element of the original decision matrix shown in Table 6.7 
using Equation 6.11, where each element is divided by its column sum. 
- 0.5021 = 
0.0827 
= pt1 (0.0827 + 0.0722 + 0.009 + 0.0008) 
In a similar way, the reaming normalized elements are obtained and provided in the 
normalised decision matrix Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8: Normalised decision matrix 
Evalua tion criteria 
Alternative 
HFP Difficulty of 
Time required Cost of RCOs 
(Potential effectiveness implementing 
for 
implementation 
implementing 
objectives) 
P11 RCO 
of RCO (day) 
RCO ($) 
Piz PO P14 
(A) 0.5021 0.1289 0.0101 0.0435 
(A2) 0.4384 0.2272 0.0303 0.1305 
(A3) 0.0546 0.2726 0.0505 0.2174 
(A4) 0.0048 0.3713 0.9091 0.6087 
Step 9: Calculating the entropy Ej of each criterion as defined by Equation 6.12. For 
example, the entropy of "HEP effectiveness" criterion involves the following 
calculation: 
El = 1/1n 4[(0.5021 x -0.689) + (0.4384x -0.825) + (0.0546x -2.907) + (0.0048x 
-5.34)] = 0.6435 
In a similar way, the E2, E3 and E4 of the other three criteria are obtained as 0.9543, 
0.2812 and 0.7473, respectively. 
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Step 10: Calculating the criteria intrinsic weights based on their entropies as defined by 
Equation 6.12. This includes calculating first the degree of diversity dj of the 
information involved in the outcomes of the jth criterion as defined by Equation 6.14. 
For example, dl involves the following calculation: 
d1= 1-0.6436 =0.3565 
In a similar way, the d2, d3 and d4 are obtained and presented in following summary 
d. =1-E. 0.3565 0.0457 0.7188 0.2527 
4 
d. ý 1.3737 
j=1 
From Equation 6.13 for example w"1 of "HEP effectiveness" criterion is given by the 
following calculation: 
565 
w"1 
L3737 
= 0.2595 
Consequently, w"1 is equal to 0.295. In a similar way, the weights of the other three 
criteria are obtained as 0.033,0.523 and 0.184, respectively. 
Step 11: Aggregating the subjective weights and intrinsic weights 
The aggregated and normalised combined weights of criteria (subjective weights and 
intrinsic weights calculated in step 4 and 10 could be derived by Equation 6.15. 
W1 = 
0.260x0.259 
= 0.4313 0.156 
In a similar way, the combined weights of the other three criteria are obtained as 0.1 19, 
0.367 and 0.083, respectively. 
The application of the conventional TOPSIS model is conducted in the following steps. 
Step 12: Constructing the decision matrix based on the priority score of alternatives on 
each criterion as defined by Equation 6.16 and shown in Table 6.9. 
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Table 6.9: Decision matrix construct 
Evaluation criteria 
Alternative 
RCOs 
HFP 
Difficulty of Time required for Cost of 
(Potential 
effectiveness 
implementing implementation of implementing 
objectives) RCO RCO (day) RCO ($) 
rt1 
r r r 
(A1) 0.0827 0.315 I 5,000 
(A2) 0.0722 0.555 3 15,000 
(A3) 0.009 0.666 5 25,000 
(A4) 0.0008 0.907 90 70,000 
Step 12.1: Obtaining the normalized decision matrix nib as defined by Equation 6.17. 
For example, the normalized nil is obtained as follow: 
n.. = 
0.0827 
=0.7508 "1,1 (0.0827)2+(0.0722)2+(0.009)2+(0.0008)2 
In a similar way, the normalized elements nLj are obtained and provided in the 
normalised decision matrix in Table 6.10. 
Table 6.10: Normalised decision matrix 
Evaluation criteria 
Alternative 
RCOs Difficulty of Time required for Cost of 
(Potential HFP 
effectiveness 
implementing implementation of implementing 
objectives) RCO RCO (day) RCO ($) 
nil 
n n n14 
(A1) 0.7508 0.2435 0.0119 0.0658 
(A2) 0.6555 0.4290 0.0333 0.1974 
(A3) 0.0817 0.5148 0.0554 0.3290 
(A4) 0.0073 0.7011 0.9978 0.9211 
Step 13: Obtaining the weighted normalized decision matrix vUj as defined by Equation 
6.18. For example, the weighted normalized element v; l is obtained as follow: 
vil = 0.7508 x 0.4313=0.3238 
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In a similar way, the weighted normalized elements vij are obtained and provided in the 
weighted normalised decision matrix in Table 6.11. 
Table 6.11: The weighted normalised decision matrix 
Evaluation criteria 
Alternative 
RCOs Difficulty of Time required for Cost of 
(Potential HFP implementing implementation of implementing 
objectives) effectiveness RCO RCO (day) RCO ($) vi' 
U U U 
(A, ) 0.3238 0.0290 0.0041 0.0054 
(A2) 0.2827 0.0511 0.0122 0.0163 
(A3) 0.0352 0.06133 0.0203 0.0271 
ýA4) 0.0031 0.0835 0.3664 0.0759 
Step 14: Determining the PIS and NIS as defined by Condition 6.19 in Section 6.3.4.6. 
From the weighted normalised decision matrix shown in Table 6.11 the PIS of vi , v2+, 
v3 and v4 are determined as 0.3238,0.0835,0.3664 and 0.0759 respectively, and the 
NIS of vi , vz , v3 and v4 are 
determined as 0.0031,0.0290,0.0041 and 0.0054 
respectively. 
Step 15: Calculating the separation measure of each alternative (denoted by M=S; +, 
Sj- Euclidean distance from the PIS and NIS) as defined by Equation 6.20. For example, 
S1 and S1 is obtained as follow: 
S+ - 
(0.3238 - 0.3238)2 + (0.0835 - 0.0290)2 + (0.3664 - 0.0041)2 
1 +(0.0759 - 0.0054)2 
= 0.3731 
i 
I(0.0031 - 0.3238)2 + (0.0290 - 0.0290)2 + (0.0041 - 0.0041)2 S= 
+(0.0054 - 0.0054)2 
= 0.3207 
In a similar way, the separation measure of the remaining alternatives are obtained and 
presented in Table 6.12. 
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Table 6.12: The separation measure of each alternative 
Sl 0.3731 Si 0.3207 
Sz 0.3629 Si- 0.2808 
S3+ 0.4537 S3 0.0530 
S4 0.3207 S4 0.3731 
Step 16: Calculating the relative closeness of each alternative of RCO to the ideal 
RCO, as defined by Equation 6.21. For example, Cl is obtained as follow: 
= 
0.3207 
_ Cl 
0.3731+0.3207 - 
04622 
In a similar way, the relative closeness C2 , C3, and C4of the remaining alternative RCOs 
to the ideal RCO are obtained as 0.4362,0.1046 and 0.5378 respectively. 
Step 17: A set of alternative of RCOs Al is generated in descending order based on the 
value of C1 indicating the most preferred and least preferred RCO according to the 
following preference ranking A4 > Al > A2 > A3. 
The above result of using a conventional TOPSIS model confirms that the alternative 
A4 is the first choice, while A3 is the worst choice. 
6.4.1.5. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis can be used to check the robustness of the decision reached through 
the model. In this respect the sensitivity analysis would be conducted in order to see the 
importance of criteria weights in selecting the best alternative among the available 
alternatives RCOs. 
To investigate the impact of criteria weights on the selection of the relevant RCO, the 
sensitivity analyses were conducted in nine experiments. The details of each experiment 
are presented in Table 6.13. From Table 6.13 it can be seen that in the first experiment, 
weights of all criteria are set equal to (0.25). In experiments 2-5 the weight of a criterion 
is set as highest (0.7525) one by one and the remaining criteria are set to the lowest 
value (0.0825). The purpose is to see the most important criterion in influencing the 
decision making process. In experiment 6-7 the weights of three attributes are set as 
highest (0.3058) simultaneously and the remaining criterion weight is set to the lowest 
value (0.0825). In experiment 7 the criteria weights are set in the inverse setting of 
experiment 6. In experiment 8 the weights of a two criterion are set as highest (0.4175) 
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and the remaining weights are set to the lowest value (0.0825) simultaneously. In 
experiment 9 the criteria weights are set in the inverse setting of experiment 8. It can be 
seen from the overall sensitivity analysis results presented in Table 6.14 and 6.15; 
alternative A4 has the highest score out of the nine experiments. The overall sensitivity 
analysis results show the definition of the importance of factors and their intrinsic 
assessment in the TOPSIS model. Therefore, alternative A4 is recommended as the most 
sustainable RCO for implementation. 
Table 6.13: Sensitivity analysis experiments 
Used criteria combined weights 
Exp. 
No. 
HFP 
effectiveness 
W, 
Difficulty of 
implementing RCO 
W2 
Time required for 
implementation of RCO 
W3 
Cost for implementation 
of RCO 
W4 
0 0.4313 0.1191 0.3672 0.0825 
1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
2 0.7525 0.0825 0.0825 0.0825 
3 0.0825 0.7525 0.0825 0.0825 
4 0.0825 0.0825 0.7525 0.0825 
5 0.0825 0.0825 0.0825 0.7525 
6 0.3058 0.3058 0.3059 0.0825 
7 0.0825 0.3058 0.3058 0.3059 
8 0.4175 0.0825 0.0825 0.4175 
9 0.0825 0.4175 0.4175 0.0858 
Table 6.14: Sensitivity analysis results 
Overall score Exp. No. Conventional TOPSIS 
A A2 A3 A4 
Case study 0.4622 0.4362 0.1046 0.5378 
1 0.3495 0.3566 0.2282 0.6505 
2 0.8305 0.7965 0.1115 0.1695 
3 0.1453 0.3969 0.5380 0.8547 
4 0.0759 0.0750 0.0607 0.9241 
5 0.0862 0.1709 0.3043 0.9137 
6 0.4007 0.3971 0.1990 0.5993 
7 0.1266 0.1888 0.2501 0.8734 
8 0.4574 0.4669 0.2339 0.5426 
9 0.1177 0.1838 0.2229 0.8822 
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Table 6.15: Sensitivity analysis ranking results 
Exp. no. Rankin g 
Conventional TOPSIS 
Case study A> 4 A> A> A 
1 A4 > A> A> A3 
2 A> A> A4 A 
3 A> 4 A> A> A 
4 A> 4 A> A> A 
5 A> 4 A3 A> A 
6 A> 4 A> A> A3 
7 A> A> A> A 
8 A> A> A> A 
9 A> 4 A> A> A 
6.5 Conclusion 
The introduction of the MCDM method combining the AHP model, entropy analysis 
method and TOPSIS models enabled integrating CREAM assessment and analysis 
models. As a result, CREAM bi-directional approaches have provided a high potential 
to improve assessed human performance reliability. In this context, the beauty of the 
human performance analysis model was shown by the classification scheme groups' 
organisation and the model of cognition characteristics. Both made the analysis method 
recursive rather than strictly sequential. The method also ensured analysis consistency 
and uniformity across applications, as it contains well defined stop rules and conditions 
to determine when an analysis has come to an end, and assures that the likely insisting 
event(s) or root cause(s) affecting HFP are identified. As a result, RCO alternatives 
could be developed and adapted in CREAM BN assessment scenarios to validate their 
desired potential for reducing targeted HFP. The proposed MCDM framework features 
some obvious attractiveness in its structure, allowing experts to evaluate the developed 
alternatives RCO on the chosen criteria subjectively and objectively. The framework is 
applicable to a wide range of real-world decision making problems in MCDM. The 
built-in inconsistency checking mechanism of the proposed framework helps to identify 
inconsistencies in judgments at very early stages of the computation process. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Summary 
This chapter briefly recaps all the developed approaches and techniques for the 
adequacy of organisation reliability assessment, human performance reliability 
assessment and analysis and decision making modelling. The developed approaches 
and techniques would be of valuable benefits to the designers, managers, operators, and 
authorities associated with the marine engineering industry, in order for them to retain 
and increase the safety and profitability of marine engineering operations in maritime 
ergonomics. Nonetheless, there are areas that require further research for the 
improvement of the developed approaches and techniques, and these are outlined. 
7.1. Research contribution 
The effectiveness of safety assessment in the maritime industry has been analysed in the 
literature from various angles. Until now, research in this area has mostly been focused 
on determination of the relevant risk factors of marine incidents and accidents, of which 
erroneous human actions account for 80-90%. Knowing that the maritime industry is 
clearly dependent on human reliability, HRA can practically be used to provide the 
suitable approaches and techniques that are needed to retain the maritime industry at a 
high level of reliability. HRA has been used to inform safety and risk-based decision 
making in many industries for decades, and a range of techniques have been accepted 
for its use. Despite the fact that HRA remains a controversial area, it would deliver a 
practical, powerful, and resource-efficient approach to the assessment and improvement 
of human reliability. HRA is certainly not an easy task to perform, given the intricacies 
of human performance, and how humans can be affected by many factors in an 
operational context. 
While it is complicated to practically model operational context in its entirety, in HRA 
modelling there are levels of compromise. The first level of compromise is to identify 
the most relevant HRA method to be included in the model. The second level of 
compromise is the amount of mathematical manipulation to use. Although mathematics 
has the potential to prove general results, these results critically depend on the 
consistency of the used HRA method, mathematical model, and the rationality of the 
prior knowledge of some variables and the observations of others. Using software to 
212 
handle model inference may never lead to neat results, but it is much more robust 
against alterations. HRA probabilistic models help to formulate a proactive assessment 
and identify the underlying assumptions of human performance uncertainty. The 
selection of the most relevant and suitable probabilistic model is crucial in HRA. Expert 
judgment is basically an integral part of HRA. Therefore, appropriate expert judgment 
elicitation is critical to HRA consistency. 
The literature review has revealed that few HRA-PSA methodologies are available in 
the maritime industry. The applicability of the existing HRA methods in marine 
engineering operations needs to be studied. Thus a new HRA framework for the 
quantitative HRA in marine engineering operations has been described through the 
development of several novel HRA methods in Chapters 3,4,5 and 6. This includes the 
adequacy of organisation reliability assessment, human performance reliability 
assessment and analysis, human performance RCO evaluation, and decision making 
under uncertainty. The framework has been developed in a generic way in which 
appropriate tailoring could make it applicable to tackle any specific human, 
technological and organisational factors in marine engineering operations. In summary, 
the methods and techniques developed to support the developed framework are 
concluded as follows: 
" Generation of the BN model maps the logical relation of human, technological and 
organisational factors. This model is needed to infer the adequacy of organisation 
reliability assessment (Chapter 3). 
" Generation of the CREAM-BN probabilistic model analyses CPCs' dependency 
characteristic and the newly introduced attributes and sub attributes nodes. This 
model features the BN "divorcing" technique, used to reduce the number of possible 
combinations of CPTs of CREAM BN nodes. A FRB technique is used to structure 
the logical relation of the new attributes' evaluation grades to simplify the subjective 
CPT elicitation of COCOM-CMs' node by experts. FS theory is also used to 
transform the posterior probabilities of the control modes to a crisp HFP value 
(Chapter 4). 
" Combining the generated CREAM-BN probabilistic model with an ER technique to 
deal with the incompleteness of information, in which ER is used to synthesise the 
incomplete degrees of belief elicited by experts, as well as to aggregate the 
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symmetrical influence factors affecting the prior knowledge of CREAM-BN CPCs' 
nodes (Chapter 5). 
" Specifying a classification scheme of the CREAM performance analysis model by 
adding new organisational factors in the maritime industry (Chapter 6). 
" Formulation of a decision making technique includes AHP algorithm and entropy 
calculation for generating the combined weights of evaluation criteria of the decision 
matrix, as well as TOPSIS algorithms for synthesising the impact of the combined 
weights on the priority score of each criterion in the assessment plans of the decision 
matrix. As a result the developed alternative RCOs are prioritised. This technique 
enables DMs to select the potential RCO that would reduce the assessed HFP 
(Chapter 6). 
All the proposed approaches and methods in this thesis are developed in sequence. They 
provide an integrated approach to increase the safety and profitability of marine 
engineering operations. Figure 7.1 depicts an overall framework diagram with 
accompanying description illustrating the interrelation of developed models in a context 
of HRA process. However, individual use of the proposed methods is a matter of 
assessing each particular situation. To maintain a human action on a strategic control 
mode requires a continuum of competencies, efforts and resources that would not 
practically withstand for long. Basically, human action can be maintained on a tactical 
control mode in a normal condition. When it tends to overlap with the opportunistic 
control mode, awareness is required to conduct the human performance analysis to 
identify and monitor the phenotypes' initiating events and the possible genotype root 
cause factors. When opportunistic control mode starts to overlap with the scrambled 
mode the adequacy of organisation reliability assessment is needed to structure an 
overall organisational belief assessment. When the scrambled mode is prevalent, the 
entire HRA approach is needed to identify the phenotype initiating events and the likely 
genotype root cause factors. Accordingly, human performance RCOs could be 
developed and decision making would be thought of as an active behaviour. In this 
context, it is essential to realize that humans are capable of performing an action 
reliably with limitations. Exactly how reliable humans are depends on the situations or 
contexts under which they are operating and the consistency of the used HRA method. 
In all respects, human performance reliability bounds need to be understood. The 
human failure probability range is limited, from 1.0 (unreliable) to 1.0E-3 (quite 
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reliable). Humans are very reliable but not ultra-reliable. They are closer to 1.01: -3 than 
1.0E-6 (Spurgin, 2010). When an ultra-reliable system is required, a system of' harriers 
and controls as well as human is needed. One cannot just rely on a person to provide a 
high level of reliability. Humans make mistakes, so the system has to be designed to 
reflect what is possible. 
Task selection 
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operational problems requirement 
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developed models in a context of HRA process 
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The major contributions of the generated methods and techniques in this research focus 
on both theoretical and practical aspects. Practically, the generated methods and 
techniques appropriately measure and analyse human performance reliability and the 
adequacy of organisation reliability. In addition, they also allow the development of 
human performance RCOs and decision making procedures. Theoretically, BN 
probabilistic inference, ER synthesising, aggregation capability, and FL distinctive 
flexibility in mapping and transformation are used to represent and process context 
knowledge and uncertainty. Accordingly, decision making techniques are used to 
prioritise and select RCOs. The new methods are developed on the basis that the 
uncertainty theories and techniques can be considered to facilitate the literature 
associated with CREAM based HRA studies and decision making procedures in marine 
engineering operations. It is believed that the developed methods possess enormous 
potential as valuable aids and effective alternatives to retain and improve human 
performance in marine engineering operations, which would bring the maritime industry 
to a high level of reliability. It is also believed that these methods can be tailored to the 
practical applications of dealing with HRA in other industries, especially in situations 
where a high level of uncertainty exists. The implementation of the described 
approaches could have a highly beneficial effect in the real world. More specific 
description can be provided as follows: 
" The adequacy of organisation reliability assessment methodology provides the 
maritime managers, operators, and authority with new insights into the reliability of 
ship system factors. The uses of BN inference technique in Chapter 3 can effectively 
help to proactively evaluate the reliability of ship system factors affecting marine 
engineering operations. Accordingly, the BN inference technique would provide the 
most effective means to identify the factors, which can make a significant difference 
to the organisations improvement. The use of BN characteristics helps to structure 
the hierarchical process and the logical relationship of ship system factors and 
enables the definition of the posterior knowledge and uncertainty of each factor, 
based on the given prior knowledge and new evidence certainty. 
" The CREAM based HRA methodology enables the maritime designers, managers, 
operators and authorities to perceive the impact of the marine engineering 
operational context on human performance. The uses of BN inference, FRB 
structure, FS mapping and transformation technique in Chapter 4 can effectively help 
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to evaluate proactively the HFP of human actions in a variety of contexts. 
Accordingly, the used techniques would provide the potential for identifying the 
initiating events or root causes, which can be used to develop the RCOs needed to 
reduce HFPs. 
" The methodology for Bayesian subjective probability elicitation using the ER 
algorithm for synthesising expert's judgments is used to enhance CREAM based 
HRA methodology, where ER capability is used to synthesise the experts' 
incomplete conditional degrees of belief elicitation and to define the unknown 
probability mass. In addition, it is used to aggregate the symmetrical influence of 
factors affecting CPCs. ER synthesising and aggregation of degrees of belief masses 
and the unknown masses enable the development of the best and worst CPT 
scenarios without loss of much information. The establishment of two CREAM BN 
models modelling the best and worst CPT scenarios can be used to aggregate HFPs 
reflecting the input uncertainty. 
" The decision making methodology for improving predicted human performance 
reliability based on operational context analysis enables decision makers to select the 
potential RCO that would reduce assessed HFPs. In this methodology AHP and 
entropy algorithms are used to provide consistently combined weights of selected 
criteria in the developed TOPSIS decision making model. A TOPSIS method is used 
to prioritise the developed alternative RCOs to provide decision makers with the 
flexibility in considering their decisions regarding selecting the most relevant RCO 
that would reduce assessed HFPs. 
7.2. Implications for future research 
This research attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis based on CREAM and 
uncertainty treatment techniques to facilitate the quantitative HRA in marine 
engineering operations. Due to the time limit, the current study does not refer to the 
problem analysis, which could be desirable in further investigations. They are listed as 
follows. 
" The selection of the representative number of experts within the maritime industry is 
necessary to reduce the bias involved in the subjective judgements. Data collected 
from more experts will further validate developed models and improve their 
credibility in HRA. 
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" It will be desirable to further validate the adequacy of the organisation reliability 
assessment BN model through incorporating the data from a well established 
organisation. 
" It will be desirable to perform more test cases to further validate the developed 
methodologies for HFP assessment, analysis and mitigation. 
" It will be desirable to conduct more research studies to determine the appropriate 
fuzzy function and the defuzzifecation method that can be used to transform BN 
inferred COCOM-CMs' marginal probabilities into crisp HFP values. 
" It will be beneficial to incorporate more powerful and flexible HRA and decision 
making techniques to facilitate further the application of qualitative human reliability 
assessment methodology in marine engineering operations' knowledge and 
uncertainty assessment. 
" It would be useful if the available software for CREAM based human performance 
analysis is further developed by incorporating organisational factors. 
" Marine engineering operations are highly affected by human factors, through which 
human performance is adaptive, flexible and able to manage multi-tasks. Therefore it 
will be helpful to define the number of simultaneous tasks that humans can carry out. 
This will affect the human COCOM-CMs' reliability in specifically configured 
context situations. 
In order to deal with the limitations stated above, this research can be extended in the 
following directions. 
" To develop generic BN models for each CPC in a similar way to the one related to 
organisational reliability assessment mode in Chapter 3, imitating its main variables 
and their influences in the DAG. This extension is valid for situations that share the 
attitude of viewing a context's knowledge and uncertainty as two independent 
entities, and so treating them by means of two distinct loosely-coupled processes. 
The reasoning process handles the knowledge as if it were exact, while a parallel 
uncertainty inference process accompanies it, computing the uncertainty affecting 
each newly derived fact. Such a proactive inference mechanism can be supportive to 
establish a trend of a reactive diagnostic approach with the necessary follow-up 
measures, where available recourses can be allocated effectively. 
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" ER can be applied successively to combine any number of pieces of evidence, in 
conditions where the variables affecting CPCs are in symmetrical positions. ER uses 
belief and plausibility values to represent the evidence and the corresponding 
uncertainty. These values can represent how the uncertainty of a hypothesis can be 
reduced as more and more evidence becomes available to the system. The advantage 
of this approach is that researchers can work with incomplete and ambiguous or 
conflicting evidence without loss of any information. 
" FS can be used to map the input and output fuzzy values for the uncertainties. FRB 
can be used to structure the knowledge base and clarify the ambiguities in the human 
decision making process. When the relevant ambiguities and uncertainties of the 
variables affecting CPCs need to be properly taken into consideration, FS can be 
used to equip FRB with an explanatory interface that facilitates communication 
between the users and the FRB. This would enable the users to know how the final 
conclusion can be obtained through the FRB. 
" Conduct simulation based HRA studies for specific marine engineering tasks. These 
would enable researchers to qualitatively analyse specific task procedures and 
accordingly determine HFPs. During these studies human work load limitation can 
be defined and probabilistic models for the assessment of multi-tasks' variability 
affecting operators' workload could be developed. Human workload probabilistic 
models could also be linked to powerful modelling techniques, which model the 
reliability assessment of systems' operational components. This would provide the 
possibility of correlating the HRA models with the operational components' 
reliability assessment technique on a continuous basis, where the needs of both 
human resources and operational components can be rationally planned. 
" In the CREAM classification scheme, newly specified factors and the added 
organisational factors in this study should be further examined to satisfy the explicit 
principle of human performance analysis requirements. Such an approach can be 
combined with the classification scheme to simplify its use and ensure its robustness 
against alterations. 
" To develop a MCDM technique to be used in a complex decision making process, in 
which DMs can choose the optimal alternative RCO in a fuzzy environment, where 
the vagueness and subjectivity are handled with linguistic terms parameterised by 
fuzzy numbers. Such a technique can be effectively and continuously used to provide 
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DMs with the relevant decision based on information that has been gathered, 
modelled, and analysed. 
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Appendix 1: Conditional probability tables 
Table Al. l: Safety management system "Hirsh" CPT 
Safety management system C. P. T. % 
Management High 
uali 
Contingency 
procedures 
Performed Not performed 
Maintenance 
Performed Not performed Performed Not performed 
procedures 
Operational 
Performed 
of 
Performed 
Not Perbmwd 
Not 
Pufanned 
Not 
edmcs d L 
Effective 100 65 80 45 70 40 . 
40 Eý IS 
Ineffective 0 35 20 55 30 60 60 85 
. e_e_ý.. _-----"'__" _. _. _..... ý _.. a+ 
Safety mann ements system C. P. T. 
Management Low 
quality 
Contingency 
Performed Not perfofined procedures 
Maintenance Performed Not performed Performed Not Perform procedures 
ýeaý 
Performed 
Not 
PC *m d 
Not Performed 
Not PerRxtned Not 
mt d a 
Effective 85 60 60 30 55 20 35 0 
Ineffective 15 40 40 70 45 80 65 100 
. n... __.:.....:.. __ý .. ý. ý.. _, . <v:.. ý+, 
O uisationalstructure C. P. T. % 
Management quality Hi 
Communication 
Or isational culture 
Effective 
Ac uired Not acouired 
ineffective 
A uired Not acquired 
Objective and strategy Clear Not clear Clear Not clear Clear Not clear Clear Not clear 
Effective 100 85 85 60 70 40 30 20 
Ineffective 0 15 15 40 30 60 70 80 
Table Al. 4: Organisational structure "Low' CFI 
Management quality 
Communication I 
Or isational culture Ac uired 
Objective and strate Clear Not clc 
Effective 80 70 
Ineffective 20 30 
Table Al. 5: Resources management "High" CPI 
Management quality 
Human resources 
Equipment and records Effectiv. 
Condition monitoring and reliable performance control re 
Effective 100 
Ineffective 0 
Table A1.6: Resources management "Low' CPT 
O niaatknal structure C. P. T. X 
Management quality Low 
Communication Effective ineffec tive 
Or isational culture 
Objective and strategy 
Acquired 
Clear Not clear 
Not acquired 
Clear Not clear 
Ac wired 
Clear Not clear 
Not 
Clear 
uircd 
Not clear 
Effective 80 70 60 30 40 15 15 0 
Ineffective 20 30 40 70 60 85 85 100 
Resources mane emeat C. P. T. % 
Management quality Hi 
Human resources Sufficient Insufficient 
Equipment and records Effective Ineffective Effective Ineffective 
Condition monitoring and 
performance control reliable 
Not 
reliable reliable 
Not reliable reliable 
Not 
reliable reliable 
Not 
reliable 
Effective 100 75 To- 40 85 20 55 15 
Ineffective 0 25 10 60 IS 80 45 85 
Resources maaa emeot C. P. T. 7ý. 
Management quality Lo w 
Human resources 
Equipment and records 
Sufficient 
Effective Ineffective 
Insuffi 
Effective 
cient 
Ineffective 
Condition monitoring and 
-performance 
control reliable 
Not 
reliable reliable 
Not 
reliable reliable 
Not 
reliable 
reliable 
Not 
reliable 
Effective 85 45 80 15 60 10 25 0 
Ineffective 15 55 20 85 40 90 75 100 
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Table A 1.7: Management quality CPT 
Management quality C. P. T. (%) 
Controls Effective Ineffe ctive 
Policies Clear Not clear Clear Not clear 
Standards Adopted Not ado ted ted Adopted Not a Adopted Not adopted Adopted Na adopted 
High 100 60 0 80 2 80 20 40 0 
Low 0 40 20 80 20 80 60 100 
Controls 
Policies Cie 
Standards Adopted I 
High 100 
Low 0 
Table A1,8: Human resources CPT 
Knowledge 
Skill 
Motivation 
Sufficient 
Insufficient 
Table A1.9: "Controls" CPT 
Reactive co 
Proactive ct 
Efl 
met 
Hunan resources C. P. T. ". L 
Knowledge Good Pour 
Skill Hi Low Hi Low 
Motivation Hi Low High Low Histh Low High Low 
Sufficient 
ý4 
100 75 70 20 80 30 25 0 
Insufficient 0 25 30 80 20 70 75 100 
Controls C. P. T. (%) 
Reactive control measures Good Poor 
Proactive control measures Good Poor Good Poor 
Effective 100 50 50 0 
Ineffective 0 so 50 100 
Table A1.10: "Equipment and records" CPT 
Eau! mentand recors C. P. T. (%) 
Availability' Hi Low 
Quality High Low High Low 
Effective 100 60 40 0 
Ineffective 0 40 60 100 
Table Al. 11. "Condition monitorinx and performance control" CPT 
Condition monitorirr and performance control C. P. T. (%) 
Availability' Hi Low 
Trust High Low Hi Low 
Reliable 100 60 40 0 
Not reliably 0 40 60 100 
Table Al. 12: "Organisational culture" CPT 
Organisational culture C. P. T. % 
Norm Committed Not committed 
Safety culture Committed Not committed Committed Not committed 
Acquired 100 50 50 0 
Not acquired 0 50 50 100 
i Table A 1.13: "Norm" CPT 
Norm C. P. T. (%) 
Management commitment Hi Low 
Crew involvement High Low High Low 
Committed 100 50 50 0 
Not committed 0 50 50 100 
Table Al. 14: "Safety culture" CPT 
Sa fe culture C. P. T. M 
Management commitment Hi sth LOW 
Crew involvement High Low Hi Low 
Committed 100 50 50 0 
Not committed 0 50 50 100 
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Appendix 2: The main /sub attributes CPTs 
Table A2.1: Operator preparedness CPT 
ODCMOr CPT °h No. Adequacy of training and expertise Availability of procedures/ plans Inappropriate Acceptable Appropriate 
1 Inadequate Inappropriate 100 0 0 
2 Inadequate Acceptable 66.7 33.3 0 
3 Inadequate Appropriate 33.4 33.3 33.3 
4 Adequate with limited experience Inappropriate 33.3 66.7 0 
5 Adequate with limited ex rience Acceptable 33.3 66.7 0 
6 Adequate with limited experience Appropriate 0 33.3 66.7 
7 Adequate with hi experience Inappropriate 33.4 33.3 33.3 
8 Adequate with high experience Acceptable 0 33.3 66,7 
9 Adequate with high ex rience Appropriate 0 0 100 
Table A2.2: Working environments CPT 
Workinst environments CPT % No. 
Adequacy of working culture _ Adequacy of Perception conditions Inappropriate Acceptable Appropriate 
1 Inappropriate inappropriate 100 0 0 
2 Inappropriate Acc table 50 50 0 
3 Inappropriate Appropriate 50 0 50 
4 Acceptable inappropriate 50 50 0 
5 Acceptable Acceptable 0 100 0 
6 Acceptable Appropriate 0 50 50 
7 Appropriate Inappropriate 50 0 50 
8 Appropriate Acceptable 0 50 50 
99 Appropriate Appropriate 0 0 100 
Table A2.3: Adequacy of perception of conditions CPT 
Adequacy of tion of conditions CPT % 
No. Adjusted 
working 
conditions 
Adequacy of man- 
machine interface MMI 
and operational support 
Skill 
Time of the day Inappropriate Acceptable Appropriate 
1 Ina ro rate p Ina r rate Day-time (adjusted) 100 0 0 
2 Inappropriate Inap ro rate Night-time PM (unadjusted) 100 0 0 
3 Inappropriate Inappropriate Night-time AM (unadjusted) 100 0 0 
4 Inappropriate Tolerable Day-time (adjusted) 80 20 0 
5 Inappropriate Tolerable Night-time PM unadjusted 80 20 0 
6 Inappropriate Tolerable Night-time AM unadjusted 80 20 0 
7 Inappropriate Adequate Day-time adjusted 66.7 33.3 0 
8 Inappropriate Adequate Night-time PM (unadjusted) 66.7 33.3 0 
9 Inappropriate Adequate Night-time AM (unadjusted) 66.7 33.3 0 
10 Inappropriate Supportive Da -time (adjusted) 50 
50 0 
1I Inappropriate Supportive Night-time PM (unadjusted) 50 50 0 
12 Inappropriate Supportive Night-time AM (unadjusted) 50 50 0 
13 Acceptable Inappropriate Da -time (adjusted) 70 30 0 14 Acceptable Ina ro rate Night-time PM (unadjusted) 70 30 0 
15 Acceptable Inappropriate Night-time AM unadjusted 70 30 0 
16 Acceptable Tolerable Da -time adjusted 33.3 
66.7 0 
17 Acceptable Tolerable Night-time PM (unadjusted) 33.3 66.7 0 
18 Acceptable Tolerable Night-time AM (unadjusted) 33.3 33.7 0 
19 Acceptable Adequate Day-time (adjusted) 33.3 33.7 0 
20 Acceptable Adequate Ni t-time PM unadjusted 33.3 33.7 0 
21 Acceptable Adequate Night-time AM (unadjusted) 33.3 33.7 0 
22 Acceptable Supportive Day-time (adjusted) 0 30 70 
23 Acceptable Supportive Night-time PM (unadjusted) 0 30 70 
24 Acceptable Support iire Night-time AM unadjusted 0 30 70 
25 Appropriate Inappropriate Da -time (adjusted) 0 50 50 
26 Appropriate Inappropriate Night-time PM (unadjusted) 0 50 50 
27 Appropriate Inappropriate Night-time AM (unadjusted) 0 50 50 
28 Appropriate Tolerable Day-time (adjusted) 0 333 66.7 
29 Appropriate Tolerable Night-time PM unadjusted 0 33.3 66.7 
30 Appropriate Tolerable Night- me AM una 'usted 0 33.3 66.7 
31 A ro riate Adequate Day-time adjusted 0 20 80 
32 Appropriate Adequate Night-time PM (unadjusted) 0 20 80 
33 _ Appropriate Adequate Ni ; ht-time AM (unadjusted) 0 20 80 
34 Appropriate Supportive Day-time (adjusted) 0 0 100 
35 Appropriate Supportive Night-time PM (unadjusted) 0 0 100 
36 Appropriate Supportive Ni t-time AM unadjusted 0 0 100 
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Table A. 2.4: Adequacy of working culture CPT 
Adequacy of workincultureCPT'Yo 
No. Adequacy of organisation Adjusted Crew collaboration 
quality 
Inappropriate Acceptable Appropriate 
I Deficient Deficient 100 0 0 
2 Deficient Inefficient 50 50 0 
3 Deficient Efficient 75 25 0 
4 Deficient Very Efficient 33.4 33.3 313 
5 Inefficient Deficient 100 0 0 
6 Inefficient Inefficient 50 50 0 
7 Inefficient Efficient 50 50 0 
8 Inefficient Very Efficient 0 50 50 
9 Efficient Deficient 50 50 0 
10 Efficient Inefficient 33.3 66.7 0 
11 Efficient Efficient 25 75 0 
12 Efficient Very Efficient 0 0 100 
13 Very Efficient Deficient 33.4 33.3 33.3 
14 Very Efficient Inefficient 0 75 25 
15 Very Efficient Efficient 0 25 75 
16 Very Efficient Very Efficient 0 0 100 
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